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Abstract
Social Order and Contest in Meanings and Power:
Black Boycotts against Korean Shopkeepers
in Poor Black New York City Neighborhoods
by
JEONGDUK YI
Advisor: Professor Gerald Sider
This dissertation aims to provide an analysis of the
process of social reproduction revealed through the conflict
between Korean sopkeepers and poor Black inner city
residents in New York City.

The major concepts, discussed

in the introduction, include culture, power, domination,
resistance, and conceptual orders.
The pervasive racism and capitalism in America provides
the context where the two minority groups have been
constituted and! where opposing meanings are contested as the
conflict between Korean shopkeepers and poor Blacks
develops.

State agents, Whites, and news media also join in

the process of the conflict.

They contest with various

combinations of coercion, persuasion, protest, and
argumentations for the maintenance or change of the existing
social relationships.
With further theoretical discussion on the conflict,
the multidimensionality of social orders, the relationship
between conceptual orders and social reproduction, and the
interconnection among meanings, power, and economic
relationships are discussed in the conclusion.
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INTRODUCTION
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The anthropologists have shown us that cultural
forms - as "determinate orderings" of things,
behavior, and ideas - do play a demonstrable role
in the management of human interaction. What will
be required of us in the future is not to deny
that role, but to understand more precisely how
cultural forms work to mediate social
relationships among particular populations. (Wolf
1982:19)
The core of culture is the form and manner in
which people perceive, define, articulate, and
express their mutual relations. (Sider 1986:120)
The word is the ideological phenomenon par
excellence. (Volosinov 1986:13)
...the maintenance of categories upholds power,
and power maintains the order of the world. (Wolf
1990:593)

Aims of the Research
This dissertation aims to illustrate processes of
social reproduction as revealed through the conflict between
two social groups in New York City.

I use the concept of

social reproduction as the reproduction or maintenance of
social order despite challenges to it.

Specifically, this

dissertation will discuss how two groups in different
economic positions came into opposition, how they
conceptualize the conflict between them, and how they
contest meanings and power in the context of wider society.
The escalation of the conflict between Korean shopkeepers
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and the poor Black inner city residents during 1988-1990 in
New York City provides a good opportunity to examine how
people challenge existing social relationships and how state
agents such as politicians, public officials, law enforcers,
and involved groups deploy their cultural and political
efforts to change, compromise, and maintain existing social
relationships.
However, because they contest in historically product 1
social conditions, it is important to understand how
structural limitation of the playing fields for both poor
Blacks and Korean shopkeepers have been constructed through
history.

In order to understand these historical and

structural backgrounds of the conflict between two groups, I
will also examine how a poor Black neighborhood was
constructed in Harlem, how the Blacks in Harlem historically
experienced the conflict with alien shopkeepers, why Koreans
immigrated and settled in urban neighborhoods, and how they
opened and expanded their business in poor Black
neighborhoods.

Because these processes have been closely

related to American racism and capitalism, I will also
consider the context of American racism and capitalism in
discussing poor Black residents and Korean shopkeepers.
By discussing the historically constructed social
conditions for social groups and the process of their
conflict and its connection to wider social context,

this

dissertation aims to contribute to the theoretical
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discussion of the process of the reproduction of social
orders and to the discussion of American social dynamics,
especially to the interconnection between racism and
capitalism.
In order to achieve these aims, I will focus on two
things in this introduction.

In sections of the first half

of this introduction, I will discuss general conceptual
tools which are necessary for the theoretical
conceptualizations of the process of social reproduction.
In sections of the second half, I will specifically focus on
the more concrete frameworks which are directly related to
the understanding of the conflict between Korean shopkeepers
and poor Blacks.

Therefore, sections in the first half

address the relationships between culture and power, between
domination and resistance, and between social order and
conceptual order.

Sections in the second half shall

consider the economic positions of Korean shopkeepers and
poor Black residents, their racial conceptions befpre the
conflict between the two groups, my motivations in selecting
this topic and a field area for this dissertation, and the
collection of my data.

Culture and Power
Most anthropologists think about culture.
culture?

What is

Culture which had meant in its early uses "the

tending of...

crops or animals" became a metaphor for the
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cultivation of the mind (Williams 1976:76-82).

In

eighteenth-century Germany, Herder provided an
anthropological turn for the conceptualization of culture.
Herder used 'cultures' in the plural: the particular
characteristics of different groups, nations, and periods.
Thus, a culture was used for a culture of a specific nation
or period.

Tylor (1871) and Boas (1920; see also 1940) used

cultures in this context, and the concept of culture as a
particular way of life of a specific group has been well
established in anthropology.
However, traditional conceptualizations of culture in
anthropology are very limited in explaining cultural
dynamics, because their conceptualizations of culture give
insufficient attention to problems of power and social
conflict (Wolf 1982:afterword).

Even those who paid

attention to power and social conflict in understanding
culture limited their analytical understanding to
equilibrium systems (e.g. Leach 1954; Gluckman 1955) or to
individual interactions (Turner 1957; Barth 1959; Cohen
1974).
The equilibrium model does not explain historical
change.

The interactional understanding of power is very

limited because this model ignores organizational and
structural dimensions of power.

According to W o l f (1990),

four different modes of power can be ascertained: individual
endowment in the play of power; imposition of one's will on
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others in interpersonal relationships;

controls within the

setting (organizational power); and the ability to structure
the settings themselves (structural power).

If we primarily

focus on individual interaction in understanding power,
neither structural power which shapes the social field of
action nor organizational power which sets up relationships
among people through allocation and control of resources and
rewards come into our view (Wolf 1990).
The various dimensions of power cannot be ignored when
we understand culture, because, as Wolf (1990:593) suggests,
Power is implicated in meaning through its role in
upholding one version of significance as true,
fruitful, or beautiful, against other possibilities
that may threaten truth, fruitfulness, or beauty. All
cultures, however conceived, carve out significance and
try to stabilize it against possible alternatives.
In another dimension, a problem for the traditional
conceptualizations of culture is that the integration,
boundedness, uniqueness, and to a lesser degree,
independence from other social dimensions of each culture
were assumed a priori.

This conception of culture, in fact,

came into existence when European nations contended for
dominance or for separate identities and independence and
"[t]he notion of separate and integral cultures responded to
this political project” (Wolf 1982:387).

The vestiges of

this conceptualization of culture in the specific European
political environment were carried over to anthropology.
order to overcome this problem and to reflect the social
reality of "historically changing, imperfectly bounded,
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multiple and branching social alignments," Wolf (1982:387)
suggests us to replace "the concept of a fixed, unitary, and
bounded culture" with "a sense of the fluidity and
permeability of cultural sets."
The concepts of cultural sets or cultural forms provide
conceptual tools free from the a priori assumptions of the
concept of culture in anthropology.

If we continue to use

culture as an integrated totality, this concept of culture
inherently limits the possibility to examine the diverse,
contradictory, permeable, and inconsistent elements in
culture because the paradigm of the traditional conception
of culture will render those elements trivial and
meaningless.
In order to avoid the limitation of traditional
concepts of culture in anthropology, my dissertation will
focus not on culture per se, but certain cultural sets,
especially meanings, which can make us possible to approach
the fluidity of cultural dynamics.

These meanings are not

to be considered as the precise and fixed meanings.

They

may be generated, assembled, ensembled, changed, modified,
distorted, and discarded in the process of concrete social
interactions (Wolf 1982:385-391).

As Moreman (1988:97)

mentions, "meaning is situated, not abstract; enacted, not
embodied; negotiated, not decoded; consequential, not prior,
to use; and not exclusively referential."

This

understanding of cultural sets is important for analyzing
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the process of social reproduction, because this approach
makes the dynamics process of cultural sets, in connection
to the dynamics or other social dimensions, come into our
view.

Domination and Resistance
The turn toward power in understanding culture, or vice
versa, which influences recent anthropologists came from
Marxist traditions(e.g. Gramsci 1971; Thompson 1963;
Williams 1977), especially for political-economic
anthropologists, and from poststructuralism (e.g. Foucault
1978; 1979; 1980), especially for feminist and post
modernist anthropologists.
most systemic —

Among them, Gramsci provides the

but scattered and often inconsistent —

conceptual tools to approach the complex interlocking
relationships between state and civil society, and between
power and culture.
Gramsci distinguishes "rule"

Idominio )

from "hegemony."

Rule is a direct political form while hegemony is "a more
complex interlocking of political, social and cultural
forces" (Williams 1977:108).
relates culture to power.

Thus, the concept of hegemony

For Williams, hegemony is never

total nor exclusive and forms of alternative or oppositional
politics and culture exist in any society.1

These

1 Foucault also states a similar view.
"Where there is a
power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently,
this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in
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oppositional features are also indicative "of what the
hegemonic process2 has in practice had to work to control"
(Williams 1977:113).

This conceptualization of hegemony

emphasizes the various processes producing consent from the
dominated.

In this sense, the hegemonic process is a good

conceptual tool to analyze the process of making consent
even in a society where the achieved moral leadership does
not exist.
However, the concept of hegemony can overemphasize the
possibility of consent3 because the concept directs our
concerns toward the possibility of achieving consent through

relation to power"

(Foucault 1978:95-96).

2 While Foucault would put power here instead of "hegemonic
process," Bourdieu would put domination. It seems to me
that Foucaultian conception of power already incorporates
the hegemonic process in it. Thus, Foucault can discuss the
hegemonic process without the concept of hegemony.
However,
because Foucault, in his conceptualization of power, ignores
the role of the material conditions in constituting social
relations, knowledge, and subjectivity, his conceptual
framework is not adequate for understanding social
reproduction. (For a concise explanation of the Foucaultian
concept of power, see Digeser 1992.)
In contrast, Bourdieu
tries to connect culture, politics, and class.
In his
conceptualization of domination, Bourdieu (1977:183-197)
argues that cultural forms are inherent elements of the
reproduction of domination.
3 At the time of Gramsci, 97% of the population in Italy
was Catholic and even Gramsci's mother considered Gramsci as
a poor atheist(Germino 1990).
The tremendous impact of
Catholicism in Italian social dynamics might have been the
major subject which Gramsci wanted to wrestle through the
concept of hegemony. Thus, in understanding the concept of
hegemony, the peculiarity of the Italian society should be
considered.
His division between the East and the West does
not solve the problem, because the variations among the East
or the West also require further explanation.
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various cultural mechanisms while the concept directs us
possibly to belittle various faces of direct political (or
dominating) mechanisms including explicit and implicit, as
well as direct and indirect, use of force, coercion,
pressure, constraint, and influence.

As Abercrombie, Hill

and Turner(1980) and Scott(1985; 1990) show, even though the
process of manufacturing consent may exist in a society, the
real consent may not be successfully produced.

Moreover,

the dominant classes do not necessarily need consent in
ruling or directing a society.
I would argue that while the hegemony of the dominant
may exist in certain sections of a society, it may not exist
as strongly, or at all, in other sections.

Even though

hegemony is not necessarily achieved over certain social
sections, the research on the hegemonic process will reveal
how relations between particular groups are mediated through
interlocking social, cultural, and political relationships.
However, the attention to both the hegemonic process and
direct political process should be balanced in order to
avoid the possibility of misdirecting our concerns toward
one aspect of social dynamics, and while ignoring the other.
Resistance provides a good window to examine the
mechanism of power, which includes the hegemonic process and
the direct political process.

The dynamics of power become

clearer during the acts of containing and defusing
resistance through interlocking cultural and political
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mechanisms.

Resistance not only reveals the complex faces

of power, but also alters the faces of power, because the
dominant groups must deploy the new or adapted faces of
power in order to contain or accommodate new phases of
resistance.

Thus studies on resistance can analyze the

continuous shift of the faces of both power (Abu-Lughod
1990 j41), and the resistance manifested both in culture and
politics and through their interconnections.
The conceptual framework of domination/resistance,
discussed above, directed this researcher to pay close
attention to the various political and hegemonic processes
not only in civil society but also in relation to state
agents during the conflict between poor Blacks and Korean
shopkeepers.

Previous discussion of the conflict between

poor Blacks and Korean shopkeepers ignored this complex
political process by focusing on the different communication
styles of the two groups (Stewart 1989), by presenting
Blacks and Koreans as similar minorities (Chang 1990), or by
focusing on the economic dimension of Korean shopkeepers
(Light and Bonacich 1988).

Conceptual Orders and Social Contests
The web of meanings is a fundamental aspect of human
life (Geertz 1973).

The web of meanings

with "conceptions of the world"

provides people

(Gramsci 1971), "a sense of

the reality" (Williams 1977), or a "symbolic universe"
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(Berger 1966) which guides people in how to live and how to
interpret the world.

As Peter Berger (1966) suggests, the

phenomenon of actual reality is too complex to experience
meaningfully without some guiding and filtering frameworks.
Thus, classificatory systems and/or symbolic categories
guide us to organize the myriad reality into a relatively
orderly and meaningful reality.
However, these guiding and filtering frameworks should
be considered as tools to grasp and organize reality rather
than as a framework to arbitrarily structure the
representation of reality.

That is, frameworks are used in

a continuous interaction with the reality and can be
transformed, discarded, and replaced with other ones.
However, in the process of grasping and organizing reality,
the frameworks influence not only our cognition of reality
but also our moral order of reality.
Douglas (1966) shows that classificatory systems are
not only classifying myriad things and organizing them into
an orderly reality but also putting them into a moral
framework.

Thus, the classification system is an organizing

tool for reality and also for morality at the same time.
According to her, what does not fit into existing rules or
classificatory systems is described by a society as dirty,
polluted, or dangerous.

By eliminating or punishing the

boundary transgression, the reality and rightness of
original rules or classificatory systems are restored and
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confirmed.

While Douglas limits her focus to the boundary

crisis, Bourdieu goes further and considers some
classificatory systems themselves as a reproductive
mechanism of class relations.
According to Bourdieu (1977a; 1977b; 1984; 1991),
access to different kinds of cultural capital such as
language, attitudes, education, consumption, and lifestyle
is determined by one's class position, and differentiations
in cultural capital reproduce these social inequalities.
That is, cultural capital or symbolic differentiation
justifies hierarchical exclusionary practices, and mutes the
critique against existing social hierarchy.

Classificatory

systems of myriad symbolic acts, words, and objects are also
the result of the active manipulation of symbols by the
upper class.

By emphasizing the distinction of the upper

class and by the devaluing of the culture of other groups,
the differential meanings of various lifestyles justify a
social hierarchy (Bourdieu 1984).
But Bourdieu does not clearly explain how existing
classificatory orders are internalized or rejected.

He also

ignores implicit and explicit resistance or disagreement
over the classification among different classes (Joppke
1986).

In order to explain the social struggle over signs,

Volosinov (1986) proposes the concept of multiaccentuality
where "differently oriented social interests" intersect.
"By and large, it is thanks to this intersecting of accents
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that a sign maintains its vitality and dynamism and the
capacity for further development.

A sign that has been

withdrawn from pressures of the social struggle...
inevitably loses force..."(Volosinov 1986:23).

In other

words, because accents in meanings of signs are challenged,
contested, and disciplined, accents in meanings are in a
state of constant tension.

However, "differently oriented

social interests" produce tension not only in accents of
meanings but also in claims and assertions.

This tension

may be negotiated through compromise or heightened through
antagonistic confrontations among differently oriented
social groups.
This logic can also be applied to classificatory
orders.

Classificatory orders are under "pressures of the

social struggle."

Because "the creation of conceptual order

is also, constitutively, the suppression of aspects of
reality"

(Valeri 1985:xi, quoted in Wolf 1990:593), power

holders should assault or suppress rival categorical claims
in order to maintain their conceptual order.

That is,

classificatory orders that justify an existing social
hierarchy can be maintained only when rival conceptual
orders or claims can be oppressed.

Thus, signs and

classificatory systems have to be seen as the sites where
disciplinary acts for domination, and resistance toward
dominant accents clash.
This conceptual framework for the relationship between
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classificatory systems and domination/resistance has very
important implications for the understanding of the conflict
between poor Black residents and Korean shopkeepers because
I found, through my preliminary research, that the
hierarchial conceptualizations of racial order and
individual virtues are the most important sites of struggles
for the both groups.

Loewen's The Mississippi Chinese(19711

clearly showed that the conceptualization of racial
hierarchy was very important for the dynamics and change of
the economic and social relationships among Blacks, Chinese,
and Whites in the Mississippi Delta area.

However, in

studies about the conflict between Black residents and
Korean shopkeepers (Chang 1990? I. Kim 1981; Light and
Bonacich 1988; Stewart 1989), the role of the hierarchical
conceptualizations of racial order and individual virtues
was totally ignored.
The conceptual orders of racial hierarchy and
individual virtues in certain groups develop within
historical and social contexts.

The historical and social

contexts of the hierarchical conceptions of racial order
between Blacks and Whites will be discussed in chapters 2,
6, and 7; I will briefly explain here the concepts of racial
order Korean immigrants brought with them from Korea to
America. This is important for understanding the context of
their present conception of racial order which is one of the
major sites of struggle between poor Blacks and Korean
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shopkeepers.

The present concepts of racial order of Korean

shopkeepers in relation to Blacks will be discussed in
chapter 6.

However, in order to contextualize the political

and cultural dimensions of the conflict between Korean
shopkeepers and poor Blacks in American society, I will
discuss their material conditions in America first.

Their

political and cultural conditions will be discussed in the
subsequent chapters.

The Material Conditions of the Existence of Shopkeepers
The following abstract presentation of the social
relationships of shopkeepers in this section is an effort to
provide a conceptual framework with which I can approach
more concrete socio-cultural relationships and dynamics in a
definite social and historical moment.

Since culture

mediates social relationships, especially, the relationships
of production and appropriation, the understanding of the
relationships of production and appropriation is an
important first step for analyzing the implications of
various cultural sets or forms.

Thus, this section should

be understood not as a result of data analysis but as a
conceptual construction to help the analysis of the data.
The human species has,

"in the course of evolution,

acquired the ability to transform nature to human use"
1982:74).

(Wolf

In the process of production and consumption,

human beings organize themselves.

In capitalist societies,
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most products and even human labor are commodified and put
into circulation.

Commodities are distributed through

wholesalers and retailers which include capitalist
distributors such as Wal-Mart or Price Club and small
retailers such as "mom and pop" stores.

This distribution

is for individual consumption through which individual
households and individuals reproduce themselves.4 Because
individual and collective consumption reproduces labor
power, this process is a critical moment of capitalist
reproduction.
Exchanges of commodities for individual consumption are
at the core of the economic relationship of shopkeepers.

In

capitalist societies, these exchanges are a part of the
circulation of commodities in the process of realization of
surplus value or profit.

Their main social relationships

can be diagrammed as below.

Importers— Wholesalers— Industrial Capitalists
Landlords
Bankers
/
\
-State Agents
Other Shopkeepers-Shop! ceepers
\
Shoplifters, Robbers, et c .
Workers
Consumers

4 Collective consumption such as health care, education,
transportation, and housing, often organized and produced by
state systems, are also necessary for the reproduction of
labor power. For the detailed discussion of individual and
collective consumptions and their implication in social
reproduction, see Dickinson and Russell (1986).
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This diagram is an abstract model for the social
relationships of shopkeepers.

However, this diagram

implies the stratification of the relationships.
capital are on top.

Those with

Shopkeepers are in the middle.

have small capital and also work by themselves.

They

0$ the

bottom, workers, consumers, and shoplifters are located
closely.

The common character through them is that they all

have labor to sell.

The diagram also implies that consumers

are usually workers and, shoplifters are usually consumers.
However, in concrete reality, the social relationships of
shopkeepers can vary.
In the U.S., the distribution system of commodities is
dominated by capitalists who own department stores, discount
stores, supermarket chains, and franchise stores.

Many

small store owners focus on the area where capitalists have
problems in expanding their distribution systems.

The areas

include labor-intensive small business (labor control
problem), businesses with small markets or demands
(unprofitable for capitalists), and inner city areas (too
high a crime rate for capitalists risk).

Many Korean

shopkeepers risk the high crime rate and move into inner
city areas because of their limited choices and relatively
strong resources for small business as a form of "dirty
work" and "cheap labor"

(Light and Bonacich 1988).

The major everyday interaction of shopkeepers is the
interaction with consumers.

Through the exchange of money

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19
and commodities with consumers, shopkeepers earn their own
profit and pay to wholesalers and landlords.

When

shopkeepers cannot sell enough for their profit, they simply
close their stores.

Because of their small amount of

capital, the survival rate of small businessmen is low.
Nearly half of all new small business ventures fail within
five years.

In order to avoid failure and to increase

profit, small businesses rely on various strategies to
secure their profits.

They may work long hours themselves,

use cheap labor, and exploit consumers.
The urban poor have problems in their reproduction
because of their lack of income.

During the 1970s and

1980s, the flight of American capital to foreign countries,
the internal relocation of capital from the Northeastern
area to the South, and the loss of competitiveness of many
American industries pushed more people into low-wage service
industries in Northeastern cities than before (Rodwin and
Sazanami 1989).

In the case of New York City, the number of

manufacturing jobs dropped 35% during the 1970s alone
(Sassen-Koob 1985:302).

The reduction of welfare during the

Reagan and Bush administration further deteriorate^ the life
of the urban poor (New York Times. Jan. 27, 1991).

The

problems in everyday reproduction of the lives of the poor
increased tension in their family relationships and other
social relationships.

During the same period, new

immigrants to metropolitan areas provided cheap laborers and
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kept many urban poor out of employment.

Some other

immigrants such as Korean immigrants rapidly expanded their
small businesses in the inner-city areas during the same
period.

The transaction between poor Blacks and Korean

shopkeepers is not only the place for an economic
relationship between the two groups but also the place of
the mediation of racial relationship.

History of Racial Conceptions
Korea has been a country with one ethnic group for over
a millennium.5

Even though the majority of Koreans' did not

have direct experiences with other ethnic or racial groups
before the turn of the century, they were aware of the other
nations surrounding the Korean peninsula.

They

conceptualized those nations in a hierarchical order.

The

Chinese - from whom Koreans adopted various social and
cultural elements - occupied the top of this racial
hierarchy.

Because Koreans believed themselves to be more

civilized than any other nations except the Chinese, they
considered Manchurians, Japanese, and other East Asian
nations inferior to Koreans.

Similarly, Koreans dismissed

Whites as vancrvi [Western barbarians] until the late 19th
5 Because Korea has been an one-nation state for almost two
thousand years, they have not developed the concepts such as
'ethnicity.' Because of this situation, there is also no
clear definition of race or ethnicity in Korean language.
Inchong [race] often connotes not only race but also nation.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21
century.
But from the mid and late 19th century, Koreans were
shocked by the military power of the supposedly inferior
vanovi [Western barbarians] and waenom [Japs].

This

disturbed the Korean conception of racial hierarchy.
Because of Japan's brutal domination and occupation of
Korean until 1945, Koreans developed and still maintain a
great hostility toward the Japanese.

The prestige of the

Chinese in the Korean conception of racial order also
declined because of the miserable humiliation of China by
the Western power during the 19th century.
From the turn of the century, Whites clearly occupied a
better position in the Korean conception of racial hierarchy
because of their military power and civilization, which was
eventually considered superior to the Chinese and Korean
civilizations.

Koreans also realized that Whites6

controlled the world with superior economic and political
power.

Because Koreans who were educated in America have

dominated South Korea since 1945, and because the Korean
media and

education system describe White civilization as

superior, Koreans still consider Whites to be the most
prestigious race.
The image of Blacks eventually came to occupy the
6 Whites include peoples in America and Europe.
It does
not come into view clearly to Koreans that many Blacks are
also living in America and Europe. Because of the close
relationship between America and Korea for the last 50
years, Whites are usually represented by American Whites.
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bottom in Korean racial conception.

Television networks in

Korea broadcast American programs almost every week, and
American movies dominate the Korean movie market.
Certainly, Korean people notice from these programs that the
dominant characters are mostly White, and that most Blacks
are often depicted as a lower class or as violent criminals.
They also know from television news programs and
newspapers that the most powerful people in America and in
the world are typically Whites, while famines and "tribal"
wars are frequent in Africa.
coming from

Thus, they perceive Whites as

"civilized" countries superior to Korea, and

view Blacks as coming from "tribal" or "primitive" African
countries inferior to Korea.

These images easily translate

into a racial hierarchy.
The image of Blacks for Koreans remains vague but
negative.

Koreans do not cognitively separate the images of

Blacks in America and in Africa.7

The images of Whites in

7 Many Korean immigrants expressed that they did not know,
when they came to America, that there are so many Blacks in
America.
Because they were accustomed only to the White
image of America, the large size of Black population in
America was a surprise for many Korean immigrants.
However,
because the increasing conflict between Korean shopkeepers
and Black Americans are frequently reported in Korea,
Koreans in Korea may now clearly aware of the presence of
Blacks in America but may have more negative images of
Blacks. (Korean newspapers in Korea depicted Black
boycotters as "reverse racists" against new Korean
immigrants.)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23
Europe, in America, and in Australia are also mixed.8
Koreans are not accustomed to the cohabitation of several
races or ethnic groups in the same country.

Accordingly,

Korean immigrants come to America with only a very vague
notion of what a multi-ethnic country is.

However, they

bring from Korea conceptions of a racial hierarchy where
Whites are "superior" and "developed" while Blacks are
"inferior" and "primitive."
Before large number of Koreans entered poor Black
neighborhoods, Blacks had similarly vague ideas about
Koreans.

First of all, the differences between Koreans,

Chinese, and Japanese were and still are not clear to many
of them; many Blacks simply consider all of them as Asians.
The position of Asians in American racial conceptions yet is
not clearly defined in American racial conceptions yet.
A considerable number of Black adults were directly
exposed to Korea when they fought there during the Korean
Civil War, 1950-1953.

Poverty prevails the image of Korea

because of the image of Korea during the Korean Civil War
and on the T.V. program, "MASH."

Even though many Blacks

thought Korea of a poor country, they might not have had a
clear negative image of Koreans.

When Korean immigrants

first appeared in Harlem in the late 1970s, some Blacks

8 Because of the White image of America (Whiteness also
means wealth for many Koreans), the existence of many poor
White Americans is also a surprise for many Korean
immigrants.
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considered Koreans to be a third world people just like
Blacks.

However, others believed Koreans to be inferior in

racial status because Korea was a very poor and undeveloped
country.
During the subsequent conflict, both poor Blacks and
Korean shopkeepers concertized and reformulated their
conceptions of racial order based on their historical
beliefs and new experiences about each other in a White
dominated American society.

Research Concerns and Methods
My research was a process of continual dialogue with
myself about the social location of urban shopkeepers.
Before I came to the United States to attend a doctoral
program at CUNY in 1985, I had some interest in the
ambiguous social position of urban petty producers. However,
my main concern was the transformation of the labor process
and organization and its implications for politics and
culture.
When I worked in Korean stores as a part-timer in 1985
and 1986, I also gathered information about Korean
shopkeepers.

At the time, my question focused on how the

Korean shopkeepers managed work processes in their stores,
disciplined workers, and manipulated meanings in the
relationship with their workers.

When I took a course,

_

"Anthropology and Marxism," with Professor Sider in the fall
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of 1986, I wrote a paper for the class blending the
theoretical constructs about the urban petty bourgeoisie,
and my experiences.

At the time, I tried to construct a

mechanical class model of the urban petty bourgeoisie.
Through Professor Sider's comments and my reflection, I
realized that I constructed an ideal model instead of
analyzing real experiences and relationships.

I also

realized that I was not dealing with the urban petty
bourgeoisie in general but Korean shopkeepers specifically.
I also received comments from other professors for other
papers reflecting my changing ideas.

My desire to

understand the petty bourgeoisie as a class eventually made
me choose the example of Korean shopkeepers as my
dissertation topic.
I chose their relationships to poor Black consumers as
my main research topic in order to understand how two
minority groups, not as passersby but as actors, participate
in the process of social reproduction.

I also expected that

this process would clarify how specific class positions and
ethnicity can intersect, particularly how class and ethnic
conflicts are both organized, expressed, and mediated in the
wider social context.
In order to achieve a more balanced understanding about
the social relationships of shopkeepers, I also decided to
collect some information about the relationship between
Korean shopkeepers and White wholesalers.

For this purpose,
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I will add a short afterword explaining the relationship
between them.
I chose Harlem as my main field research area.

Harlem

serves as a historical base for the conflict between Black
residents and Korean shopkeepers.

In addition, there was

further historical documentation on earlier conflicts
between Jewish shopkeepers and Black residents.

Data on

previous conflicts would help to interpret present
conflicts. Furthermore, Harlem has become, for Blacks and
others, the symbol of the Black inner city.

The conflict

between the two groups was not limited to local areas.
Through the involvement of city-wide organizations, news
media, and various levels of city and state agents, the
conflict became a city-wide issue.

Thus, I also researched

the conflicts in other areas, city-wide organizations, news
media, and various state agents.

I also collected data from

other areas and from city-wide discourse (e.g. newspapers).
My data collection methods were necessarily informal.
Before I started my research, I worked in several Korean
stores in New York City.

For my pilot research, I worked in

a clothing store in Harlem for six weeks in late 1988.

As

an employee, I could observe and actually participate in
everyday transactions as a "Korean" salesclerk.

Because

was a Korean, the Korean employer was relatively open with
me. However, Black customers and I felt a certain distance
between us.

My Korean background helped me to obtain
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information from Korean shopkeepers but was also a barrier
to opening dialogue with Black residents.
I usee only one formal questionnaire form in my
research.

With this, I collected data from twenty-eight

Korean shopkeepers in the field area regarding their
business establishments and relationships with White
wholesalers and Black residents.

Other information about

the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and poor Black
residents came mainly from three sources; my informal
interviews, conversations with related people, and
newspapers.

Some other data was collected from radio and

television news programs.

Information from newspapers was

critical to my understanding of Korean and Black
organizations, their points of view, and the actions of
various politicians.

Without the information from

newspapers, my description of the relationship between the
Blacks and the Korean shopkeepers would have been very
limited.

As a Korean, I encountered difficulty in gathering

the full co-operation of the Black population.

Thus the

information from newspapers was very critical to my
understanding of Black experiences, views, and
organizations.
However, I conducted informal interviews, with Black
residents on the streets of Harlem and participated in their
meetings.
boycotters.

I observed Black boycotts and interviewed Black
My Black research assistant, Sabiyha Prince,
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also conducted an interview with the organizer of the Black
boycott against

Korean shopkeepers in Harlem.

I also

conducted informal interviews with Korean shopkeepers in
Harlem and in other areas.

Initially, I had problems

interviewing them, because they were reluctant to speak
about their business practices and racial problems.
are very sensitive issues for Korean shopkeepers.

Both
However,

some of the Korean shopkeepers soon began pouring out
information due to the fact that I was Korean.

I also

participated in the events and observed the meetings of
several city-wide Korean organizations on a regular basis
during the field research.
My formal fieldwork started June 1989 and finished in
May 1990.

However, I visited and worked in the field area

before my formal fieldwork began, and I also visited the
area after my formal fieldwork ended.

Materials on the

conflict between Jewish shopkeepers and Black residents in
Harlem was collected from historical documents and texts.

Structure of This Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into four parts.

The

first part discusses the conceptual frameworks that guide my
presentation and analysis of data.

The second part deals

with relevant historical issues on how Blacks and Koreans
came to Harlem.

This part also deals with questions

regarding the construction of social conditions through
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which they confront each other.
Specifically, chapter two in part two will show how the
Blacks in New York City have been segregated and
concentrated in Harlem, why Blacks could not develop their
small businesses, and how the conflict between Black
residents and Jewish shopkeepers developed.

Chapter three

will explain why certain Koreans came to America, and how
they concentrated in the small business sector of innercities.

Chapter three will also explain American

immigration policy and its implication for American racial
order.

Chapter four focuses on how Koreans became

shopkeepers, and how the social and family relationships of
Koreans were geared toward making money.

The information in

this part will help us understand the social and historical
contexts of the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and
Black residents.

This understanding will also help us

clarify the context of deployed meanings and power contests
during the conflict between the Black residents and Korean
shopkeepers.
The third part deals with questions about the present
conflicts between the two groups.

What happened, why and

how do Blacks and Koreans feel in everyday interactions, how
do Blacks boycott Korean shopkeepers, how do they present
their stories and organize their power, how do the White
majority and 'White' media understand and present the
conflict between the two minority groups, how do state
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agents intervene in the conflicts, how do state power and
capitalist relationships constitute the playing field of two
groups, and how do Koreans try to avoid or diffuse problems
with Black residents?

Chapters five and six in part three

will answer these questions.
Part four is a section for the discussion of the
implications of the data presented in the parts two and
three.

In part four, I will discuss the theoretical

implications of the data in the light of the conceptual
framework presented in the first section.

In this part, the

social order, domination, resistance, and the
interconnection among meanings, power, and economic
relationships will be discussed with more concrete data
presented in the parts two and three.
I add an afterword in order to explain the conflicting
relationships between Korean shopkeepers and White
wholesalers.

This is a brief sketch to show the social

relationships of Korean shopkeepers with the "higher" group,
in terms of racial status and class position.

Because this

dissertation is imbalanced in the representation of Korean
shopkeepers by focusing on only one side of Korean
shopkeepers' social relationships, I want to provide a brief
sketch of the other side.

In the future, this section will

be further developed to explain the "contradictory" social
position of Korean shopkeepers.
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PART TWO

THE HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL CONDITIONS FOR
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN POOR BLACKS AND KOREAN SHOPKEEPERS
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CHAPTER TWO
"WE MEAN BUSINESS": BLACK HARLEM AND ALIEN SHOPKEEPERS

rolks r I ccnic up North
Cause they told me de North was fine.
I come up North
Cause they told me de North was fine.
Been up here six monthsI'm about to lose my mind.
e • • •

(from "Evenin' Air Blues" of Langston
Hughes, 1942:38)

From Native Land to Jewish-Dominated Harlem
On September 3rd, 1609,

Henry Hudson with his ship

dispatched by the East India Company of Holland and seeking
a western route to 'golden' China, approached an 'unknown'
river, later called the Hudson River, in North America.
Natives viewed them with astonishment, and finally conluded
that "it's nothing less than the wigwam of the great
Manitto, or Supreme Being himself, who has evidently come to
pay them a visit"(Riker 1904:110).

Hudson's discovery of

the area stimulated annual dispatches of vessels to 'New
Netherland' for further discovery and the fur trade.
this purpose, the Dutch established trading posts.

For
The

Dutch eventually brought and built their settlement at the
tip of Manhattan in 1623 (Riker 1904:109-118).
The Dutch bought Manhattan island for the sum of 24
dollars of beads and trinkets from the natives in 1626, and
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started to call the upper part of the island "Haarlem,"
after a city name of the Dutch.1

The first Dutch settlers

in Haarlem, Johannes de la Montagne and his family, began
living there in 1636.

He obtained a grant of the land where

he settled from Governor Kieft of New Amsterdam.

The

Manhattans and Wickquaskeeks, the native tribes of the
region, were not satisfied with this development.

They

attacked the Dutch settlements and ruined the farms.
Gradually, the natives were driven out by the Dutch and the
Haarlem land was given to the European settlers (Pierce
1903).
After the British gained control of New Amsterdam in
1664, they changed the city name to New York City.
Eventually, one va' was deleted from Haarlem.

Harlem

remained a rural settlement distant from downtown Manhattan
until the Civil War.
The economic expansion of the United States after the
Civil War attracted massive immigrants from Europe and many
of them settled in lower Manhattan.

When upper- and middle

class Whites such as Germans, Irish, German-Jews, and
Italians migrated to Harlem to avoid congested downtown
Manhattan,2

Harlem was transformed into the first suburban

1 Haarlem is located on the westside of Amersterdam in the
Netherlands.
2 The population of Manhattan was 124,000 in 1820 and
516,000 in 1850. The number already passed 1,200,000 in
1880 (Scheiner 1965:222). Nearly one million people
overcrowded lower Manhattan. While the poor immigrants
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residential area of New York City.

New railroad lines

connected Harlem to downtown Manhattan.

In the early 1880s,

the residential construction boom rapidly transformed the
landscape of East Harlem (Gurock 1979:15).
When the overhead trolley line was extended to Central
Harlem in 1895, that area experienced a construction boom
and accommodated new settlers from the downtown.
lines were constructed during the late 1890s.

New subway

Lower and

middle class Russian-Jews and Italians also migrated to
Harlem.

Until 1910, about 100,000 Russian-Jews migrated to

Harlem and this made Jews the largest ethnic group in
Harlem.3

The construction boom of new houses and

apartments rekindled from 1903, and most vacant places in
Harlem were built over by 1906.

Many Jewish shopkeepers and

businessmen also heavily invested in the construction and
renovation during the period (Gurock 1979:32-49).

Black Business before the Emergency of Black Harlem
Many Blacks in New York City worked as domestics and
common laborers before the Civil War.

The jobs which were

overcrowded the area south of 14th Street, the middle and
rich classes lived in the area between 14th and 42nd streets
(Gurock 1979:5).
In order to avoid the congestion and new
immigrants, many escaped from downtown Manhattan to Harlem.
One man recalled, "It was our way of avoiding contact with
such uncouth citizens as might be found downtown..."
(Osofsky 1971:26).
3 Between 1901-1910, 976,000 Jews immigrated to the United
States mostly from Russia and 696,000 of them to New York
City (Joseph 1914:195).
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considered distasteful for Whites were left for Blacks.
When a great number of Irish immigrated to New York City
during the mid-19th century, there was a serious competition
for the menial jobs occupied by Blacks.

The Irish, and

later other immigrants from Europe gradually replaced Blacks
in many menial jobs (Scheiner 1965:45-48).

Thus, for

example,
By 1850 there were more Irish servants than the entire
Negro population of the city, whereas twenty years
earlier Negro labor constituted a majority of the
servant class. (Scheiner 1965:46)
According to the Colored Mission in 1879, Negroes were
"entirely excluded from the more lucrative branches of
employment".... One year later, the Mission reported
that "many of the various industries open to the
foreigner" were closed "to the native colored man."
(quoted in Scheiner 1965:53)4
In these conditions, Blacks were often hired as strike
breakers and as cheap laborers to reduce the wages of White
workers.
A small number of Blacks specialized in certain
businesses until the mid-19th century.

Businesses in the

catering, barbering, and whitewashing fields were known as
"Negro Business" before the Civil War and were patronized
largely by Whites.

After the massive influx of millions of

European immigrants after the mid-19th century, European

4 However, in terms of absolute number of workers, there was
a steady increase in Black workers within New York City.
This was the result of the steady increase of the Black
population in New York City after the 1890s. While Handlin
(1959) stated that there was considerable progress between
1870-1900 for Blacks in New York City, Bloch (1960)
concluded that European immigrants replaced Blacks.
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immigrants displaced the Black small businessmen from "Negro
Business."5 (Ottley and Weatherby 1967:229)
This process was very tumultuous and the tension
between European immigrants and Blacks was very high through
the 19th century.

Many race riots were directed towards

Blacks not only in New York City but also in many other
northern cities.

In July 1834, the anti-abolitionist riot

continued for eight days, and many Blacks and their churches
were attacked in lower Manhattan.

Because of the strike

breaking role of some Black workers, European immigrant
workers often attacked Black strike-breakers (Bernstein
1990:5).6
The Draft Riots were the worst race riot.

In the

middle of the Civil War, the Conscript Act of 1863 caused a
wide-spread resentment from working-class immigrants who
were the victim of the new law.

The resentment was

expressed in bloody attacks not only upon the wartime

5 Until the 1850s, barber shops, the catering business, the
white washing trade, coachmen, and the boot-black business
were primary business areas for Blacks. Many hotel dining
rooms and restaurants hired Blacks. According to a news
article, "[Black employment] has been receding ever since"
the 1850s. ( Harper/s Weekly. Dec. 22, 1900)
6 Because of the pervasive racism, it would be difficult for
Blacks to attack European immigrants or Whites.
If they
did, they would be severely punished. Racism might also
encourage the European (or White) immigrants to attack
Blacks without the consequence of severe punishment from the
White government.
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authority and some established Republicans7 but also on
Blacks and their property.

The rioters thought that the

main reason for the Act and the war was Blacks.
were slain and thousands of them fled town.

Many Blacks

Amid the

confrontations, 105 or more people were killed (Berstein
1990:5).

This riot and other riots caused a great loss of

Black businesses in New York City and the loss of much White
patronage to Black businesses.

Eventually, the Blacks and

their business were driven into strict segregation (Ottley
and Weatherby 1967:229).
The first World War halted immigration from Europe.
The expansion of the war economy and the shortage of labor
made it easy for Blacks to obtain employment.

As a result

of the immigration halt and war expansion, the number of New
York City Blacks in the manufacturing, mechanical, trade,
and transportation fields more than doubled in the decade
1910-1920.

The number of Black women in manufacturing and

mechanical pursuits increased almost fourfold in the decade
(Scheiner 1965:52).

This period saw a massive influx of

Blacks which dramatically transformed the color of Harlem.
The expansion of Black employment and the massive

7 At the time Republican Abraham Lincoln was the President.
Local Republican leaders supported Lincoln's war efforts,
while Democratic leaders had a more conciliatory attitude
toward the seceding South.
Republicans were stronger at
that time than now in New York City. The state and city
governments changed hands often at the time.
There was also
a very severe economic depression during 1860-61 in New York
City.
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influx of the Blacks from the South did not necessarily lead
to the prosperity for Black businesses.

Some Black leaders

thought the lack of racial loyalty was one of the reasons.
They subsequently urged Blacks to patronize Black owned
stores.

Fred Moore in 1904 declared that "Jews support

Jews? Germans support Germans...and Negroes should begin to
support Negroes." Booker T . Washington urged Blacks in New
York City in 1914 to patronize Black businesses rather than
White businesses, maintaining that economic success was a
prerequisite for political and social advancement.

Adam

Clayton Powell Sr. also stated during the same period that
"[a]s long as Negroes talk race loyalty and race rights and
then spend their money with White business and professional
men" there would be no change in the race problem.

Powell

also preached about the "double duty" dollar - buying from
Black shopkeepers provided more jobs for Black workers
(Scheiner 1965:70-71).
One of the successful forms of this nationalism was the
Marcus Garvey Movement.

Marcus Garvey formed the Universal

Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in 1914 in Jamaica.

He

arrived in New York in 1916 and established his headquarter
in Harlem.

He urged support of Black business and organized

a chain of groceries, restaurants, laundries, and factories.
He stressed African pride and history for Blacks.
for the redemption of Africa.

He called

The movement raised a strong

African consciousness among Blacks.

However, the movement
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was doomed after Marcus Garvey was deported to his native
country, Jamaica.

But this movement made a great impact

upon Black people (Martin 1986).8
These appeals became more prevalent after the complete
transformation of Harlem into a Black neighborhood and have
continued through this century.

These appeals were a

reaction to the discrimination from the White dominated
soceity.

Since White patrons shunned Black stores and

patronized the stores opened by new European immigrants
after the massive influx of European immigrants during the
late 19th century, Black customers were the only hope for
Black businessmen.

The Transition of Harlem into a Black neighborhood
In 1741, the Black population was 20% of the
inhabitants of New York (Harper's Weekly. Dec. 22, 1900).
By 1820, the Black population was the about 9% of the total
population in Manhattan.

The rate decreased to 2% in 1900

because of the massive immigration from Europe through the
previous century.9

During the 19th century, the main

8 "Buy Black" campaigns have frequently reappeared in
Harlem.
Black Boycotts against Korean shopkeepers often
accompany the "Buy Black" campaign.
The first boycott
against Korean shopkeepers in Harlem was organized by the
followers of Marcus Garvey Movement in 1981. Their main
theme was "Buy Black."
9 In 1741, among the ten thousand inhabitants in Manhattan,
two tousand were Black slaves.
In 1820, there were some
124,000 people and the number of Blacks was about 11,000.
In 1860, there were 12,000 Blacks among 805,000 residents.
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residential area for Blacks moved northward and remained
separated from White residential areas.
The hostility of Whites10 toward Blacks limited the
Black residences to segregated areas.11

The residential

areas for Blacks moved from the present City Hall area to
Greenwich Village, the Tenderloin district,12 and San Huan
Hill in the West Sixties.

After the draft riots in 1863,

many relatively affluent Blacks moved to Brooklyn out of
fear of race riots, wa well as for better housing.

After

While the total population of Manhattan in 1900 was
1,850,000, the number of Blacks was 36,000. (Harper7s
Weekly. Dec. 22, 1900; Scheiner 1965:221-222)
10 The hostility from the Irish immigrants was especially
harsh. Antagonism between Blacks and Irish existed since
the massive influx of Irish immigrants during the mid-19th
century.
They competed for jobs and housing.
The Irish and
other Whites abused and attacked Blacks many times in the
19th century.
The Blacks feared and distrusted the
immigrants. (Scheiner 1965)
11 For example, a Black sociologist said that Harlem was in
1927, "a solid Negro community... with as definite lines of
demarcation as if cut by a knife." (quoted in Greenberg
1991:15)
Residential segregation, to a lesser degree, still
continues in New York City (Hacker 1992).
12 The Tenderloin district did not have a clear boundary,
since this name was folk-designated.
It referred to the
streets of the west Twenties and Thirties streets in midManhattan in the late 1880s. "Captain Reilly, of a
Tenderloin police precinct, remarked in 1889 that Negroes
had xtaken up every street from Twenty-Fourth to ThirtyThird, between Sixth and Seventh avenues7"(Scheiner
1965:18). Soon the tenderloin extended to Forty-second
street. A "New Tenderloin" extended north from 42nd street
through the upper Fifties during the 1890s, this area also
housed the red-light district (Osofsky 1966:12-14).
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the Tenderloin Riot13 of 1900 and another race riot in San
Huan Hill in 1905, many Blacks moved out of the areas to
Harlem and later to Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn (Scheiner
1965:15-24).
After 1900, the Black population in Manhattan rapidly
increased in number.

By 1910, there were 61,000 Blacks

(scheiner 1965:221).

Because of the broken real estate

market in 1904-1905 and the vacant spaces, some White
landlords in Harlem who had not rented their houses to
Blacks began to rent to them.
higher rents to Blacks.

These landlords charged

Other landlords and White residents

organized associations to stop Black settlement in their
areas.

But when Black families settled in an area

successfully, many White families sold their houses and
moved out.

Thus Blacks were segregated and concentrated in

certain blocks.

However, there was a steady increase of

Blacks in Harlem through the early decades of this century
(Osofsky 1971:31-37).

Around 1910, Blacks became a dominant

racial group in the area above 130th Street, between Fifth
and Seventh Avenues of Harlem (Gurock 1979:147).

In and

13 On August 15, 1900, there was a general assault cn Blacks
in the Tenderloin district primarily by Irish men and the
police after one Black killed a policeman on August 12.
Many Blacks were brutally beaten by white mobs (Scheiner
1965:121-2).
Policemen also beat Blacks rather than
protecting them from the attacks. The policemen arrested
Blacks instead of White attackers.
"As policemen patrolled
the Negro blocks they were showered with bricks, bottles and
garbage from rooftops and tenement windows.
They fired back
with revolvers." (Osofsky 1966:48-50)
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near the area, some 50,000 Blacks lived in 1914 (Osofsky
1966:105) .
However, White landlords and resident associations
continued to block the influx of Blacks into Harlem. The
founder of the Harlem Property Owners' Improvement
Corporation said in 1913, "It is the question of whether the
white man will rule Harlem or the negro."

He suggested to

fight "the common enemy" by organizing the entire community.
He also urged that "Whites who lived on streets bordering
Negro blocks build twenty-four-foot fences to separate
themselves from Negro neighbors"
1979:107).

(quoted in Gurock

But all of their efforts failed.

During the First World War, Harlem experienced a
massive influx of Blacks.

Harlem also experienced the

physical deterioration of buildings without further
investment.

Landlords increased rent and families doubled

up in the same space (Gurock 1971:139-141).
Soon new subway lines connected Brooklyn, Queens, and
the Bronx to Manhattan within reasonable commutation time.
Realizing the shortage of adequate housing after the First
World War, New York City exempted almost all tax levies
until 1932 for housing constructed during the 1920s.

The

construction boom continued through the 1920s in the outer
boroughs as well as, to a lesser degree, in Manhattan.
Better housing in the outer boroughs, rapid transit system,
and increased income after the First World War sparked the
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final mass migration of Whites, especially Jews, from Harlem
to the outer boroughs.

Jewish population in Harlem which

reached 178,000 in 1920 declined to 25,000 in 1930 (Gurock
1971:142-146)
This sudden departure was also a response to the
massive migration of Blacks into Harlem during the 1920s.
With severe racism, the poor living conditions for Blacks in
the South, and the opening of job opportunities in the North
for Blacks because of the First World War, massive numbers
of poor Black farmers in the South migrated to northern
industrial cities.
West Indies.

Many Black immigrants also came from the

Between 1910 and 1930, the Black population in

New York City increased from 92,000 to 328,000.
87.000 Blacks arrived between 1920 and 1930.

In Harlem,

By 1930,

165.000 Blacks, about 72% of Manhattan's Black population,
lived in Harlem (Osofsky 1966:128-130).

Whites such as Jews

and Italians moved out to the Bronx and other outer
boroughs.

Thus during the 1920s, the predominantly Jewish

Harlem became a predominantly Black Harlem.
After the Harlem Renaissance in the 1920s and the
Depression, there was little investment in Harlem.

With

socially and economically discriminated Black residents,
Harlem became a ghetto (Smith and Schaffer 1987:59).
Because of the deprivation of Harlem and the discriminatory

14 The estimate of the Jewish population in Harlem
varied from 25,000 to 5,000 in 1930 (Gurock 1971:146).
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policies and practices of local governments, police,
landlords, and businessmen, there has been continuous
tension in Harlem.

As a result, Harlem was one of the most

active places of Black nationalist groups throughout the
mid-20th century (Greenberg 1991; Naison 1984).

Alien Shopkeepers and Black Residents
Jewish shopkeepers came to Harlem's Third Avenue
commercial district after the Civil War to open store.
Because of the increasing number of Jews and others who
moved to Harlem, Jewish businesses followed them and
expanded through the whole Harlem area.

After the migration

of White residents to the outer boroughs during the 1910s
and 1920s, many Jewish shopkeepers stayed while some others
followed them.

For example, H.C.F. Koch, who opened a large

store in 1890 on 125th Street, reportedly treated Black
customers discourteously and sold his store in 1930 rather
than continued doing business among Blacks.

But most

shopkeepers stayed and Jews remained a prominent ethnic
group in Harlem business.

For example, L.M. Blumstein, a

German-Jew, who opened a store in 1896 and opposed Black
settlement in Harlem, remained as one of Black Harlem's most
successful businessmen (Osofsky 1966:121).
As the Black population increased, there were more
possibilities for Black businesses in Harlem.

Some Black

shopkeepers successfully established their own businesses
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and served Black residents in the business areas where Black
customers were discouraged by White store-owners.

For

example/ many Blacks experienced subtle discrimination in
White-owned restaurants although state laws prohibited
discrimination in public places.

White-owned funeral

parlors also discouraged Black patronage.
were successful in these areas.

Black businessmen

But in the area where Black

shppkeepers competed with White shopkeepers for the same
Black customers, the result was dismal for Black
shopkeepers.

In addition suffering the effects of

discrimination by White wholesalers, bankers, and landlords,
Black shopkeepers were beginners, had a lack of capital and
credit, and could not provide a variety of goods, credits,
and competitive prices to Black customers.

"Buy Black" and

"Double Duty Dollar" campaigns were not effective in drawing
Black customers to Black stores.

"Appeals to race loyalty

fell on deaf ears when the offerings of the Negro merchant
were inferior to those of this White competitor." (Scheiner
1965:78-80)
After the transformation of Harlem into a Black
residential area during the 1920s, most residential and
commercial buildings and businesses in the area were owned
by Whites, especially Jews.

One famous Black poet lamented,

"Black Harlem really was in whiteface, economically
speaking"(Hughes 1969a:63).

In 1930, less than 20% of

Harlem's stores were owned by Blacks (Naison 1984:147).
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Even though most customers were Blacks, White storeowners usually refused to hire Blacks as salesmen, clerks
and cashiers, not to mention managers.
employed Whites only.

They usually

Blacks suffered open discrimination

in all types of employment in New York City at the time
(Naison 1984? Greenberg 1991).
Blacks the hardest.

Moreover, the Depression hit

The rate of unemployment of potential

labor force reached a staggering 66% in Harlem in 1934
(Grant 1986:215).
By the spring of 1931, Blacks organized a "Don't Buy
Where You Can't Work" campaign.

Ministers, politicians, and

newspaper editors appealed to Black residents to follow the
same campaign which, in Chicago, had opened up hundreds of
jobs to Blacks.

Many nationalist groups, the Harlem

Business Men's Club, and the Garvey movement preached race
loyalty as a first step toward winning control of Harlem's
economy.

But because of factional divisions in the Garvey

movement and vast political differences between the street
speakers, church leaders, and businessmen who supported the
concept of a boycott, a well-organized boycott was not
possible.

Nevertheless the boycott, aimed at White stores

with White employees, drew broad support from Black
residents (Naison 1984:50-51).
Sufi Abdul Hamid, who was active in the Chicago
boycott, came to Harlem in 1932.

In 1933, he launched a

boycott on 135th Street and won jobs for members of his
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group, the Negro Industrial and Clerical Alliance. In May
1934, he organized a boycott against Woolworth's 125th
Street store after the manager had refused to hire members
of his group. These activities stimulated other community
leaders to employ the boycott as an important tactic for the
campaign (Naison 1984:117).
In June 1934, Rev. John Johnson, Rev. Adam Clayton
Powell, J r ., several other leaders, and the editors of the
New York Age formed an organization called the Citizens
League for Fair Play.

They began boycotting Blumstein's,

the largest retail store in Harlem, to demand jobs for
Blacks.

Ira Kemp and Arthur Reid who led the league's

"picket committee" were Garveyites who supported the
development of Black business and the creation of
economically self-sufficient Black communities.

Nationalist

groups defined the boycott as a struggle of "Negro against
White."

This boycott became a crusade against racial

injustice and drew support from all sections of the
community.

Blumstein's and other stores finally agreed to

hire Blacks (Naison 1984:118).
At the same time, White shopkeepers initiated a legal
action to halt the boycott movement.

In October 1934,

following a meeting between Jewish shopkeepers and the
mayor, police arrested the boycott leader, Sufi Hamid, on
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charges of "spreading anti-Semitism in Harlem."15

State

Supreme Court Justice Samuel Roseman also granted a shoe
company an injunction order against the boycott on the
ground that "their activity might stimulate 'racial riots
and racial reprisals.'"

The judge declared that the

conflict between the boycotters and the company was solely a
"racial dispute."

(Naison 1984:121-122)

But there had been

no centrally organized anti-Semitic movement in Harlem,
though propaganda was carried on by groups which channelled
the grievances of Blacks.

Since the majority of Harlme's

rental collectors, shopkeepers, and money lenders were
Jewish in Harlem, the Jews became a target of resentment.
In fact, the uneasy economic relationship between Jews
and Blacks started earlier.

As early as in 1883, the New

York Globe, a Black oriented newspaper, stated that Jewish
control of the southern money market victimized the Blacks
in the region.

In 1913, New York A c e , a descendant of the

Globe. continued that
[The Jew] is a peculiar race, ...parasitical and
predatory... preying upon and devouring the substance
of others rather than creating and devouring the
substance of itself.
That is essentially the race
characteristic of all parasites, all race fungi,
fNew York A g e . Aug. 21, 1913, quoted by Scheiner
1965:131)
15 During Black boycotts in 1990, Korean shopkeepers also
raised the question of anti-Koreanism of the boycotters
successfully. Korean and White newspapers also emphasized
the "reverse racism" of the Black boycotters.
State Supreme
Justice Held also issued an injunction order to limit a
Blfick boycott against Korean shopkeepers in Brooklyn in May
1990. See chapter 6 for details.
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Marcus Garvey also complained about the Jewish control
of the Black economic life.

However, some other Black

leaders urged fellow Blacks to learn from the success of the
Jews.

For example, Booker T. Washinton wrote in 1907,

"Unless the Negro learns more and more to immitate the Jew
in these matters, he cannot expect to have any high degree
of success"

(Washington 1907:183, quoted in Steinberg

1981:88).
The tension between Black residents and White
shopkeepers culminated in the explosion of a riot.

On March

19, 1935, the riot began with a rumor of the death of a
Black boy who stole a five cent knife from Kress' Five and
Ten Cent Store which swept through Harlem.

The store was a

major target for the "Don't Buy Where You Can't Work"
campaign and refused to hire Blacks (Naison 1984:140).
In the afternoon of that day, a 16 year-old boy whom
the manager of the store suspected as a shoplifter was
grabbed by the manager.

A

policeman took him to the

basement of the store to avoid onlooking spectators.

One

Black woman screamed that "they had taken "the boy to the
basement to beat him up.'"
Harlem Riot 1969:7)

(LaGuardia's Commission on the

One witness described the starting

moment:
There were just a few policemen.
They walked through
the store to the back.
Then something happened in the
back.
Some people say a woman screamed. All of the
group surged to the back of the store. When I got back
there, they were driven forward by the policeman who
was in front of them, and one woman particularly
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demanded that they produce the manager, and the boy and
the policeman told her it was none of her damned
business. All of this time I heard no explanation,
nothing except among the people themselves indignation
grew higher.
In the meantime more policemen came into
the store and they said, "drive these people out," and
became rather rough and pushed the people, (quoted by
LaGuradia's Commission 1969:14)
Soon the rumor of the death of the boy spread into the

street.

The rumor awakened the deep-seated sense of

mistreatment, discrimination, dishonesty, exploitation, and
denial by the shopkeepers and by society in general.

One

woman cried out "that the treatment was just like down South
where they lynch us"(LaGuardia's Commission 1969:8).

The

resentment turned a hundred or more spectators into a
protest group.

The police attempt to disperse the crowd

only aroused resentment and swelled the numbers in the
crowd.

Soon the rumor spread all over Harlem.

Several

thousand people participated in outbursts here and there.
Leaflets were distributed.16

Windows of hundred of stores

16 Below is the content of a leaflet distributed by
"Young Liberators," comprised mainly of young Blacks.
CHILD BRUTALLY BEATEN1
WOMAN ATTACKED BY BOSS AND COPS.
CHILD NEAR DEATH
One hour ago a 12-year-old Negro boy was
brutally beaten by the management of Kress'
Five and Ten Cent Store.
The boy is near death, mercilessly
beaten because they thought he had stolen
a five-cent knife.
A Negro woman, who
sprang to the defense of the boy, had her
arm broken by the thug and was then arrested.
WORKERS! NEGRO AND WHITE.
Protest against this Lynch Attack of
Innocent Negro People.
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were smashed, and often looting followed.

The police

dispersed the crowds, but they gathered and destroyed stores
again (LaGuardia's Commission 1969:8-12).
In the beginning, the resentment was expressed against
White stores.

But as the crowd grew, but all other stores

also became the target of destruction and looting.

Many

Blacks also participated in looting "to express their
resentment against discrimination in employment and the
exclusive rights of property"

(LaGuardia's Commission

1969:11-17).
The Communist Party of the United States of America in
New York City organized a city-wide campaign against the
butcher shops in order to drop the price of meat in June
1935.

It soon spread to Harlem and a branch of the CPUSA

organized a boycott in Harlem.

With help from nationalist

and religious groups, Harlem Communists led the march of
Black housewives through the streets and demanded that
butchers lower their prices by 25%.

"Hundreds of aroused

Negro women joined the demonstrations, warning butchers of a
repetition of March 19 [1933's riot] if they failed to
reduce their prices."

When butchers agreed to cut prices,

housewives tore down old price signs and put up new ones.
Demand Release of Boy and Woman.
Demand the immediate arrest of the
management responsible for this lynch attack.
Don't Buy at Kress'.
Stop Police Brutality in Negro Harlem.
JOIN THE PICKET LINE.
(quoted from Mayor LaGuardia's... 1969:10)
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All but one store reduced the price by 25%. Eventually the
prices went up, but they stayed lower than that they had
before the march (Naison 1984:149-150).
Prior to becoming Congressman, Adam C. Powell, Jr. also
assumed an important role in the "Jobs-for-Negro Movement."
In 1938, A. C. Powell, Jr., Rev. William Lloyd Imes, and A.
Philip Randolph organized the Greater New York Coordinating
Committee for the Employment of Negroes.

James W. Ford,

Black Vice-Presidential candidate of the Communist PartyUSA, Captain A. L. King, the Garveyite Ira Kemp and Arthur
Reid, founders of the Harlem Labor Union, also participated
in the organization (Clarke 1969:235).

The Coordinating

Committee organized picket lines at local offices of
Consolidated Edison and the New York Telephone Company to
force them to hire Blacks (Naison 1984:268).
Other major targets were the stores on 125th Street.
Even after several boycotts and riots, the owners of the
stores in Harlem had been reluctant to hire Blacks.

The

Harlem Labor Union, a nominal affiliate to the Coordinating
Committee and a nationalist group, organized a new boycott
after the Supreme Court decision allowed picketing to
protest the exclusion of minority racial groups from
employment opportunities in April 1938 (Naison 1984:268).
The HLU argued that all jobs should be controlled by Blacks
in Harlem.

Enough unemployed Blacks joined the picket line

to force the shopkeepers to hire the members of the HLU.
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river-to-river picket line appeared on 125th Street.

This

spectacular event and 'the Don't Buy Where You Can't Work'
chanting of the picket lines "struck terror in the hearts of
the store owners"(Clarke 1969:235).

The shopkeepers hired

some HLU members by discharging their own employees, who
were members of established unions.
However, in constrast to the HLU, the Coordinationg
Committee tried to avoid racial antagonism and to protect
employees of established labor unions.

Thus, the

Coordinating Committee organized its own picketlines (Naison
1984:268).

The Coordinating Committee negotiated with the

White dominated Harlem Chamber of Commerce which, in August
1938, guaranteed that one third of all jobs be given to
Blacks.

In return, the Coordinating Committee promised to

stop the picket line of the HLU (Naison 1984:269).
The HLU continuously drew support from the unemployed
and refused to stop its own picket lines.

Thus the conflict

between the HLU and the Coordinating Committee continued.
After a bitter controversy, they agreed that the
Coordinating Committee should focus on companies outside
Harlem, while the HLU focused on those in Harlem (Naison
1984:269).
In August 1943, a confrontation between a White
policeman, a Black woman, and a Black soldier turned the
potent tension in Harlem into a riot of even greater
intensity.

Thousands of people participated in looting and
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demonstrations.

Mayor LaGuardia reinforced the police force

with 6,000 policemen and 1,500 volunteers.

The result was

six dead, hundreds injured, and hundreds of shops wrecked
and looted.

While Mayor LaGuardia said, "The hoodlums

quickly sized up the situation and took advantage of it to
smash windows and attempt to loot,"

Ralph Ellison, managing

editor of Negro Quarterly, said that only white stores were
looted and black stores were not touched by the rioters (New
York P o s t . Aug. 2, 1943; Amsterdam Ne w s . Aug. 7, 1943).
In January 1948, after a series of pickets on the 125th
Street area stores by Blacks, the Uptown Chamber of
Commerce, consisting mostly of White businessmen, agreed to
a "code of ethics."17

The Chamber also agreed that non

members of the Chamber would place a pledge to consumers
inside stores.

The pledge promised: to promote efficient

Black employees; to mark prices clearly on all merchandise;
to abide by good business standards; to abandon all
misrepresentation as to quality and classification in the
sale of merchandise; to abide by an employment policy
strictly consistent with the provisions of the State
Commission Against Discrimination; and to cooperate with the
recognized civic and charitable organizations of Harlem to
promote the well-being of the community (New York Times.

17 Some Korean leaders also tried to establish their own
codes of ethics after the Black boycotts against them in
1988 and 1990.
However, the efforts did not receive support
from ordinary Korean shopkeepers.
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Jan. 28, 1948).
In July 1959, there was an agreement between the Labor
and Industry Committee of the New York branch of the NAACP
and seven Harlem liquor stores, owned by Whites, not to do
business with wholesale liquor houses refusing to hire Black
salesmen.

The Labor and Industry Committee organized tight

picket lines against three liquor stores which refused to
buy from Black liquor salesmen.

Only two customers crossed

the picket line during the boycott.

This move brought

"seven White liquor stores to their knees."

The retail

stores sent the signed agreement to liquor distributors. The
agreement included the passage,
... you are hereby informed that forthwith I will
refuse to continue doing business with any wholesaler
who will not send as a representative a Negro salesman.
This salesman, being a Negro, will reflect the economic
interest of the local community on which I depend for a
successful operation of my business.
A spokesman for the NAACP declared that they would organize
the picket lines against "other business enterprises
practicing economic discrimination against Negroes"
(Amsterdam Ne w s . July 4, 1959).
The riots of 1935 and 1943 were partially successful in
changing some attitudes of the White shopkeepers and pushing
them to hire Blacks.

Some residents said, "White folks

respect us more when they find out we mean business....

We

got a great many jobs out of that riot that we couldn't get
before in our own community...." (Hughes 1969b:218-219).
The riot of 1943 also changed the police in Harlem.
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"Chocolate and vanilla teams of policemen appeared on uptown
streets walking together. Squad cars became integrated....
The riots of 1943 almost ended public police brutality on
the streets of Harlem"

(Hughes 1969b:219, my emphasis).

However, the economic situation of Blacks did not improve
much.
The repeated boycotts against shopkeepers in the area
showed that Harlem residents were tired of the status quo
which persisted with racial discrimination.

With the

minimal change of the situation, the tension and anger of
Harlem residents exploded again in the 1960s when the whole
American society experienced a new form of protest, the
Civil Rights Movement, which culminated the protest history
of Blacks against racism.

Riots and Shopkeepers in the 1960s
Even though there were some gains in income in the
early 1960s, racism, poverty, and high unemployment
continued.

In 1964, 48% of Black families were in poverty,

while 19% of White familes were in poverty (National Urban
League 1968:477).
outsiders.

Most stores in the area were owned by

In Central Harlem, 85% of businesses were owned

by White shopkeepers.

In fact, there had been no progress

for Harlem residents during the last half-century.
frustration ran deep.

The

The struggles in various fronts,

including racism, housing problems, school problems, and
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economic problems, continued with higher intensity.
The Mew York Times reported, on January 25, 1960, that
moderate Black leaders worried that "extremists" agitated
Blacks about the rate of improvement.
Malcolm X and his Temples of Islam.

One of those was
In August 1960, more

than 8,500 people were attracted to the speech of Elijah
Muhammad, the leader of the Temple of Islam.

He called for

Black unity and said that a White just "kicks you in the
mouth instead of helping you"(Amsterdam N e w s . August 6,
1960).

The Temple of Islam preached,

a vision of the doom of the white "devils" and the
coming dominance of the black man, promised a utopian
paradise of a separate territory within the United
States for a Negro state, and offered a practical
program of building Negro business through hard work,
thrift, and racial unity. (National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders 1968:229)

They emphasized a doctrine of self-help and provided
programs for the organization and operation of enterprises
by Blacks.

They also scoffed at the efforts of the Urban

League and the NAACP to seek jobs in the Whiteman's
enterprises.

One Black writer wrote, "except for their

demand for a separate state for Blacks, their enunciated
program and statement have achieved general acceptance by a
majority of colored Americans.... It is no longer a question
of ssocial equality' but rather one of 'economic justice'"
(Stevens 1969:112).

The fierce spokesperson of this

perspective was Malcolm X whose thoughts exerted a great
influence on the militancy of young Blacks during the 1960s.
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He pointed out that,
The American, black man should be focusing his
every effort toward building his own businesses, and
decent homes for himself. As other ethnic groups have
done, let the black people, wherever possible, however
possible, patronize their own kind, hire their own
kind, and start in those ways to build up the black
race's ability to do it for itself. That's the only
way the American black man is ever going to get
respect. One thing the white man never can give the
black man is self-respect!
• • • •

In every black ghetto, Jews own the major
businesses.
Every night the owners of those businesses
go home with that black community's money, which helps
the ghetto to stay poor.
But I doubt that I have ever
uttered this absolute truth before an audience without
being hotly challenged, and accused by a Jew of antiSemitism. ... I have told them that if I tell the simple
truth, it doesn't mean that I am anti-Semitic; it means
merely that I am anti-exploitation.
... All Negroes... admit the white man's criminal
record.
They may not know as many details as I do, but
they know the general picture.(Malcom X 1989:275-284)
In Black communities, the tensions as well as the
expectation went high when the Civil Rights movement
stimulated new hope and militancy to achieve it.

They took

to the streets in an assault on racial segregation and
discrimination.

They sought "a final toppling of the walls

of segregation and discrimination," asserted Percy E. Sutton
(New York Times. Aug. 12, 1963).
One of the continuing tension in ghetto areas was with
White shopkeepers as Malcolm X pointed out.

Many Black

residents shared the belief that they were exploited and
abused by local shopkeepers.

Caplovitz (1963) showed in his

study of consumer problems in Harlem that "the poor pay
more."

Since the poor did not have enough cash and good
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information about merchandise, they were easy victims of
fraudulent credit practices of the shopkeepers.

The

continuous destruction and looting of stores during the
riots throughout the country during the 1960s, which
Caplovitz referred to as "consumer revolts," gave a greater

sense of urgency to the problem.

Many studies showed that

the prices for durable goods were not only higher in lowincome market stores, but the operating costs of those
stores were also higher.

But the differences in the food

prices were not clear (Sturdivant 1969:3-6).

The rude

attitude toward Black consumers and the indifference to the
problems of Black residents were other factors for the
resentment of Blacks (Wall Street Journal. Aug. 16, 1966)'.
The high prices and unfair practices of the shopkeepers
in the area were not the only reasons for the resentment and
consequent looting.

Some Blacks considered looting as

"getting back at whitey."

One Black resident said,

what whitey don't understand is that America is a damn
rich country and she flashes this richness in the
brother's face and tells him, NIt ain't for you.'
The
brother gets out and grabs a bit of it now and t h e n ....
(New York Times. April 8, 1968)
Wide-spread looting occurred during the 1964 and the 1968
riots in Harlem.
In July 16, 1964, during a confrontation between an
off-duty policeman and several young Blacks, a boy attacked
the policeman with a knife, and the policeman shot and
killed the boy.

Crowds confronted the police for several
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days.

Thousands of people shouted at the policemen and the

Whites, smashed store windows, and looted stores fHew York
Times, July 17,19,20, 1964).

Shouting, shooting, and

triggered burglar alarms, as doors and windows were smashed,
made a strident harmony on the streets.
after three days of violence.

The riot ebbed

During the process, Mr. Gray,

leader of the Harlem Rent Strike, urged the formation of a
revolutionary organization to obtain equal rights for Blacks
(Ferretti and Berck, 1986:353).
This call for the revolutionary organization continued
through the 1960s in Harlem.
Black Panthers.

One of those groups was the

Max Stanford was a member of the Harlem

branch of the Black Panthers.

When a rally was organized by

the branch of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC) in Harlem in August 1966, he spoke in front of 250
cheering people.

He proclaimed that Blacks must unite and

overthrow their White oppressors.

Stokely Carmichael,

chairman of SNCC, also called for the unity of AfricanAmericans to take over their own communities (Amsterdam
New s . Sept. 3, 1966).

One of the major goals of the Black

Panthers Party was to achieve power to determine the destiny
of.the Black community.

In relation to the economic

situation of Blacks, they believed that
the federal government is responsible and obligated to
give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We
believe that if the white American businessmen will not
give full employment, then the means of production
should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the
community so that the people of the community can
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organize and employ all of its people and give a high
standard of living.(Black Panther Party 1970:2)
The Wall Street Journal reported on January 13, 1970, that

"a clear majority of Blacks support both the goals and
methods of the Black Panthers."

Especially young Blacks

supported them because of "their avowed determination to

overturn the American 'system,' their refusal to back down
under intense police pressure." (Foner 1970:xiii)

The resentment against White America was also shared by
other Blacks.

Since a great number of the shopkeepers and

building owners in ghetto areas were Jewish, the Jew was an

easy target. Indeed, "the invective 'Jew merchant' was
spewed at all White merchants in Watts and even some Black
store owners"18 (Sturdivant 1969:9).

James Baldwin, a

famous novelist, resented the Jewish shopkeepers because
they were a part of the White domination over Blacks.

He

expressed this sentiment in his article, "Negroes Are Anti-

Semitic Because They're Anti-White."
When we ware growing up in Harlem our demoralizing
series of landlords were Jewish, and we hated them....
...The butcher was a Jew and, yes, we certainly
paid more for bad c u t s ..., and we very often carried
insults home, along with the meat.... The merchants
along 125th Street were Jewish - at least many of them
w e r e ... - and I well remember that it was only after
the Harlem riot of 1935 that Negroes were allowed to
earn a little money in some of the stores where they
spent so much.
.... It is bitter to watch the Jewish storekeeper
18 Even these days, "Jews" implies some invective meanings
for some people. One Black shopper spat out "Japanese Jew"
to a Korean shopkeeper, when the Korean shopkeeper refused
to refund'. See chapter 6.
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locking up his store for the night, and going home.
Going, with your money in his pocket, to a clean
neighborhood, miles from you, which you will not be
allowed to enter.
• • • •

In the American context, the most ironical about
Negro anti-Semitism is that the Negro is really
condemning the Jew for having become an American white
nicin o • « •
• • •

He is singled out by Negroes not because he acts
differently from other white men, but because he
doesn't.... And he is playing in Harlem the role
assigned him by Christians long ago: he is doing their
dirty work.(Baldwin 1969:3-10)
After several riots, as Blacks continued to believe that
there had been no change in the unfair practices of the
shopkeepers (Sturdivant 1969:16), White shopkeepers
reinforced their stores with steel, cement, alarm systems,
or moved out.

As one Black manager of a shoe store in

central Harlem put it, "They don't want their white faces to

be obvious.

They're pulling further into the background

rather than joining the group."

Most shopkeepers claimed

the riots were not justified and saw no reason for further

involvement in a hostile community (Wall Street Journal.
Aug. 16, 1966). Riots induced many shopkeepers to avoid

ghetto areas.

Thus, after the riots, many commercial

buildings went vacant.

The fear of looting continued for

shopkeepers, and insurance doubled.

Many commercial

buildings stayed vacant in Harlem until the late 1970s.
Even today, vacant stores exist on the busiest street of
Harlem.
New Korean immimigrants were looking for business
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opportunities requiring small capital in the 1970s.

They

found stores with low rent, and customers who would buy
cheap merchandise which these Korean shopkeepers could
provide.

Thus the Korean immigrants rushed into the inner-

city area from the late 1970s.

The Influx of Korean Shopkeepers into Harlem
Many Kotean immigrants made a small fortune from wig
trading during the 1970s.

Some brought money from Korea.

Others saved their salaries by working at stores owned by
other Koreans.

Some others worked in factories but became

frustrated after repeated lack of promotion due to their
broken English, and possibly due to racism.

A good number

of them were looking for better opportunities in small
business enterprises and began small business with small
capital from the 1970s.

Since a few Koreans already had

made a fortune from small business, other Koreans followed
them.19
They found stores with low rent ins Black
neighborhoods.
1970s.

Some started green grocery stores in the

They swept the green grocery business in all areas

of New York City through the mid-1980s.

Many others opened

various stores in the poor neighborhoods and also in many
busy commercial strips.

One of the first Korean shopkeepers

19 See chapter 4 for detailed discussion of capital
accumulation of Korean shopkeepers.
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to open a store in Central Harlem recalled:
After making a small savings from my wig peddling in
Brooklyn and my wife's factory work, I wanted to open
my own business. When I came here [125th street] in
1975, I could see a lot of buildings ruined by fire.
Many people worried about my safety when I decided to
move in to open a store. Whites were afraid of riots
and crimes here. But if I had been afraid of crime or
anything, I would have not come here.
I came to
America to succeed, or I would die....
Because the
rent was cheap and affordable for me, because I was
familiar with Black areas, and because some illegal
activities such as drug trafficking generated cash
among people here, I thought I could do business here.
...In the beginning, Black customers liked me.
They told me that "we are same colored people.
I am
glad you open a store here.
It is nice that I can shop
at a colored person's."
I knew that Whites had treated
Blacks badly....
Soon many Koreans came here to open a small
business.
Some Koreans were bad and some others
good....
The troubles with Blacks increased....
Blacks became suspicious of Koreans. They wondered how
Koreans made money....
New Korean immigrants found that it was very difficult to
get a decent job because of language problems, cultural
differences, and sometimes racism.

Even when the number of

Korean shopkeepers was small at the time, it was clear to
Korean immigrants that a small business produced more income
than other decent jobs \.

Thus, to run. a small business

became a dream for most Korean immigrants.
Many Korean immigrants flocked into Black neighborhoods
to open a store soon after they accumulated a savings of
around $15,000 - $50,000 during the two to four years after
their immigration.

The rent was inexpensive, and moreover

Blacks would buy cheap merchandise which new Korean
shopkeepers could provide.

The Koreans did not have enough

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
capital to compete with White shopkeepers in White
neighborhoods with quality merchandise.

Many Korean

shopkeepers agreed that it would be difficult to sell cheap
merchandise in White neighborhoods.

One Korean shopkeeper

in Harlem said, "It is easier to deal with Blacks than
Whites.

Blacks shop impulsively if they have money.

They

are not bothering with details such as price and quality of
goods."

Another Korean shopkeeper continued,

succeed in White areas.
Korean stores.

"We cannot

White customers will not come to

They will go to White stores.

It is not

only that White merchants can provide quality merchandise;
White customers prefer White stores."20
One Korean shopkeeper recalled, "One of my friends
opened a nice restaurant in a White area.
came.

No customers

Soon he learned of a rumor that fleas and lice were

in his food.

That was a rumor spread certainly by a White

restaurant owner.

He lost $300,000 overnight."

It was a

general consensus among Koreans that Korean shopkeepers

20 Loewen (1971) shows that White shopkeepers who opened
business in Black areas were isolated and degraded by other
Whites in the Mississippi Delta.
Because of it, Whites
shopkeepers avoided Black areas.
However, the Chinese,
because of their ambiguous social status, could open
businesses in Black areas and succeeded.
Because the status
rule in New York city is not quite the same as in the South,
I think there is less pressure (but there is certainly
pressure) for Whites not to open business in Black areas.
Many Korean shopkeepers expressed that White customers look
down on Koreans and are very demanding.
However, Korean
shopkeepers in Black areas expressed that their status is
degraded because of the low status of Blacks (see chapter 5
and 7 for more discussion).
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cannot succeed in White neighborhoods except in laborintensive businesses such as green groceries, dry cleaners,
and fish markets.21
Around 1980, there were already more than twenty Korean
stores on 125th Street in Harlem.

The stores included wig

stores, green grocery stores, fish markets, clothing stores,
and variety stores.

During 1981-82, Lloyd Williams,

president of the Uptown Chamber of Commerce now dominated by
Black businessmen, estimated that "Koreans had opened two
out of every three new businesses on 125th street" (Mew York
Times. Sept. 11, 1982).
around 1985.

The number soon reached fifty

Sneaker and shoe stores, small restaurants,

jewelry stores, and dry cleaners were added.
were introduced in 1987.

Nail shops

The number of Korean stores in

1990 was about sixty-six.22
Within fifteen years, the Koreans had taken over more
than one-third of the 160 stores on the busiest street in
Harlem, 125th Street.

"For years, 125th Street was a street

21 Because the children of White shopkeepers who owned
labor-intensive businesses such as green groceries already
had professional jobs or did not like to work hard, the
White shopkeepers had to sell the stores to others.
Korean
immigrants appeared at the right time to take over those
businesses.
The Korean shopkeepers also destroyed the green
grocery business of Whites by providing cheaper and better
vegetables.
One Korean green grocer recalled, "After I
opened my business, nearby White shopkeepers closed their
stores one by one. And Koreans took over their business.
I
put in extra labor to clean vegetables and sell them
cheaply.
Whites didn't clean enough."
22 The number fluctuated because
stores while others closed theirs.

some

Koreans

opened

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

new

67
made to be off-limits to Blacks, and property owners [mostly
Jews and Italians] have not rented to Blacks," said Lloyd
Williams.

"Now they see Asian merchants where Blacks

couldn't get in" (Village Voice. July 12, 1988).
One Black shopkeeper in the area responded to the
influx of Korean shopkeepers:
Some feel that their anger could easily explode and
then Koreans could be their targets, for they are seen
by disadvantaged Afro-Americans to be foreign
exploiters who don't live there, don't employ people
from the neighborhood, take from the community and give
nothing in return. The riots and boycotts in Harlem
were the visceral reaction of people no longer able to
suppress their anger and frustration, (quoted by
Village Voice. July 12, 1988)
A boycott toward Korean shopkeepers began as early as 1981.
The complaints and boycotts among Blacks toward Korean
shopkeepers continued not only in New York City but also in
Chicago, Washington, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Los Angeles.
Black rap songs (Ice Cube's "Black Korea"), Black movies
("Boyz N the Hood" and "Do the Right Thing"), White movies
("Falling Down"), and Korean movies ("Western Avenue") deal
with Korean shopkeepers and their conflict with Blacks.
This increasing attention within popular culture to the
conflict between Black residents and Korean shopkeepers show
that the presence of Korean immigrants in Black
neighborhoods is an important issue in current times.

Conclusion
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Blacks, who were discriminated and segregated because
of White racism, demanded jobs and fair treatment from White
businessmen when they dominated Harlem.

Since the law and

the politicians were on the side of the White shopkeepers,
boycotts became a prevalent tactic beginning in the 1930s
and drew support from various segments of the residents.

High unemployment, deteriorating housing conditions, police
brutality, and racism also contributed to sporadic riots and
uprisings, depending on different perspectives.
In comparison with White race riots which took many
Black lives during the 19th century, the Black riots were
mainly directed toward property rather than people.

Some

scholars described the Black riots as "commodity riots"
(Graham and Gurr 1969:397) or "consumer revolts"(Sturdivant
1969:3).

But these riots were not about commodities.

These

were against White domination and discrimination over
Blacks.

The Black rioters could not attack White people due

to the complex White domination.23

Therefore, authority

23 This was clear during the LA riots in April 1992. White
areas were well protected during the riots while Korean
areas were abandoned by the police.
Half of all property
damage during the riot, about $400,000,000 damage, and 60%
of all burned stores (about 2,400), were owned by Korean
shopkeepers in the area of the riots and in nearby Koreatown
(Korea Times of Mew Y o r k . May 11, 1992). While Whites
killed Blacks during the race riots in the 19th century,
Blacks do not kill Whites during their riots in the 20th
century. This reflects the fact that while the Whites who
killed Blacks in the 19th century were seldom severely
prosecuted or not prosecuted at all. Blacks who kill Whites
would get very severe setences through the "Justice" system.
Thus, there is more protection for Whites.
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and property became the main targets of riots in Black
areas, as the local symbols of White domination (National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968:6).

Policemen,

storeowners, and landlords were those with whom the ghetto
residents had direct contact.

Many Black residents

experienced White domination and racial prejudice through
their everyday contacts with them.
The Black residents received daily humiliation and
insults in their contacts with policemen, storeowners, and
landlords.

As Baldwin (1969) put it, the Black residents

"very often carried insults home" from policemen and
storeowners.

The humiliation ran deep when they were

totally excluded. As shown earlier, "what whitey don't
understand is that America is a damn rich country and she
flashes this richness in the brother's face and tells him,
vIt ain't for you'" (New York Times. April 8, 1968).
The frustration came through exclusion not only from
wealth but also from power and culture.

Despite the

spectrum of different orientations, expressed from the
Garveyites to the Black Panther Party, these movements all
maintained that economic autonomy is closely related to
political and cultural autonomy.

From the "Buy Black"

movement to the "Black Power" movement, Blacks of inner-city
areas had hopes at the beginning, that never really brought
the desired changes.
Since many Harlem shopkeepers were Jewish, the boycotts

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70

in the 1930s had some anti-Semitic undertones repeated by
many Black nationalist leaders in the 1960s.

Many

nationalist leaders were accused of being anti-Semitic and
anti-White.

Many Black leaders were harassed and arrested

by local, state, and federal governments.
put in jail.

Many of them were

While they were described as criminals in the

"White" society, they commanded sizable support from the
Black community.
When Korean shopkeepers became a large group of
storeowners on 125th Street in the early 1980s, the conflict
between Black residents and Korean shopkeepers started.

The

Black residents carried home insults and humiliation again.
The Korean shopkeepers took money out of Harlem.

Yet

despites these similarities with the conflict between the
Black residents and Jewish shopkeepers, the situation is
different in several aspects.
First of all, New York's City Hall was in the hands of
a Black mayor in 1990.

The main shopkeepers changed from

Jews to Koreans, whose population in New York City is very
small and thus whose political influence at the City Hall is
very limited.

Black people experienced the Civil Rights

Movement and its achievement and frustration through the
last half-century.

While many professional and middle-class

Blacks left for other areas, Black residents in Harlem
became poorer during the 1970s and 1980s.

New York State

welfare grant decliend through the last two decades.
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the welfare grant paid 110% of the federal poverty line in
1975, they paid 66.7% of the poverty line in the late 1980s
(New York City Interfaith Hunger Policy Task Forse 1989:4).
In 1989, the poverty rate was 43.6% and per capita income
was about $ 6,737 for Blacks in a Harlem census track24
which included various Korean stores and also boycotted
Korean stores (1990 Census of Population and Housing Summary
Tape File 3A, New York County, Tract 213.01).
The process of the conflict between Blacks and Korean
shopkeepers will be discussed in detail in chapters five and
six.

Before discussing the conflict between Korean

shopkeepers and Blacks in Harlem and Brooklyn, I will
discuss the immigration of Koreans to America and the
emergence of Korean shopkeepers in New York City in the
following two chapters.

These chapters will help us to

understand how the Koreans are put into contact with poor
Blacks in certain situations.

By understanding the process

by which social conditions for Korean shopkeepers are
S'

consituted, we can understand better the constraints and
environments which limit and guide the activities of Korean
shopkeepers.

24 There were 3,503 Blacks, 157 Whites, 18 Asians, 47 native
Americans, and 277 others living in the area. (1990 Census
of Population and Housing Summary Tape File 3A, New York
County, Tract 213.01)
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CHAPTER THREE
"TO A DREAM COUNTRY": KOREAN IMMIGRATION TO
THE UNITED STATES AND NEW YORK CITY

After my firm went bankrupt in 1980, I was
deeply frustrated.
I decided to leave Korea and
came to America alone in 1981. After I converted
to Christianity, I always prayed for my family.
I
missed my family very much. I swept away tears
often.
I worked for a friend of mine in
Philadelphia, but soon moved to New York City and
found a job at a fish market.
Tears came down all
day long when I started to clean fish on the first
day.
I thought, "I was the owner of a small
company in Korea but now I am just cleaning
fish...."
I regretted my past again and again....
Anyhow, my family was able to come to America nine
months later, (a Korean fish market owner)
When I arrived here, my husband was a fish
cleaner. What a smell and workI
I could not stop
crying.... Soon, I started to work with him at
the same fish market. Whenever I heard the sound
of an airplane, tears fell down.
I really wanted
to fly back to my country....
I had thought that
America was a really rich and White country.
But
all that I could see were dirty streets and poor
Blacks.
I could not believe it.
I asked my
husband many times, "Is this really America?"
(his wife)
The America-Korea Connection and the Early Immigration
Beginning in the 16th century, European countries have
sailed eastward to contact Asian countries for trade and
colonialization.

In the early 19th century, Britain,

France, Russia, and the United States finally arrived near
the Korean peninsula and displayed their interest in trade
and colonialization.

The Korean government rejected Western

demands for trade and closed her doors out of fear for
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similar disasters which China had endured after her clashes
with the Western powers in the early and mid-19th century
(Lee 1984:262-266).
The United States as well as the European powers
intruded many times into the Korean peninsula with force in
the mid 19th century (Chay 1990).

Finally, Japan was

successful in forcing Korea to open her doors in 1876.

Soon

after, Korea and the United States of America signed the
Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1882.

Britain, Russia,

Germany and France followed the United States.

The Korean

peninsula soon became the battlefield of China, Japan, and
Russia for control of this strategic location in East Asia.
Here, Japan fought China in 1894, and Russia in 1904.

Japan

won both wars.
The Sino-Japanese War in 1894 uprooted a large number
of Korean peasants, and many of them moved to major port
cities in hope of finding employment (Yun 1977:34-35).

When

a long drought struck Korea in 1901, the Hawaiian Sugar
Planters' Association explored the prospect of employing
Koreans as farm laborers.

They wanted to replace the

militant Japanese who demanded higher wages and better
working conditions.

They tried to import European laborers,

but Europeans were not willing to work for low wages1
1 Even Europeans received better wages, better housing, and
one acre of land, and they were not willing to work under
such poor conditions.
They could get better wages on the
continent.. Asians came to work in Hawaii for less wages
(Europeans got $18-20 a month while Asians got $15), worse
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(Patterson 1977). After the annexation of Hawaii to the
United States in 1898, contract labor2 became illegal and
laborers were legally free to find better employment. Many
of them left for the continental United States where they
could often get twice the pay (Patterson 1988:13). The
Association contacted the minister of the United States
legation in Korea.

The minister asked the Korean government

to permit Korean migration to Hawaii.

The Korean

government, who feared famine after the severe drought of
1901, allowed the emigration (Yun 1977).
In December 1902, the first group of Koreans,

121

emigrants, left Inchon for Hawaii, and during the next three
years a total of 7,226 Koreans left Korea for Hawaii (Yun
1977:33).

Most immigrants came from the port cities of

Korea where they had engaged in manual labor.3

Most of

housing, and no land (Patterson 1977:17-18).
2 This contract labor was similar to indentured labor.
The
contract specified the wage and the duration of labor in the
plantations for the imported laborers.
It was illegal to
violate the contract for farm laborers.
Since the contract
was a result of a very unequal relationship between the
planters and the poor peasants or laborers in Asian
countries, imported laborers worked under abysmal working
conditions without freedom to leave the farm until the
expiration of the contract.
Many farm laborers lived with
very low wages, harsh supervision, and poor housing.
Remember that Africans and Europeans were imported as
indentured laborers to the American South during the 17th
century.
3 "Chinese and Japanese immigrants to Hawaii were mostly
peasants, but only one-seventh of the Korean immigrants were
peasants, the others were common laborers, coolies, lowgrade government officials, ex-soldiers, students, house
servants, mine workers, and political refugees." (Yun, Yo-
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them were Protestants who had converted through the
influence of American missionary activities after 1882.
"American missionaries had encouraged and persuaded Korean
Christians to depart from their homeland, which was deeply
imbued with the Confucian culture of ancestor worship"(I.
Kim 1981:23).4 One Korean immigrant to Hawaii stated/
the great and good missionary... appeared in Korea and
began telling the wonderful story of the Cross...
Eagerly he asked of its power and a sample of its
results.
The one was told him by the missionaries, the
other was pointed out to him in the advanced life of
the United States.
Soon the United States was the hope
of Korea, for was it not there that the wondrous Cross
had brought beneficient results? Was it not worth the
while of any timid, downtrodden Korean laborer to make
the attempt to reaching this haven of peace and plenty?
As the Korean embraced Christianity he began to look
for a place where it might be lived in peace.(T. Yi
1932:47, quoted by H. Kim 1977b:49)
The immigrants worked in plantations as farm workers.
This immigration was soon stopped by the influence of the
Japanese government which sought to protect Japanese
plantation workers and to limit the anti-Japanese activities
by Koreans in Hawaii in 1905 (Patterson 1988).5

Before the

jun 1977:35)
4 The number of Christian converts in Korea increased very
rapidly through the 1890s and the 1900s and the number
reached almost 200,000 by 1910 (Paik 1970).
Since
Christianity was considered heresy at the time, the
Christians were easily ostracized by other Koreans.
The
Christian converts were labeled as "foreign Koreans" (Kang
1987:10).
5 "In 1902, there were 31,029 Japanese immigrants working on
sugar cane farms in Hawaii, 73.5 percent of the total 42,242
sugar cane workers on the Islands... With an increasing
number of Korean workers on the farms, Japanese workers
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farm work immigration, there were some Koreans who stayed in
the United States to study or to do business, but the number
was less than fifty by 1902 (Choi 1979).

Some 500 political

refugees, who opposed Japanese rule over Korea, were allowed
to enter the United States by 1924 (Mangiafico 1988:79).
Because the farm workers were mostly bachelors, they sent
photos to obtain brides from Korea.
The National Origins Act enacted in 1924, banned the
immigration of all Asians.6

Because of this Act, the

pressed their government to influence the Korean government
to suspend Korean immigration to Hawaii." (Yun 1977:39-40)
6 Until 1875, there were no immigration laws in the United
States.
It meant that anyone who wanted to immigrate to the
United States could immigrate freely. The American
government gave up this Open-Door Policy gradually.
Congress introduced laws for immigration restriction in
1875, 1882, 1885, and 1888, the restriction culminated with
the National Origins Act of 1924.
In the 1870s and 1880s, convicts, prostitutes, persons
likely to become public charges, Chinese, and contract
laborers were prohibited.
In terms of ethnic groups, the
Chinese were singled out, because of the imagined threat of
a mass influx of Chinese, the fear of competition in labor
market, and the racism of White Americans. After the shift
of the European immigration from northwestern Europe to
southeastern Europe during the 1890s, the earlier European
immigrants were alarmed at the possible challenge to their
racial and cultural domination. The farmers and industrial
workers feared the possible threat to their economic safty
from new immigrants.
The Quota Act of 1921 restricted "the immigration of
any nationality to 3 percent of those residing in the United
States according to the 1910 census of the foreign-born
population"(Kung 1962:81). The National Origins Act of 1924
limited the annual quota to 2% of the population of each
nationality of the 1890 census. Congress prohibited the
immigration of many Asians by the Immigration Act of 1917
which imposed the barred zone, "natives of which were
declared inadmissible to the United States" (Kung 1962:292).
While the Act of 1924 imposed quotas for Europeans, the Act
prohibited the immigration of all Asians. All Asians were
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immigration from Korea became almost impossible after 1924.
Until 1945, it is thought that there were less than 10,000
Koreans in the United States (Yu 1986:14). The real influx
of Korean immigrants to the United States started after the
introduction of a new immigration law in 1965.

The Immigration Act of 1965
The introduction of a new immigration law in 1965,
which changed the National Origins Act of 1924, made a major
influx of Korean immigrants to the United States possible.
The Act of 1924, which prohibited the immigration from Asia
and thus from Korea, was "designed in the 1920s to
perpetuate the cultural and political dominance of northern
and western European stocks and which had been reaffirmed
during the Eisenhower adminstration by the Immigration and
Nationality Act7 of 1952"(I. Kim 1981:27).
The new immigration act, which was formulated during
the strong Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, presented
more liberal openings to the non-Whites.

Skill and kinship

became two major criteria to select immigrants to the United
States.

In other words, immigration now was allowed for

ineligible for citizenship.

(Kung 1962:80-82)

7. This Act reduced the annual immigration quota of any
nationality to 0.166% of the number of that nationality
residing in the United States in 1920 - While the annual
quota for northwestern Europe was 125,000, the quota for
southeastern Europe was 26,000 between 1949-1958 (Kung
1962:292).
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family reunions or for occupations where employers could not
find American applicants (I. Kim 1981:26-28).

Under the new

law, each country was assigned with a maximum qota of
20,000, and the ceiling for the Eastern and Western
Hemispheres was respectively limited to 325,000 each.

The

children, parents, and spouses of American citizens were
exempted from the quota (I. Kim 1981:26^28).
Even before the new immigration act, a considerable
number of Korean immigrants had entered the United States as
wives of American citizens.

They were called "war brides"

because they were usually Korean wives of American soldiers
who were stationed in Korea after the defeat of Japan in
1945, and also after the Korean war.

The total number of

these was 6,400 by 1964. Another major group immigrating to
the United States were orphans adopted by American families.
The total number of them was 5,300 by 1964. Some students,
who came to the United States to study, also stayed after
their graduation. The total number of immigrants from Korea
to the United States from 1950-64 was only about 15,000
(United States Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Annual Reports, 1950-1964).
After the passage of the new immigration law in 1965,
Korean immigration to the United States dramatically
increased through family reunions and professional job
applications. Under the new law, some professionals such as
nurses, physicians, and dentists could immigrate to the
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United States without a pre-secured job certificate.

The

shortage of medical professionals, especially in large
cities, made the liberal openings to the immigration of
medical professionals possible.

It is estimated that at

least 13,000 Korean medical professionals immigrated to the
United States by 1977 (I. Kim 1981:148).

Other skilled

laborers as well as medical professionals found their jobs
in large cities such as Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago.
These cities became the nuclei for the expansion of Korean
communities.

When the American job market declined during

the late 1970s, and the ever-increasing number of Korean
Americans could invite more Korean relatives from Korea,
immigrants for professional skills declined while immigrants
for kinship reunion reached 92% of all Korean immigrants in
1981 (Light and Bonacich 1988:145).
The code of family reunion made the chain migration
possible for Korean immigrants.

If one migrated to the

United States, then he/she could bring their family members.
The family members would bring their brides or bridegrooms
and again, the spouses would bring their own family members
from Korea.

Thus, there was an endless chain reaction

effect upon migration.

The quota, 20,000 per year, assigned

to Korea was always exhausted.

Many others such as Korean

wives and children of U.S. soldiers could immigrate as non
quota immigrants.

The annual number of Korean immigrants to

the United States steadily increased from 3,100 in 1966 to
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33,000 in 1976.

Since 1977, it remains around 29,000-35,000

per year .(The United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Annual Reports, 1965-1989).
This change of Korean immigration made the rapid growth
of the Korean community possible.

The "estimated" Korean

population in America was 113,000 in 1970 (Yu 1977).

This

soon increased to 460,000 in 1980 (Kco and Yu 1981:4), and
to more than 1,000,000 now.8
Korean-American Population in the United States
Year
1910
Number 4,994

1930 1950*
8,321 8,176

1960*
14,331

1970
70,598

1980
354,329

1990
799,000

* American-born Koreans were not included? complete data not
available.
** These numbers are different from the 'estimated' number
of Korean population (see footnote 8).
Source:U. S. Bureau of Census
Census of the Population (1910-1980).
Summary Report of 1990 Census (1990).

Who Immigrated to the United States and Why?
During the 1900s, the majority of Korean immigrants
were poor urban "Christians"

(Yun 1977).

laborers or low-level public officials.

They had been poor
Because of their

8 The population of 1,000,000 includes not only Korean
immigrants but also students, businessmen, visitors, and
illegal residents who do not have permanent resident status
nor American citizenship. The number is unclear since there
is no precise mechanism for counting them.
To count the
number of illegal Koreans living in the United States is
impossible. Census reports usually underestimate the Korean
population in the United States. Because of English
difficulty and other problems, many Koreans did not answer
the census questionnaire.
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religion, they were estranged from other Koreans and many of
them also experienced economic hardship.

With encouragement

from American missionaries, thousands of them immigrated to
Hawaii.

But religion was not a significant factor after

1945 in Korea.

The first president of Korea was a

Christian, and Christianity became one of the most powerful
religions during the last several decades in Korea.

There

has been a great tolerance of religion in Korea and religion
was gradually considered to be an individual question rather
than a public or political question after 1945.

However,

Chritianity is the primary religion of migrants to the U.
S ., and Christianity reamins the dominant religion among
Korean immigrants.

While about a quarter of the total

population are Christians in Korea, about 80% of all Korean
immigrants are Christians in the United^ States.9
After the liberalization of the immigration process in
1965, the majority of Korean immigrants were well-educated
and from the urban middle-class.

The 1980 census report

shows that 52% of Korean-American males over 25 years old
and 22% of Korean-American females over 25 years old
graduated from four-year colleges.

Compared to 22% for

American White males and 14% for White females, the rate of
college graduation of Koreans in America is very high
(Census of Population, Bureau of Census, 1980).

In fact,

9 This is also in great contrast to the situation of
Koreans in Japan.
The majority of Koreans in Japan are
Buddhists.
Buddhism is the most popular religion in Japan.
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the Koreans are the best-educated ethnic group in the United
States.

A nationwide mail survey of Koreans in 1979 found

that 66.5% of the repondents had received a college
education (Chung Anq Daily Mews of L.A.. 1979, quoted by Koo
and Yu 1981:8).
The Korean immigrants came from urban-middle class
backgrounds which includes white collar workers, public
officials,, doctors, nurses, pharmacists, small and mediumsize businessmen, and students.

In 1973, 65% of Korean

immigrants were from professional or managerial backgrounds
(Yu 1982:51).

However, the number of Korean immigrants from

a professional or managerial background gradually declines,
and the number of Korean immigrants for family reunion is
increasing (I. Kim 1981:31).
In my research area in Central Harlem, 19 in a sample
of 28 Korean shopkepers10 answered to my formal
questionnaire that they had graduated from a four-year
college.

Six others had completed at least high school.

Only two were limited to primary or junior high school
educations, and one did not answer.

Among the 28

shopkeepers, six had had their own small businesses in
Korea, nine had been white collar workers, two had been
10 My formal questionnaires were addressed only to
shopkeepers.
However, my conversation with Korean workers
revealed that less than half of Korean workers were college
graduates (excluding family members).
Thus, Korean
shopkeepers had relatively higher education than Korean
workers.
Korean workers were also younger than Korean
shopkeepers.
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teachers, two had been laborers, one had been a public
official, one had been a pharmacist, and three had not had
jobs because they were too young then.

Three had been

students who came to the United States to study.

Two of the

wives of them immigrated as nurses.
If they had middle-class status in Korea, why did they
give up their middle-class life and immigrate to America?
The most important reason cited for immigration by Koreans
has been an economic one (Light and Bonacich 1988:121).
Koreans heard only the good sides of the American economic
situations.

The American dollar was very valuable and

strong against the Korean w o n .

The individual annual income

of American people was at least ten times than that of
Korean people up till the early 1980s.

Thus a one month

salary in America was nearly as a one year income in Korea
during the 1970s.11

This huge discrepancy between incomes

served as the tremendous magnet attracting Korean people to
America.

Because of the high income in America, many

relatives of Korean Americans and professionals in Korea
aspired to immigrate to the United States to enjoy a more
11 As of 1993, average income in the U. S. is only about
three times that of Korea.
Thus, Korean white collar
workers in Korea are reluctant to immigrate to America these
days. Nowadays the immigration to America is not as popular
among Koreans in Korea anymore. Many Korean immigrants
lamented that if they had stayed in Korea their situation
might have been better. One Korean American who visited
Seoul, Korea, said with jealousy, "they [Koreans in Korea]
are living better than us [Korean-Americans]." That phrase
is not exactly true but expresses the feelings of many
Korean Americans.
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comforable life.

Other Koreans envied the ability to

immigrate to America.

It was a popular idea in Korea up

till the early 1980s that every one in the United States is
rich.

They did not know that a considerable part of the

American population is also poor.
One of my interviewees, who illegally immigrated to
America in 1981, thought that he could "pick up money in
America:"
Before I came to America, I had thought I could pick up
as much money as I wanted in America. Thus I decided
to immigrate to America to pick up money after my
business failure in Korea.
In fact, I could pick up
money on a beach when I immigrated to Los Angeles.
I
picked up a great number of empty cans on a beach and
exchanged them a cent per can.
I painted during
weekdays and picked up cans during weekends.
Another immigrant put it this way:
I was a salesman without a college education in Korea.
But you know, I didn't like to live poor all my life.
I could only live from hand to mouth with my salary.
If your parents are poor and you don't have a college
education, you will be poor all your life in Korea.
Since I could immigrate to America for family reunion,
I decided to make an adventure. Here, I can earn more
than educated people.
However, ecomonic reasons were not the only reasons.
Since the strong economic, political, and cultural
influences of the United States on Korea have continued ever
since the time, when South Korea was under the U.S. military
regime for three years after the defeat of Japan in 1945,
Korean people have related to many aspects of American
society.

Many Koreans admired not only the comfortable life
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of Americans, but also the cultural and educational
advances, as well as political stability of the United
States.12
Due to the oppressive regimes in Korea during the 1970s
and the early 1980s, and the severe tension between North
Korea and South Korea during the late 1970s, many Koreans
who feared possible political instability in Korea also
immigrated to the United States.

For North Korean

Christians who fled from communist North Korea during the
Korean War, America seemed an especially safe and attractive
place.

It was easier for them to leave South Korea than

others since they did not have strong kinship ties in South

Korea.

They were feared being the first victims in the

event that North Korea invaded South Korea.13

They have a

strong influence in the Korean community in New York City
(I. Kim 1981:35). One of my interviewees said:
My father was a small landlord and a Christian in North
Korea. After the establishment of the Communist regime
by Kim II Sung, they confiscated his land. My family
was classified as reactionary.
The commies bothered us
everyday. We couldn't find any hope for life in North
Korep.. My family escaped to South Korea before 6.25
(the Korean War)... My brother came eventually to
12 However, an increasing number of Koreans, especially
students, became more critical of American support for the
military government in Korea after 1980.
13 Tension between South Korea and North Korea was high,
especially in the late 1970s. When an American captain was
killed by North Korean soldiers near Panmunjum in 1975, the
tension was so high that many Koreans believed that the war
would start soon. Both Korean governments tended to
exaggerate the possibility of war in order to oppress
internal dissent.
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America and established his business.
members followed him....

All other family

The authoritarian regime in South Korea also made some
intellectuals and professionals emmigrate to the United
States.

One ex-professor told me that he could feel the

pressure after he criticized the government.

Thus he

decided to leave Korea and drove a taxi in Manhattan for
several years.

Even though many others did not feel severe

fear or pressure, they aspired to possess the political
freedom that the citizens of the United States enjoyed.
The United States has also been an attractive place for
education for many Koreans.
centuries in Korea.

Education has been admired for

The discrepancy of earnings and

privilege between high school graduates and college
graduates is very large in Korea.

Degrees from good

universities in the United States have been a great
privilege for Koreans.

Koreans also knew that the American-

educated high bureaucrats, business leaders and professors
assumed the leading role in their respective areas.

Many

parents stated that they emmigrated for the education of
their children.

Many students who came to study in America

during the 1960s and the 1970s also stayed in the United
States after their graduation because they could find better
jobs in America, and they had already become accustomed to
American culture.
Many professionals, who could not find good jobs in
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Korea, also wanted to immigrate to America.
By the 1970s South Korea had a population whose
educationnal level was exceptionally high relative to
the economic development of the country.
Un- and
underemployment was common among college graduates. In
particular, Korea had difficulty absorbing the rapidly
expanding numbers of health professionals produced in
her own schools and hospitals. (Light and Bonacich
1988:111)
Thus the first block of immigrants who came to the United
States as professionals were these medical professionals for
whom demand was high during the late 1960s and the early
1970s (I. Kim 1981:chap.5).
However, most Korean immigrants usually followed the
chain of connections which Korean immigrants could find.

If

they had some personal connections in the United States, it
would be easier for them to come to the United States.

Thus

connections to American personnel stationed in Korea, "war
brides," and previously immigrated Koreans were important
for the actual chain migration.

During the 1950s and 1960s,

Korean brides of American soldiers and those who were
working for American forces stationed in Korea were the
majority of Korean immigrants.

After the change of the

immigration law in 1965, relatives of the "war brides" and
many other Korean-Americans could easily immigrate to the
United States for family reunions.

The relatives of Korean-

Americans became an ever-increasing majority of new Korean
immigrants.

These kinship chains also helped new Korean

immigrants to open and manage their small businesses.
Then, why did urban middle-class Koreans immigrate to
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the United States?

First of all, the new immigration law

simplified the immigration of professionals, whom the United
States needed, by giving them more opportunities.

The

American consul in Seoul could select immigrants by giving
visas selectively.

Well-educated urban middle class Koreans

also had better connections and information about America.
Because Koreans studied English from 7th grade until college
graduation, the educated middle class commanded some
English.

Through education and news about America, and the

influence of American society upon Korea, they were
accustomed to some American culture.
However, as one Korean immigrant put it, "now some less
educated Koreas are allowed into the United States through
family reunions.

But 15 years ago, only higher-educated and

professional people were allowed to immigrate."

The

majority of present Korean immigrants come for family
reunion and are less educated than before.

Urban Settlements
As with other ethnic immigrants since the mid-19th
century, most Korean immigrants also settled in a few of the
largest metropolitan areas of the United States.

The major

areas for Korean settlement include Los Angeles, New York
City, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington
metropolitan areas.

The Korean population in these six

metropolitan areas occupies a clear majority of the Korean
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population in the United States.

Ninety three percent of

the Korean-American population was living in urban areas
while seventy four percent of the total American population
was living in urban areas in 1980 (Yu 1986:21).

Because of

economic opportunities, as well as family and ethnic
connections, Korean immigrants tend to settle in the
metropolitan areas.
Since their English was very limited and subtle racial
discrimination existed,14 the Korean immigrants did not
have many opportunities to obtain good jobs except through
the medical profession.

Thus, Korean immigrants preferred

to establish their own businesses rather than labor under
the supervision of "foreigners."15

Even those who had a

professional job such as nurses gave up their jobs to help
in their husbands' business.16

One Korean nurse recalled,

I immigrated to New York City with dozens of other
Korean nurses from Germany in 1972. We married here
and provided money for our husbands to establish small
businesses. We had a lot of trouble in the hospitals.
We had a poor command of English poor.
Collegues,
supervisors and other administrators despised us,
perhaps because of our poor English.
All of us often
14 In fact, English language problems and racism are
intermingled for many Koreans; it is difficult to separate
them.
15 Korean
immigrants
often differentiate
"us"
Americans] from "foreigners" [other Americans].

[Korean-

16 Since many well-established small businesses can deal
with considerable amount of money, small businessmen always
need reliable employees (a lot more things can be stolen by
employees than by customers). A professional nurse will
often give up her job to help husband's business. A small
businessman often earns more than $100,000 per year.
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wanted to quit.
Since their husbands needed extra
labor and they could make more money in a small
business, all but me eventually quit. Now 1 am left
alone....
I married a Korean graduate student here.
He
dropped out of his graduate school and opened his small
business. We hoped to continue our education to an
advanced level, but after opening a store and having
babies, we did not have time to do so.
I wanted to
quit the hospital, but my husband did not like the
idea. He is conservative and doesn't like adventure.
My job provides my family a safty net: a steady income
and health insurance. But I often still feel
frustrated in the hospital.
Korean immigrant white-collar workers or factory
workers also found it attractive to open their own
businesses.

When older immigrants, who spoke fluent

English, found their advancement in professional or whitecollar jobs limited because of racism or their lack of
ability, they simply turned to small business.

In general,

small business produces more income than many professional
or white-collar jobs.

Small businessmen need not concern

themselves with cultural and language nuisances or "foreign"
colleagues and supervisors.17

If they own their own

business, they become their own boss and work for
themselves.

Since they came from a country where the

average working hours per week had been the longest in the
world until recently and they were accustomed to work often

17 It is true only in a relative sense.
They experienced
many problems in their business becuase of their English
laguage problems. However, one Korean shopkeeper told me,
"if you know only how to count in English, you can open a
business.Jl
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10-12 hours a day, six days per week.18

Therefore, they

were eager to work longer, to make more money quickly.

They

could also mobilize family and kin members, and use cheap
but loyal co-ethnic workers.19
Since they could only open a store with small amount of
capital, they tended to concentrate in poor minority
neighborhoods.

Host their businesses were small and served

poor minorities neglected by White businessmen: the Blacks
in Los Angeles, New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia,
Atlanta, Washington, and many other smaller cities; Chicanos
in Los Angeles and in many Texan cities; and Puerto Ricans
and other minorities in New York City.

One Korean

businessman put it this way,
Many Koreans in this [New York] city work "twenty-five
hours" per day. We set up small businesses in run-down
areas where other people are afraid to g o . ... We have
helped restore areas like Harlem. That's why Mayor
Koch said that Koreans are number one. We open
businesses in parts of the city where [business] people

18 The average working hours in Korea had been longest in
the world for the last 20 years until 1988.
It was common
especailly for factory and white-collar workers to work for
10-12 hours per day, five and half or six days a week during
the 1970s and the early 1980s. Because the government and
capitalists oppressed the labor movements harshly, the
movement to improve working conditions and hours had not
been successful during that period. Another reason why the
Korean workers would work long hours might be that many
Korean workers were transformed from rural boys an4 girls
into fatory workers. While about 80% of the Korean
population was living in rural areas in 1960, now only about
15% live in there.
19 See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion.
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had given up.(C. Kim 1988:164)20

Expansion of Korean Community in Mew York City
New York City has been a center for immigrants for many
centuries.

About 24% of New York residents came from other

countries in 1980, and 31% of New York residents were
immigrants in 1990 (Arian et al. 1990:6).21

New York City

has been the second largest receiving city, next to Los
Angeles, of new Korean immigrants to the United States.
The beginning of Korean settlement in New York City
dated back to the 1900s.

However, the existence of a Korean

community in New York City was not visible before 1970,
because of the small size of the community.
In 1920, some seventy Koreans lived in New York, and
about thirty Christians from among them established the
first Korean church in the city, which still exists,
near Columbia University.
From that time until 1970,
when a large number of Korean immigrants began to enter
the city, the situation did not change much. A few
Korean-Americans lived in Manhattan, and students from
Korea came to America and stayed here or went back to
20 This raises the very important issue of why it is that
Koreans and not Blacks are opening businesses in Black
neighborhoods - this is the source of the conflict and
conflicting interpretations about American society between
Black residents and Korean shopkeepers.
Both the reasons
and the conflicting interpretations will be discussed in
chapters 4, 5, and 6.
21 In 1970, there were 1,437,058 foreign-born residents
among 7,894,862 New Yorkers.
In 1980, 1,670,199 were
foreign-born people among 7,071,639 and there were 2,227,000
(estimated by a 1988 CUNY survey) foreign-borns among
7,322,564 New Yorkers.
Thus the rate of foreign born
population is increasing.
The new immigrants include West
Indians, Latin Americans, and Asians. (Arian et al. 1990:56)
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Korea after their graduation. The total number did not
pass a few hundred.
The activities of the Korean
community were led by students. ( I . Kim 1981:182)
During the 1960s, an increasing number of Korean
students came to the United States to study.

Many

physicians also entered the United States for internship or
residency training through the Exchange Visitor Program.

The majority of them stayed here because of the poor
economic and job situations in Korea.

Many other students

also gave up their studies because of economic hardships or
sometimes because of their business success.

They turned to

small businesses such as wigs or Korean imports.
During the 1970s, some Koreans who had lived in
Manhattan moved to Flushing, Queens.

The new Korean

immigrants and other Korean immigrants who had lived in

small and mid-size cities came to New York and settled in
Flushing where the White middle-class had deserted in favor

of surburban areas .22

The Korean immigrants could find

relatively inexpensive and safe housing in Flushing, Queens,
and commuted to Manhattan where they had wig shops or green
grocery stores or worked for hospitals and others.

One

Korean businessman recalled moving to Flushing from
Manhattan,

We had lived in mid-Manhattan for several years.

Once

22 Korean immigrants whom I interviewed did not remember
whether there was racial conflict when they entered
Flushing. (Remember that a communty's transition in ethnic
or racial composition was usually accompanied by tension in
the United States.)
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we got our business going, we moved to Flushing,
Queens, in 1976.... Now, there are almost forty
thousand Koreans living in Queens.
Back then the
neighborhood was mostly Jewish. We found a nice
apartment with enough room for the kids, who were
becoming pretty active.
Our home in Flushing was very near the subway to
Manhattan [thus convenient to commute].... (C.Kim
1988:174)
Koreans and other Asians filled Flushing and eventually
expanded into neighboring communities following the No.7
subway line, which runs from Flushing through mid-Queens to
mid-Mahattan.23
The size of the Korean population in New York
metropolitan areas soon reached about 20,000 in 1972,
100,000 in 1980, and 200,000 in 1987(Korea Times of New
York, 1988).24 It is now estimated that around 70,000
Koreans are living in Queens and the rest are dispersed in
the Bronx-, Brooklyn, Long Island, and New Jersey.

After

Koreans amass some savings, they tend to move from New York
City to the surburban areas of Long Island and New Jersey.

23 See Kyeyoung Park (1990) for detailed discussion about
the spread of Korean immigrants into mid-Queens.
24 This number is exaggerated because some Korean
leaders and ethnic newspapers prefer a bigger number in
order to emphasize the importance of the Korean community in
the New York area and thus gain attention from others.
However, it is a good indication of how fast the Korean
community in the New York metropolitan area has expanded.
Professor Min in Queens College estimated the size of the
Korean population in the metropolitan area to be about
70.000 in the late 1980s.
The summary report of the 1990
census reported that the size of the Korean population is
96.000 in New York state and 39,000 in New Jersey.
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Conclusion
The immigration of Koreans to America reflects the
American immigration policy.

The American government

controls not only the number of immigrants but also the
their racial and ethnic composition.

The immigration policy

of the government also decides who can immigrate.

This

process implies that the government can discriminate over
certain groups of the population, based on some racial,
national, and occupational categories.

While Africans were

the least numerous immigrants during 1881-1983, Europeans
were the most numerous.25

After the changes of the

Immigration Act of 1965, Asians and people from Latin
America became the most numerous immigrants.
By importing large numbers of immigrants, the
government provides relatively cheap laborers for the
capitalists.

The availability of numerous immigrants,

sometimes combined with mechanization, pushed wages down.
Most of the immigrants took the unskilled, lower-paying
jobs.

The immigrants not only contributed to the expansion

of the American economy but also took jobs which might have
otherwise been available to lower-class Americans,
especially Blacks.

Thus, some Blacks expressed their

perception that "foreign" immigrants "stepped over" the

25 Total number of immigrants from Africa during 1881-1983
was 200,900; the number of European immigrants during the
same period was 28,045,800; and the number of Asian
immigrants was 3,897,500 (1987:42-43).
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shoulder of Blacks to move upward.
According to Wolf (1982:380)/ "Racial designations,
such as 'Indian' [Native America] or 'Negro,' are the
outcome of the subjugation of populations in the course of
European mercantile expansion."

Koreans were mobilized as

plantation laborers at the turn of this century, and after
1965 Koreans came to America as free labor and eventually
became incorporated as a predominantly shopkeeper ethnic
group.
In the process of the reproduction of American society,
various groups have been differentially segmented,
integrated, stigmatized, privileged, excluded, included,
incorporated, and displaced.
these processes.26

Korean immigrants experience

The introduction of new immigrants

requires not only a new economic incorporation, but also a
new symbolic and hierarchical incorporation into American
economic and racial relationships.

Korean immigrants

26 For example, Koreans also had to accept or develop new
identities as Asians in American context. Asian identity is
a very strange concept for Koreans in Korea.
But in
America, Korean immigrants are categorized and treated as
Asian.
This circumstance, coupled with their need to make
connections to other Asian groups to increase their power,
made them accept and develop some sense of Asian identity.
The concept of Korean may also change.
In Korea,
regional identity is very important.
However, in America,
Korean identity becomes more prominent than regional
identity because they meet and experience themselves as
Koreans or Asians in counter-position to Whites, Blacks, or
Hispanics in American life. This development of new
identities happens in the context of an already structured
playing field, that is, the racialized subjugation and
mobilization of world-wide labor through the American
economic and political system.
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concentrate in metropolitan areas and in small businesses in
poor urban neighborhoods not because their original intent
but because their circumstances in America made them
suitable for the small business.

This economic

incorporation into American society will be discussed in the
next chapter.
However, this economic incorporation also accompanies
their symbolic and hierarchical incorporation into American
racial relationships.

The vague conception of racial

hierarchy held by Korean immigrants has colored their
expectation of racial order in America.

Upon arrival it

must quickly be adjusted in order to incorporate and explain
their new experiences in America.

Other racial or ethnic

groups must also adjust their conceptions of racial
stratification in order to incorporate newly arrived groups
into their racial conceptions.
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CHAPTER FOUR
"BITTER FRUIT": EXPANSION OF KOREAN SHOPKEEPERS
IN NEW YORK CITY

I, my brother-in-law, and other family members
worked for my aunt's fruit and vegetable store in
Harlem. We saved all that we earned.
Two years
later, in 1983, we took over a fish market across
the street.
The cost was about $170,000. We got
some money from Keh [Korean rotating credit
club]1 and borrowed some other money from our
relatives.
Since our money was not enough for the
cost, we paid the remaining $100,000 to the
original store owner on a monthly basis for three
years after taking over the store.
My brother-in-law, my sister, my parents, and
I were working for the store. Meanwhile, my wife
and brothers arrived from Korea.
They also worked
with us in the store. We hired nobody in the
beginning.
My children were raised in the
store.... We could save enough money to open
another store soon. My brother-in-law opened a
small restaurant nearby, my brother opened a fish
market later in New Jersey, and another brother
also opened a fish market in downtown Manhattan.
(A Korean fish market owner)

Historical Recollection
New Korean immigrants and some Korean students found a
gold mine in the wig business during the late 1960s and
early 1970s because of the sudden popularity of wigs among
Black females.

To wear a wig was in vogue among Black

1 The sum of the money from Keh and from their relatives was
more than $100,000.
They used some of this money for an
operation fund. For K e h . see the section of Capital
Mobilization in this chapter.
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females in the mid 1960s.2
The artificial wig business was very brisk.

For many

Koreans and students, the wig business was a starting point
of their small capital accumulation for business.

One

Korean importer in mid-Manhattan remembered his small
capital accumulation in the mid-1970s,
My wife went to various wholesale stores during the
day, while I worked at a factory. We were able to buy
wigs for $3 apiece in bulk orders.
On weekends I would
go into the streets and sell them.
I started out
peddling in Harlem....
In one day of selling wigs I could make as much as
one week salary in the factory.
Soon I left the
textile job and expanded my selling trips to Newark and
Philadelphia.
Then I found out where the black
neighborhoods were, where people appreciated our lowcost merchandise....
I would walk down a street and see someone having
a party in their backyard. They'd say, "We don't want
to buy any wigs."
I'd say, "Okay. I'll just rest here
for a minute."
I'd look around and choose the most
beautiful lady.
I'd go up to her and start to talk:
"Whether you want to buy one or not, I'd like for you
to try this new style one time." I'd take out a wig
that was very beautiful. She'd shout, "Oh! That's
beautiful." And all the people would come around and
buy.(C. Kim 1988:171-172)

Korean immigrants were soon established in the wig
business.

For example, the above wig peddler became a wig

wholesaler after several months of peddling.

He and his

wife imported and distributed wigs to many Korean immigrants

2 One wig peddler of that time remembered, "Black ladies
liked the wigs because they don't have long straight hair.
Most couldn't afford to buy a $300 or $400 human-hair wig.
My wigs looked like human hair but only cost $10.
They were
made from a nylon material.
The colors were black, red, all
shades of brown" (C. Kim 1988:173).
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and graduate students.

In a short period, many Koreans

flocked into the wig business.

They established wholesale

stores in mid-Manhattan or retail stores in Black
neighborhoods.

They imported human-hair and artificial wigs

from Korea3 and distributed them
States.

all over the United

As they could import cheap wigs directly from

Korea, they could compete with Jewish wig wholesalers.4
The Korean wholesalers who imported wigs mainly from Korea
organized the Korean Wig Business Association in New York
City in 1972 (Korea Times of New York 1988:46).

They tried

to monopolize and regulate the wig business through co
operation among members but failed because of the threat of
the anti-trust litigation by Jewish wig wholesalers and the

3. Korea started its export-oriented economic development in
the early 1960s. They exported various cheap merchandise
produced by very cheap labor. Thus, their labor-intensive
products such as artificial wigs were very competitive
because of their cheap price. By 1970, the wig industry was
the leading export industry in Korea, earning 94 million
dollars (I. Kim 1981:127).
The wholesale price of an
artificial wig was around $ 3 and the retail price was
around $10 in the mid 1970s.
There were many human hair collectors during the 1960s
in Korea.
I also saw them shout in villages, "I buy hair, I
buy hair."
In order to sell long hair which commanded
higher price, many women and girls in Korean villages did
not have their hair cut for long time.
4 Labor intensive wig manufacturing was in a boom in Korea
from the 1960s because of the increasing demand from the
United States. Most wig products in Korea were sold to
America (I. Kim 1981: 124-125).
However, Korean wholesalers
in mid-Manhattan had connections to Korea and could import
directly from Korean wig makers.
Thus, they could buy
cheaper than Jewish wholesalers who bought from importers in
America or imported from Korean exporters who again gave the
order to subcontractors.
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severe competition among Korean importers.
Because of the sudden waning in wig popularity,
accelerated by the oil shock of 1973, many people started
dumping wigs.
1970s.

The wig business collapsed during the mid-

However, many Korean who accumulated small capital

in a wig business could establish other kinds of wholesale
or retail businesses.5
Some green grocery stores were taken over by a few
Korean immigrants in the early 1970s.6

By offering

customers well-cleaned and trimmed vegetables,7 they could
attract many New Yorkers to their small stores away from
supermarkets and other groceries (Young 1983:54-55).

They

took over the business from retiring Jewish and Italian
5 For example, nine out of 28 Korean shopkeepers in my
research area started their life in America as a wig
retailer, peddler, or salesman. One Korean shopkeeper still
owns a very successful wig store in the area. His parents,
two brothers, and sister established the store there in
1976. The annual sales for the store was about one million
dollars and 20% to 30% of that was profit.
His parents are
retired now, and the two elder brothers and one sister moved
out to start other business.
He said that there were many
wig shops and wig peddlers in the area until the late 1970s,
but every one left except him after the demand for wigs
declined.
6 The beginners of the green grocery business included
Koreans from Brazil or Argentina. They emigrated from Korea
to Latin America during the 1960s but migrated to the United
States after the change of the Immigration Act in 1965. As
a means of population control, the Korean government
encouraged migration of Koreans to Latin America during the
1960s.
7 One of my interviewees said that vegetables and fruits
were sold without cleaning and trimming by Jews and Italians
previously.
He said that Koreans changed the face of green
grocery stores.
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green grocery owners.

Soon the green grocery business

became the main small business for Koreans in New York City.
A few other Koreans also ventured into other small
businesses such as small garment manufacture, deli
groceries, or fish markets from the middle and late 1970s.
The common characteristics of the wig and green grocery
business were cheap starting capital in relation to other
businesses.

In the case of the wig business, anyone could

start wig peddling without any initial capital.

In a 1981

study, 70% of the sample of Korean green grocers (28 out of
40) said they started their green grocery business because
relatively little start-up capital was required in the
business (Young 1983:57).

Both the wig industry and the

green grocery business also depended on the extremely low
costs of labor at some point in the process.8
The green grocery business is also known for its
requirement of intensive labor in the process of retailing.
Other businesses which Koreans have taken over also required
intensive labor.

New Korean shopkeepers input their long

labor hours and free family labor9 for buying, cleaning,

8 The difference between the wig and vegetable businesses is
that for the wig business the ultra cheap labor existed in
Korea and for the vegetable business, Korean immigrants are
the source of cheap labor.
9 Because of Confucian ideology and the hard-presse,d urgency
required for establishment in a foreign country (see Park
1990:chap.4 for the discussion of the establishment), their
family members (brothers, sisters, wife, sons, and
daughters) were loyal to their family head.
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and arranging vegetables and fruits.

Because they competed

well with Italian and Jewish green grocers, many Italian and
Jewish green grocers gave up their businesses.10

M&ny

other Italian and Jewish green grocers also gave up because
they became old enough to retire, and their sons did not
want to continue the business.

Koreans took over those

establishments or established new green grocery stores (I.
Kim 1981:281).

In 1991, about 85% of about 1,500 green

grocery stores in New York City were owned by Koreans.

They

also owned about 80% of 900 fish markets.
After amassing a small capital in labor-intensive small
businesses, many Koreans moved to other small businesses
such as liquor stores, dry cleaning shops, variety shops,
stationery shops, and clothing stores.

Because of this

aggressive advance in various small businesses, the rate of
self-employed persons among Koreans is the highest among all
ethnic groups.11

A survey done in 1977 revealed that an

astounding 32% of Korean households in the United States

10 One Korean green grocer told me that an Italian gave up a
green grocery after he and other Koreans had opened green
grocery stores in an area.
He heard that some Korean green
grocery stores were set on fire because of this kind of
competition.
Some fish markets were also set on fire.
This
is a result not only of competition with other ethnic groups
but also of competition among Korean immigrants.
11 "Koreans have the highest business-ownership rate of any
ethnic group, according to the Census Bureau's most recent
survey, conducted in 1987. That study showed that more than
one of every 10 Korean-Americans is a business owner. The
figure for non-minorities is one in 15; for blacks, it's one
in 67" (Wall Street Journal. June 16, 1992).
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were engaged in business and that an additional 28% were
thinking of opening a business.12

About 9,000

establishments were believed to be owned by Koreans in New
York City in 1,986 (Korea Times of New York, 1988:56).

While

their population consisted of less than 2% of the total
population in New York City, they owned 5% of all the
establishments in New York City.

This is a great change

from 1967 when the number of Korean business establishments
in New York City could be counted with fingers (Korea Times
of New Y o r k . Sep. 25, 1990) .

Networks and Overwork
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, once Koreans
have immigrated to America, they could invite their family
members.

The majority of Koreans immigrated to the U.S. as

family members.

When Korean immigrants to New York City

arrive at the Kennedy International Airport in Queens,
mostly their family, kin members, and friends who fcave
already immigrated to New York metropolitan area welcome
them at the airport.

These family and kin members are the

guides in the New World for the recently arrived immigrants.
If a new immigrant's family or kin members already have an
business, the new immigrant's family or kin will certainly
hire him/her.

For the Koreans who come from other parts of

12 Notice the difference from the footnote 11. There are
various possibilities.
It may be caused by the difference
of unit of count: individual and household.
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the U.S. to New York area, stores of their family and kin
members also provide the first working place in many cases.
If new immigrants have no relatives who own stores,
they can use other ethnic networks.

They can look in the

classified advertisements of Korean ethnic newspapers.

They

can also church members in the Korean church where they
attends.13

They can also visit Korean stores by themselves

and inquire about jobs.

Since Korean store owners prefer

co-ethnic workers for various reasons,14 the new immigrants
have a greater possibility of finding a job in a Koreanowned store.

Because of Korean small business in New York

area, one Korean business leader boasted,
society, there is no unemployment problem"

"In our Korean
(quoted by I. Kim

1987:226-27).

13 There are more than 600 Korean churches in New York City.
Approximately 80% of the Koreans in New York City attend
church.
Churches provide sources of various networks for
Koreans: job opportunities, capital mobilization, counseling
and assistance for domestic life, and political
mobilization.
14 Because store owners need reliable laborers who do not
and who always work hard, Korean store owners prefer
Koreans, and better get, relatives.
Koreans believe they
work harder than other ethnic groups.
Because of English
language problems, Korean owners feel more comfortable with
workers who speak Korean.
Because of the wage difference
between Korean workers and Hispanic workers (they are
usually undocumented immigrants from Central America), many
Korean green grocery owners prefer Hispanic workers for
simple but hard work.
The Hispanic workers usually got $250
-300 while Korean workers got $300- 450 in 1989. Both
groups worked about 10-12 hours per day, six or seven days a
week.
However, if a worker is needed on whom the owner can
rely, like cashiers or managers, relatives or fellow Korean
workers are preferred.
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It is almost impossible for most new Korean immigrants,
with the exception of qualified doctors and nurses, to
obtain professional jobs even though many of them have
college degrees.

Those who find a job in American companies

often feel frustrated because of their problems in English,
skills, lack of status, and/or racism.

Even those who find

jobs in American companies will continue to look for jobs
and business through Korean community networks after saving
a small amount of capital because they think that they, as
Koreans, have little hope of being promoted, and that they
can earn more money through small business. It was wellknown among Koreans during the late 1980s that the income
from small businesses could range from $50,000 to

$100,000.15
Thus, most new Korean immigrants begin their lives in
America in a store owned by a fellow Korean.

Sung Soo Kim,

the president of Korean American Small Business Service
Center of Hew York, Inc., estimated that "in 1986 some 70
percent of employed Koreans in the New York Metropolitan
area found employment in Korean businesses"
Kim 1987:226).

(quoted in I.

In a sample of 28 shopkeepers in Harlem,

about two-thirds (18 of 28) began their life in America by
15 One Harlem shopkeeper told me in 1989 that a wellestablished Korean shopkeeper can earn at least $100,000 per
year.
That was also his expectation for his new business.
However, because of the grim expectation due to the
recession of 1991 and 1992, the estimate is changed.
Many
of the Korean shopkeepers in Harlem said the recession of
1991 was the worst period for them.
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working for Korean shopkeepers.16
When they begin to work in Korean stores, through
connections with kin, fellow Koreans, Korean store owners,
or the Kojrean news media, they quickly realize that their
most achievable goal in America is to become a store owner
and eventually a successful businessman.17

Thus, to save

money, open their own establishment, and expand their
business becomes the only hope for their future life in the
U.S.

For this dream, the new immigrants endure the long

hours and intensive labor of the green grocery stores, fish
markets, deli groceries, or garment factories with low pay
without medical or other fringe benefits.

It is common for

them to work 12-15 hours a day, six to seven days a week.
Not only do they have no

time

to spend money, they also have

no intention of spending

that

money.

In general, both spouses work together in the
beginning-

Koreans say that they usually spend the wages of

one person for living expenses and save the wages of the
other at the beginning.

The stories about saving

frequently reported in Korean ethnic newspapers.

money are
For

16 Four others were working for American companies.
Three
began their business as soon as they arrived here with money
they brought from Korea or they borrowed from their kin.
Three other situations were not clear.
17 All of Korean workers and small store owners whom I met
expressed this dream.
Because they think they cannot get a
privileged high-ranking job in America and that only
business is relatively open to them, many Koreans want to
compensate for their lack of status or downward mobility by
earning more money.
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example, one Korean taxi driver who immigrated in 1986
earned $2,500 and his wife earned $1,500 per month.

They

spent $2,000 for living expenses and deposited $2,000 into a
Keh.

Their goal was to save $150,000 till 1991 in order to

open a variety store (Korea Times of New York. Oct.2, 1989).
Single persons have more difficulty saving money than
couples:
A Korean green grocery owner who illegally entered into
America in 1977 had worked in five green grocery stores
in NYC for five years before he opened his own store on
Grand Concourse, Bronx.
He spent only 50 cents per
week for living costs.
50 cents were for two subway
tokens for a round trip to a Buddhist temple.
He had
meals and slept in the stores where he was working even
though sleeping in a store was illegal.
He did not have time to spend money.18 He worked
from the dawn, to the late evening.
Sometimes he
worked on New Year's Day. Many of new workers quit in
a week because the owners of stores pushed workers to
work all day long without any rest, seven days a week.
He sent most of the money he made to his family in
Korea and saved the rest.
He got his permanent visa in
1982 and invited his family from Korea.
He opened a
green grocery store with $30,000 in 1982 since he knew
only about the green grocery business.
He was very
delighted because he now worked for himself. (Sae_Gae
Ilbo, Sep.2, 1988)
However, it is well-known that the work in a green grocery
is very difficult.

Most Korean immigrants did not

experience such hard work in Korea.

One Korean worker

remembered,
At the beginning of my work in a green grocery store, I
couldn't sleep because of pain. My leg muscles were
often "wrenched" when I slept.
I felt pain in all my
muscles before I slept.
I didn't know that working in
green grocery stores was that hard.
I didn't do this
18 In 1980, his weekly wage might be around $200.
have saved all the money he earned.

He should
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kind of hard work in Korea.
this in Korea.

Maybe, nobody works like

There are more problems for Koreans with babies who
want to save money.

One female Korean college-graduate

married a Korean American, who had immigrated one year
earlier, in a hope that she could enjoy the comfortable
American life.

She thought that everyone in America was

rich and enjoyed their leisure.

But as soon as she arrived

in New York City, she realized that life in America was like
"a life in the hell."

She did not expect that she would

work as a cashier in America.

Especially, a cashier who had

to stand up for 12 hours a day, six days a week.

Whenever

she returned home, she was too tired and exhausted.
pain in the legs!"

"What a

When she delivered a baby a year later,

the situation was worse.

She and her husband reasoned that

"if we paid for baby-sitting, we couldn't save any money."
With no savings, their dream for a comfortable life was
gone.

Thus, she carried her baby to the store where she was

working and tied the baby to a stroller all day long in a
nearby room.
torn.

Whenever she heard him crying, her heart was

However, she and her husband saved $20,000 after

three years of heartbreaking work.

Because of problems with

child-care, many Korean couples invite a mother-in-law,
usually the wife's mother, from Korea.

These grandmothers,

or sometimes grandparents, took care of the babies, while
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their daughters and sons-in-law worked hard to save
money.19

Capital Mobilization and New Store
Because of a strong desire to save and mobilize money,
the K e h . a traditional Korean rotating credit club, has
survived the transition to the U.S. and has been rather
revitalized in Korean American communities.

For many

centuries, Koreans have pooled their rice, and later cash,
for expensive expenditures such as funerals, wedding
ceremonies, the education of their children, and the
purchase of land or other expensive things, as well as
smaller expenditures for socialization.
The present Kehs in the Korean community can be divided
into two categories.

One is just for friendship,20

and

19 One of the common complaints of Korean grandmothers in
the Korean community in New York City is that they have to
take care of their grandchildren.
However, it is well
accepted that taking care of babies or toddlers is the
responsibility of a grandmother if a grandmother is alive.
The grandmothers complain often that baby-sitting is
physically demanding.
Three generation families are the
norm in a Korean community if the grandparents are alive.
However, an increasing number of Korean grandparents want to
live separately if money is available for them (it means
refusal of baby sitting and avoidance of family tension).
20 Because people are busy
and concentrate on their own
problems, it is difficult
formany people to meet or visit
friends and colleagues if there are no specific reasons.
Many Koreans organize Keh clubs to meet friends.
Monthly
meetings for contributing a share of money to a Keh club is
a good excuse to meet friends.
They share various
information and help each other if members have problems.
This kind of Keh club usually has a small monthly pool and
each member contributes afixed amount of money.
The order
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the other is for capital mobilization.
issue in this section.

The latter is the

This Keh usually has a bigger

monthly pool, $30-100,000, and gives the pool to the bidder
who will pay the highest interest.
For example, 20 out of 28 in my sample of Korean
shopkeepers joined from one to three Keh clubs.

One Keh

club whose members are mostly shopkeepers on 125th St. was
organized as a $30,000 pool K e h .

The majority of them are

shopkeepers and the others are store workers.21

Six have

half memberships and the others have full memberships.
full membership requires a contribution of
month for 25 months.

One

$1,200 every

The Keh-Ju (the president or leader)

who organized the Keh club is responsible for any problems
in the management of K e h .22

In every monthly meeting, a

member who bids the highest interest23 for the pool can
obtain that month's pool.

Those who receive the pool will

of who will take that month's pool is predetermined before
each Keh starts.
21 These 28 members include 20 shopkeepers and 8 store
workers.
Store workers tend to join at half membership
because their income is not enough to afford a full
membership.
22 Keh-iu literally means the owner of the K e h .
23 The interest is usually between 14% and 17%. For this
K e h . the interest was between $200 and $500 per month.
If
the interest is too high, there is a greater possibility
that the member who gets the pool may default her monthly
contributions($1200 + interest) later. The high interest
also hurts mutual-help spirit. Thus, the leader usually
controls the possible high interest and prearranges who can
get the monthly pool if there is competition on bidding.
Each member can receive only one monthly pool.
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contribute not only $1,200 but also their interest payment
to the total pool every month until every member has taken
the monthly pool.
$30,000.

For the first month, the total pool is

However, the pool gradually increases because of

interest payment.

Thus, the last person of the Keh can get

about $36,000 without paying interest because the Keh
dissolves after every member has taken a monthly pool.
Thus, for those who use the monthly pool at the early
stage, a Keh club is the source of a loan, and for those who
do not take their turn until the final month, a Keh club is
the place to deposit money at a high rate of interest.
Because one can immediately obtain a considerable amount of
money if one joins a bidding Keh club, many Korean
shopkeepers who have not established credit for formal
financial loans join Keh clubs.

Korean store workers can

take the monthly pool when they want to open a business.
They can also obtain a higher interest rate than available
at any other financial institution.
Since there is no written contract among members,
mutual trust is very important in Keh participation.
Sometimes, the leader (Keh^ju) runs away with the pool or a
member may disappear after obtaining a pool.

Because of

business failure, some members may be unable to pay back
their monthly shares after taking a pool.
often.

This happens

However, the Keh-~iu has the responsibility to find
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members and organize a Keh club.

She24 has the privilege

to take the first month pool without interest.

She also has

to secure money from members until her Keh has gone through
its cycle.

The duration of one Keh usually takes two to

three years.
Because most new Korean immigrants have no credit
history in bank, no bank will lend money to Koreans who want
to start a new business or to expand existing business.
Even though only 3 out of 28 shopkeepers in my sample
answered that they used money from a Keh for their first
small business,25 these statements by no means decrease the
significance of Keh for the Korean community.

Through my

research, I have found that many shopkeepers help their
family, kin, or friends open a store with money from K e h .
Thus, many of those who receive help from family members or
friends when they establish their own business have actually
raised small capital indirectly through K e h .

For example,

one fish market owner worked with his entire extended family
members which included five couples.

The owner assisted two

couples with money from Keh when they established their

24 Traditionally, Keh-ius are mostly female.
The most
frequent participants in Keh clubs have also been females.
They usually join the Keh as a family representative.
25 Of the 28 respondents, 19 answered they used individual
savings for their first stores.
However, this individual
savings often includes money from Kehs.
In a study of Keh in the Chicago Korean community, only
20% of shopkeepers answered they used Keh money to start
their business(Korea Times of New Yo r k . March 27, 1991).
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independent business.

The fourth couple plan to establish

their own business with money from K e h .

Of 28 my sample

shopkeepers/ 11 obtained financial assistance from their kin
or friends.

A Keh is even more important for those who have

already established their own business.

Most Keh members

use money for floating capital (to expand inventory stocks,
to remake stores, or to purchase new equipment) or for the
expansion of business (e.g. opening another small business).
One of the most important functions of the Keh club is
that the membership forces members to save money in order
not to default on their club membership.

Members who

default will lose face in the Korean community among their
acquaintances.

Once they default, they will experience

difficulty in borrowing elsewhere in the Korean community.
This mandatory saving mechanism forces many Koreans to work
two jobs, to seek other venues to make extra money, or to
avoid spending money.
In fact, many Koreans prefer Keh clubs with a high
monthly share in order to force themselves to save more.
Thus, they give first priority to securing a monthly deposit
for the Keh

from their earnings and use the remainder for

living expenses.

If the income is not enough, they will

endure substandard living conditions in order to deposit a
monthly share or find another source of income.
A Korean worker who saves a considerable amount of
money is usually intending to establish an individual
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business.

Since many of them are looking for a store while

savings are still insufficient, they are also looking for
various sources to mobilize capital.
money are family, kin, and friends.

Frequent sources of
It is very difficult

for Korean workers to borrow money from banks since they
have little credit and have problems providing the
appropriate documents.26
It is an ethical responsibility for Koreans to help
their family and kin.

Any who do not assist their family

members will be often accused of ignoring fundamental ethics
by other Koreans.

Thus, the frequent financial helpers were

parents, brothers, and sisters.

Parents, brothers, and

sisters who had immigrated earlier usually gave advice and
money to new immigrant family members ready to open a store.
Usually the money was provided without interest.

New Korean

immigrants also expected their brothers and sisters would
help once the new business was opened.

For example, one

couple received $10,000 from the husband's elder brother
when they opened a green grocery.

They also used their own

$20,000 savings. However, when the husband's brother's wife
demanded the money back, the couple complained that the

26 There was only one shopkeeper who borrowed enough money
from a bank to open a business among my 28 sample
shopkeepers. He borrowed $100,000 from a bank and $80,000
from a relative for a gas station in California.
He
mortgaged his gas station for the loan from the bank.
Because he had been in the U.S. Army before he started the
gas station business, he could borrow money from a bank.
He
failed in his business and moved in New York City in 1984.
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sister-in-law was very stingy.
Distant relatives or friends usually lend money with
interest.

Mutual credit associations have been formed in

the Korean community, but the range of their activities is
still very limited.

Some immigrants bring money from Korea.

Among my sample of 28 Korean shopkeepers, five brought a
considerable amount of money to help themselves open a
business.

They brought $50-200,000 from Korea.

relatively recent immigrants.
U.S. after 1986.

These are

All but one immigrated to the

The Korean government had strictly

restricted the amount an emigrating family could carry to
$10,000.
family.

From 1981, this sum was raised to $100,000 per
However, some Korean immigrants illegally carried

more than the limit.
Occasionally, despite small capital, some Koreans will
nevertheless open a store.

Sometimes, they take over a

store and its debt without paying any money for the business
establishment.
debt.

The newcomer merely needs to pay off the

Another method is to consolidate capital from two or

three persons.

For example, one Korean immigrant spent only

$4,000 to own a business.
The salary from my factory work was not enough for my
family's living expenses.
Since I heard and read about
Koreans who were doing the green grocery business, I
wanted to do the same business. When I heard that one
green grocery owner was looking for a co-owner, I
decided to start with him.
I invested $4,000. The
other person also invested $4,000.
I learned from him
how to do the green grocery business. tSae Gae Ilbo.
Sep.l, 1988)
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In short, capital for the new store came from personal
savings; from loans from family members, other kin, and
friends; and from money acquired in Korea.

The cost of

opening their first stores among my sample shopkeepers was
between $5-200,000.

Most opening costs fell between $15-

20,000 during the late 1970s, $30,000 in the early 1980s,
and about $50,000 in the late 1980s.

However, the cost

depended on the kind of store and on the expected volume of
sales.
Most shopkeepers in my sample established their own
business within four years of their immigration to America
(10 within 2 years, 7 within 3 years, 6 within 4 years, 2
within 5 years, another 2 within 6 years, and 1 after 6
years ).

But the increasing start-up cost of a store makes

Korean workers save longer in order to establish their own
business.

One store worker complained that even though he

worked two jobs, he still had problems saving enough
money.27

A Korean peddlar on 125th St. also complained

that he needed much more money to open a small business than
did those who immigrated in the late 1970s.

It is now said

that about half the Korean households in the New York area
have their own business.
However, the expansion of Korean shopkeepers sets its
own limit of growth.

Because of the expansion of new Korean

27 He is single. He spent considerable money to get a permanent
visa.
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businesses, cheap and loyal Korean laborers become scarce.
Thus, Korean shopkeepers employ undocumented Mexicans or
other Hispanics.

The expansion of Korean shopkeepers makes

the competition among them very intense.

Some Korean

shopkeepers in the same area do not talk to each other
because they are in competition.

Many Korean shopkeepers

complain that the competition among Korean shopkeepers is
the primary problem for them.

Those remaining Korean

workers also need much more savings than before to open
their own business.

There is an increasing possibility for

Korean workers that they may not achieve their dream of
owning their own business.

This will probably stratify

Korean immigrants into two different groups and increase the
tension between these two groups will increase.

Self-Denial and Pain
Once Koreans establish their own small business, they
begin to exhaust themselves in business.

Since the primary

small businesses for Koreans are labor-intensive businesses
requiring low capital, the profit depends on mobilizing
cheap and intensive labor.

In order to push the store

workers to work hard, the owner must work hard.

Korean

shopkeepers are also very worried about the possibility of
failure.

In order to secure success, they push family

members, workers, consumers, and themselves to the limit.
Most Korean green grocery owners and fish market owners
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work from dawn to dusk, six or seven days a week.

Because

they must buy vegetables and fruit at dawn at the Hunts
Point Terminal, the major vegetable and fruit wholesale
market in Hew York City, the green grocers get up anywhere
between 1 and 5 A.M.

Due to parking problems in the market,

many green grocers arrive at 1 A.M. to get a parking place
and to select better vegetables and fruits. It is said,
earlier the better."

"the

They must also clean and trim

vegetables and fruit in preparation for sale during the
early morning.

They either close their store about 8 or 9

P.M. or stay open 24 hours.

As one Korean green grocer put

it, "sometimes you get so tired, you cannot see the dollar
in your hand"(Harris 1983).
One grocer recalled that he slept at 11 P.M. and arose
up at 1 A.M. to shop in the Hunts Point Market.

He slept

only two hours at home (he also slept at the store when
business was slow).

He and his wife did everything for the

green grocery store which needed at least 6 workers (Cho Sun
Ilbo, April 1, 1987).28

Many Korean green grocers pleep in

their trucks or stores during the day.

Fish market owners

and deli grocery owners also feel the effects of lack of
sleep.
28 Another Korean green grocer had a similar experience.
Because he could not sleep enough he always looked forward
to red lights when he returned from Hunts Point.
Pulling up
to a red light, he would fall asleep for a moment.
Then the
car driver behind him always honked a moment later because
he did not move when the light turned green.
Then he awoke
and drove again. (Sae Gae Ilbo. Sept. 1, 1988).
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Korean shopkeepers who own other kinds of small
business can sleep better.

However, they must also have

their stores from 10 to 16 hours a day, and at least six
days a week.

Most take no vacations.

Among my sample of 28

shopkeepers, only five shopkeepers took a vacation from 2 to
10 days off during 1989.

The rest had no vacation.

If they

do not open their store, they believe they will lose money
doubly because of no sales on that day and because the
customers who use other stores on that day will begin to
patronize other stores.

One shopkeeper said, "I can hear

the customers step to other stores when I take two or three
days off.

Even during a vacation, you cannot rest if you

have a business."
The long and intensive work certainly produces a lot of
problems for their body.

Common complaints were pains in

their legs, back, shoulders, or stomach.

One female green

grocer, working as a cashier, complained,
Since I have stood up all day long and have struck cash
registers for six years, 12-14 hours a day, seven days
a week, my knees and shoulders are ailing.
I predict
the weather better than a meteorologist because my
knees and shoulders always bring prickle pains before
rain fall.
A fish market owner also complained,
I hardly have a good breakfast because I must shop at
the wholesalers at dawn. I also have lunch irregularly.
If you are busy at 1 P.M., you cannot have lunch at 1
o'clock. Even if you have lunch, you have to pay
attention to whether shoplifters come in and customers
steal.
Thus, you don't have any time to relax.
I have
to have dinner at home after closing my store.
It is
always around 8 or 9 o'clock. But I don't have time to
digest before sleeping because I have to go to bed
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early for tomorrow's shopping at dawn.
One Korean doctor reported that 3 or 4 of every 10
Korean patients had stomach problems.

That is 3 to 4 times

higher than the rate for American patients (Korea Times of
Mew Y o r k . July 17, 1989).

The Korean green grocers also

have physical strain - aching backs, kidney damage from
overexertion, and arthritic hands (Harris 1983).
A common saying among Korean green grocers is, "You
cannot do this business forever.

Make money quick and do

some other business which gives you more time to relax."
The reason why they want to move to other businesses is not
only because of pain but also because of status anxiety.
Among Koreans, the green grocery business is considered on a
bottom rank because the owner should work "dirty" and
"hard".

Many green grocers are ashamed of it. Thus, many of

them want to move to "clean" business such as dry cleaning
or a jewelry store.

Mobilization of Family Members and Tensions
Once a store is established, the whole family and
possibly other kin are mobilized to ensure stability and
maximum profit.

Family workers are reliable29 and do not

complain much about hard working conditions because they
think they are working for themselves.

Individual family

29 The store workers steal more than shoplifters.
One third
of the store workers steal something fSae Gae Ilbo. May 26,
1989).
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members are not paid, and the total income of a store is
considered to be family income.

Female participation in

work dramatically increased in Korean communities in America
in comparison with that in Korea.

Professor Min of Queens

College30 reported from 1983 and 1984 data that while only
18.8% of married women in Korea were working, 56% of married
women among Korean immigrants were (the rate for all
American married women was 49%).

Most Korean shopkeepers in

Harlem were working as couples in 1990.

Among my sample of

28 shopkeepers, 18 of them worked with their spouse.31
However, the participation of women in family business
does not decrease their domestic work load.

Husbands are

reluctant to share housework with their wives.

Most of the

decision-making in business is done by husbands even though
wives fully contribute to the establishment of the business
and work as much as husbands do.

Since wives contribute a

lot, many women feel they must have some input into home and
business matters.
Other family members and kin are also mobilized.
Twenty eight Korean shopkeepers of my sample hired or rather

30 This information comes from an article clipped from Korea
Tiinfts of New York, circa 1988. The date did not appear on the
clipping.
31 Two (a wife and her husband) have separate stores nearby.
The eight others includes two single men, a widow, a
divorcee, two whose spouses have businesses in other areas,
and two whose wives stay at home. Therefore, only two
female spouses in my sample did not participate in business.
Female spouses usually worked as cashiers.
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mobilized sixteen family members and kin, excluding spouses.
They include fifteen household members (four sons, one
daughter, two mothers, five brothers, one sister, one
sister-in-law, and one niece), and one distant relative.
This number included part-time workers.

However, if we

consider casual help from sons, daughters, or other family
members, the number will be higher.

For example, when a

grandfather from Korea visited his son who owns a store in
Harlem, he came to his son's store everyday and watched
shoppers.
Grandfathers and grandmothers who are usually living
with their son or daughter are also frequently mobilized.
Because they do not know English and can not drive a car,
they can only stay home.

However, it is very monotonous for

them to merely stay at home.32

Many old people said that

"to stay at home is like staying in hell."

They often come

to the stores and stay there as a "watcher," taking care of
babies and making meals for family members.

As I mentioned

previously, many of them who stay home take care of
grandchildren.
One grandmother who came to a store in Harlem everyday
told me she enjoys herself more at store even though she
cannot speak English.

"I take care of a grandchild and cook

food for my son, daughter-in-law, and other employees in the

32 They cannot visit friends or centers for the old because
they cannot drive.
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store.

If I just stand any place in the store, my presence

will deter shoplifters.

So I believe, I am more productive

at the store than at home."

Another grandmother was an

active worker for at a store on the 125th St.

She said,

"I

gladly work hard because I can see that I make money."
Grown children, who attend junior-high and high
schools, often help their parents in stores during weekends,
holidays, and vacation.

In order to save the cost of baby

sitting, babies are often brought to the stores.

One

shopkeeper raised his babies in the store for two years.
Babies or toddlers often play by themselves in the store
without close supervision by their parents.
Since all family members are participating in the same
store with intensive labor, there is often tension about who
enjoys the fruit of hard labor and who decided what.

Since

many Korean immigrant women are active participants in small
business, they have more influence on family matters here
than in Korea.

However, the increased participation of

Korean immigrant women doesn't result in the change of
attitudes of husbands.

Many husbands want to maintain the

patriarchal relationship.

This and other matters heightened

the tension in many couples.

One wife of a Korean

shopkeeper complained about her husband.
My husband has no ability in business at all.
He
doesn't pay attention to the arrangement of the
window.
The color and arrangement of clothing in
the window is messy and cannot get attention from
passers-by.
Because he is so bored waiting
customers at the store all day long, he just calls
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his friends all day. When I saw this, I told him
to cut the calls short.
How do the conversations
help our business? That doesn't make money....
I urged him to help with the children at home
but to no avail.
He doesn't move even a finger at
home. When I managed a store, everything at home
was in trouble.
I took care of my youngest son at
the store.
I couldn't relax at the store because
many things that are troublesome could happen. At
home, I had to do all domestic work alone.
I was
easily irritated and felt anger at him...
Even if we can enjoy a little comfort now,
how meaningful is it if my children fail? He
doesn't pay any attention to the children.
Some couples who have severe complaints about their
spouses endure their relationship out of fear of being
single, having no money, or raising children alone.
However, the rate of divorce among Koreans in America is
rising even though the rate is much lower than the average
in America.

Professor Min of Queens College33 reported

that while the divorce rate in Korea is 6.2 among 1,000
couples, it is 36.8 among 1,000 couples for Korean immigrant
couples (it is 72.6 among 1,000 couples for all America).
Thus the divorce rate among Korean immigrants in America is
six times higher than the rate among Koreans in Korea.
However, divorce brings more difficulties to wives than
to husbands among Korean immigrants because it is easier for
males to find a new spouse than for females (e.g. the
ideology that values chastity).

More problems arose when

females run a business with their husband because of
differential experiences of business (while Korean females
33 From an article clipped from Korean Times of New Y o r k ,
circa 1989. The data does not appear on the clipping.
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concentrated on cashier, Korean males concentrated on
business transactions).

There are also possibilities of

sexism directed against female divorcees in jobs or in
business.

Separation from children also often cause more

pain for women.

Because wives suffer far more than husbands

after divorce, some Korean immigrant wives endure various
hardships in order to avoid a divorce.34
However, the role of a wife is very important in
capital accumulation.

Therefore, she tries to exert a more

important role in the family and business decisions in
comparison with wives in Korea.

Thus, Korean immigrant

wives are increasing their influence and becoming more
assertive.

This also increases tension in some families

because many Korean husbands are reluctant to relinquish
their power.

In comparison with females in Korea, Korean

immigrant wives wield more power not only because of their
contribution to the family economy but also because Korean
immigrant families maintain a closer relationship to the
wife's family.
increases.

The influence of sisters of husbands also

While the importance of patrilineal kinship

34 There was one divorced Korean couple in my research area.
The wive lamented that while she had worked really hard in a
green grocery business with her husband, her husband did not
give her any say in business and home matters.
She had
endured hard work and tension with her husband until he
assaulted her brother who had co-invested in the business.
To make a long story short, the couple sold the business and
divorced.
Both were socially and economically in very bad
shape in 1990. Usually wives rather than husbands endure
various difficulties as far as possible in order to avoid
the divorce.
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networks declines, the importance of a wife's or a mother's
kinship networks increases in comparison with the situation
in Korea (Park 1989).

For example, when a mother helps her

daughter and son-in-law in baby-sitting or when other
members of the wife's family help the couple in business
(these are common phenomena in Korean community), the wife's
family claims more say in the couple's home and business
matters.
The tension and change in family relationships is also
coupled with the tension and anxiety of Korean immigrants
regarding their social status.

Many Koreans feel no

satisfaction from their business because they experience a
decline of social status (they were usually well-educated
urban white collar workers in Korea).

Because of this

anxiety, they often try to compensate for their downward
mobility by making "big money" quickly.

The hard-pressed

desire to quickly make money for that compensation also
contributes to tensions not only in the relationships with
family members but also with store workers and customers.
One Korean shopkeeper in Harlem lamented,
We Koreans are slaves of money. We don't have any
holiday. Because we want to make more money as quick
as possible, we cannot rest...
If the business is not
good, we are anxious.
If the business is good, we
continue to overwork for extra money.
Thus, we open
stores even on holidays. We just chase money without
realizing how we are living.
The Sweat of Workers
As I already told, because Korean shopkeepers think
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that Korean workers are more loyal than any other ethnic
workers to Korean shopkeepers, they hire Korean workers as
managers or cashiers.

Korean workers are also hired as

workers for hard labor as in the green grocery business or
in fish markets.

However, because of the decreasing

availability of Korean workers (many of whom have already
opened their own business), the increasing avoidance of hard
labor by Korean workers (they find better jobs now because
of the expansion of Korean business during the last two
decades), and the relatively higher wages paid to Korean
workers than to Hispanics and Blacks, Korean store owners
are employing an increasing number of Hispanics, usually
illegal immigrants.35
The Korean shopkeepers think Blacks are not qualified
for green grocery or fish market work because they do not
want to endure the hard work and easily quit.36

According

35 In 1990, 28 Korean shopkeepers in my field area employed
41 Koreans (including family and kin members), 26 Blacks, 22
Hispanics, and 1 Chinese.
36 This is a very important ideological point in the
conflict between Blacks and Koreans. Korean shopkeepers
think Black people are lazy because they do not work hard
and quit easily.
Blacks think that Koreans do not pay
enough, disregard the labor laws, and over-exploit Black
workers and others. A Black in Harlem answered my question
about why he doesn't work in a fish market, "He [the Korean
owner] doesn't share profits with me." He meant that Korean
owners pay very low wages.
In fact, the wage for Blacks and
Hispanics was at minimum wage or lower, especially for
undocumented Hispanics. In 1990, an illegal Hispanic
received $200 for 72 hours work per week in a green grocery
store. The wage for undocumented Hispanics was between $150
and $300.
Six Korean green grocery or fish market stores in
my field area employed only 2 Blacks (one as a security
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to Light and Bonacich (1988:363), hard work, long hours, and
low pay are not welcomed by the local poor or unemployed
because "the local poor had a certain conception of the
length of a reasonable workday, of how hard they ought to
expect to work, of how much leisure time a good life
entailed, and so forth."

Thus, Korean green grocers and

fish market owners usually employ Koreans and undocumented
Hispanics who endure hardship due to their expectation of
becoming independent small businessmen or to the problems
with their illegal status.

Because they also come from

relatively poor countries, the low wages and bad working
conditions do not look bad in comparison with the conditions
of their native country.
However, the Korean and Hispanic workers complained
about long working hours, physically demanding work, and low
wages.

The workers in the green grocery or fish market

business work 12 to 16 hours per day without overtime pay or
any other benefits.

One Korean fish cleaner said,

guard, the other one as a fish frier), while they employed
14 Hispanics (illegal residents), and 15 Koreans.
Korean shopkeepers often hire Blacks as sales work
which does not require hard physical labor.
Still the wage
was low (about $3.50 per hour without any benefits) but the
sales work was easier (physically) than the work in a green
grocery store or fish market.
However, because of low wages
and no benefits, there was a high turnover for store
workers, not only for Blacks but also for Koreans.
Since
Korean workers got better wages (about $5-7) and they
thought they were learning how to manage a business (Korean
workers more often do supervisory and managerial work in
Korean stores), their turnover rate was lower than that of
Black workers.
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I have no time to do anything except work and sleep.
I
work and sleep, work and sleep. On Sunday?
I sleep
all day long or sometimes I watch Korean video tapes.
I don't know what happens in New York City or in the
world.
I can't do anything because I am tired. I just
want to open my business soon.
I don't think of
any
thing else.
One Korean green grocery worker also complained:
I worked for him [a Korean green grocer] for seven
years.
Thus, when I tried to buy my own business, I
expected he would help me in terms of money.
Because
of my hard work, he made a lot of money.
Right? I
didn't expect much from him. But he didn't give me
even one dollar. He is not a human being.
This statement shows that Korean workers expect help
from their Korean employer when they try to open or manage a
new business.

This is true for some Korean immigrants,

especially kin employees.

Thus, they consult with their

Korean employers about new business and get advice from
them.

Because of this expectation, many Korean workers are

very loyal
employers.

(at least in appearance) to their Korean
However, the majority of Korean workers did not

get help from their previous employers.

The paternalistic

relationship between Korean workers and employers often
means the exploitation of those workers with a vague future
promise.

When the promise is not realized, the Korean

workers often express their disbelief and anger.
However, there is no paternalistic relationship between
Korean shopkeepers and their Black or Hispanic workers.
When I worked in a restaurant,37 the Korean owner told me
37 I worked in a restaurant which was located in mid-Manhattan
for three months in 1986.
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not to be close to Hispanic workers.
"spoiled them."38

His reason was that it

One of his real reasons was his

reluctance to let Hispanic workers know the difference in
the wages of Korean workers and Hispanic workers.

However,

the Hispanic workers already knew the difference but endured
the difference because of their undocumented status.

Since

they receive low pay in other areas, they do not have many
choices.
One Korean green grocery worker told me of a similar
experience.

"When a Hispanic worker ate an unsalable fruit,

the Korean owner told me not to give it to him but rather to
throw it nway."

When I worked in a clothing store in

Harlem, the manager tried hard to create a distance between
Korean and Black workers.

The manager also told me not to

greet Black workers and not to compliment their sales
ability.

This distance is, in fact, an effort of Korean

shopkeepers to create a hierarchical order among Korean
shopkeepers, Korean workers, and Hispanic or Black workers.
This hierarchical distinction is not only an effort to
justify their authority but also an effort to justify
different wages among different groups.

Many Korean

shopkeepers in the area were cold and expressionless to
38 A similar thing happened when I worked as a sales clerk
in a Korean store in Harlem in 1988. When I told a Black
sales clerk, "You are selling better than me," the manager
of the store later told me that I should not say that again
to the clerk.
His reason was, "it spoils him."
In fact,
"spoil" is a code word regarding more demands from the sales
clerk.
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Black employees.39

Through this cultural manipulation, the

Korean shopkeepers try to devalue the labor of the
employees, especially Black and Hispanic workers, to justify
discriminatory wages for them.

Certainly, Hispanic and

Black workers know that they are devalued and isolated from
Korean shopkeepers and workers.

One Black worker in the

above clothing store complained that the Korean shopkeeper
was very stingy.

However, they stay and work for Korean

shopkeepers because they cannot find a better alternative.

Those Shopkeepers Who Failed
Even though the success rate among Korean shopkeepers
is relatively high, many fail in their small business.

The

competition in small businesses became severe during the
1980s.

Because the poor Blacks became poorer since the

welfare for the poor was reduced, the enforcement of drug
regulation decreased floating money in Black neighborhoods,
the rent for a store has doubled and tripled during the
1980s, and the New York City economy declined since Black
Monday in the stock market in 1987, the rate of failure
among Korean shopkeepers has been increasing.

In fact, more

and more Korean shopkeepers complain about the fierce
competition.

It is said, "the old immigrants made money

easy, but now it is really hard."
39 It is also applied to Hispanics.
However, a few Korean
shopkeepers did have very close relationships with their
Black or Hispanic employees.
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There were 3 Korean shopkeepers among 28 shopkeepers of
my sample who experienced business failure.

For example,

one Korean shopkeeper said he realized as soon as he had
opened a green grocery business in the mid-1980s that there
was no hope for making money from that store because sales
were very slow.

He gave up in a few months and started

another business.

He believed that the previous Korean

owner of the store deceived him about the prospects of that
green grocery store.

One variety store owner said, he also

gave up his green grocery business soon after its purchase,
but he could not start another business because he lost all
his investments in that business.

He and his wife worked

again as store employees.
One couple eventually divorced after they had failed in
their first green grocery business in Harlem.

With a small

amount of money left and a small loan from a relative, they
opened another small green grocery store in Queens after the
failure.

But the husband and wife could not agree on

business matters, and they argued and fought over many
things regarding the business.

Under stress, he began to

beat his wife.

Eventually, the new business failed, and

they divorced.

The wife lamented,

I couldn't forget the [first] store [in Harlem].
I put
all of my hope, love, sweat, and blood into every
corner of the store.
Because that was my first store,
I dreamed of many things from the store.
The store was
the hope for my hard life in America.
But that's all
gone now. Still, I miss the store.
I couldn't leave
here.
I came back here to see my first love, my first
store. Now, my life is broken.
My family is broken.
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I really feel sorry for my son and daughter.
I always
feel anxiety, and my mind is empty now.
I don't have
any more joy in my life.... (She shook her head with
tearful eyes).
Because of the possibility of failure, those who have
not yet stabilized their business or those who are on the
borderline of profitability are very fearful for their
future.

In order to establish their business quickly, they

try everything they can do.

Owners of newly established

businesses are more anxious because of the higher rate of
failure for the beginners.

Since the owners of newly

established stores often treat customers and shoplifters
harsher to extract more profit and establish themselves
quickly than established business owners, the store-owners
boycotted by Blacks were usually newcomers in small
businesses.

Conclusion
Korean immigrants who were eager to take root and make
money in the U.S. discovered some possibilities in small
business.

In fact, they had no other "respectable" choice

other than small business.

Good factory jobs disappeared as

the manufacturing industry declined.

Only a few

professional jobs were available for them.

However, they

had a competitive edge in small business in comparison with
other ethnic groups.

They came from a country which has the

longest labor hours in the world.
family and kin networks.

They brought strong

They revised, strengthened, and
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mobilized the family and kin networks which made the rapidly
expanding reproduction of small businesses among Korean
immigrants possible.
However, every social relationship for Korean
shopkeepers is geared toward the quick accumulation of
capital.

This accumulation is based on sacrifices of

shopkeepers, family members, store workers, and customers.
The sacrifice of individual family members is justified as
inevitable for "family survival" in a hostile environment.
The small business is explained as a matter of whether the
whole family can survive or die.

With failure, they think

that the whole life of the family will be ruined because
everybody will look down on them, and an extremely hard life
will follow.
Because of the hard-pressed desire for success and fear
of failure, excessive hard work and family mobilization are
exemplified.

Because of this, the rate of failure among

Korean shopkeepers is extremely low;40 their income is also
relatively high.41

But, children were ignored and the

burden for wives was doubled.

Family life was forgotten.

Tension among family and kin members erupted.

Tension with

40 A survey conducted by Min and Jaret indicates that only
8% of Korean shopkeepers were not successful.
The average
failure rate within five years is about 50% for all American
small businessmen.
(From an undated newspaper clipping from
the Korea Times of New Y o r k , circa 1989)
41 A poll for 374 Koreans across America reported that their
annual income was $40,590. (Lotte News. July 7, 1992)
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customers also erupted.

This tension and consequent

struggle for meanings and power are the subject for the next
two chapters.
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PART THREE

BOYCOTTS, MEANINGS, AND POWER
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CHAPTER FIVE
"KOREANS NEED TO BE TAUGHT A LESSON?": BLACK BOYCOTTS
AGAINST KOREAN SHOPKEEPERS

They [Korean shopkeepers] came here only with rice
bowls, but now take everything, money.
They
charge much more... No jobs for [Black] kids and
nothing to [Black] people...
They ain't say hello
to us.... They create a very bad situation. (A
Black in Harlem)
The Koreans needed to be taught a lesson. (A Black
Reverend in Harlem, quoted in Lombardi 1986:15)
If they have time to boycott me, they have to work
and save money to establish their own business.
Those niggers [gumdungyi] want to drive me out.
But it is a waste of time because I will never
leave this place.
If I leave, they will force
other Koreans o u t .... This is free America where
anybody can open a store in any place. (A Korean
shopkeeper in Harlem)

In Washington, D.C., 11 Korean-owned shops were firebombed between 1984 and 1986 (Song 1989:10).

The Black

boycotts against Korean shopkeepers occurred in many cities
such as Atlanta, Philadelphia, Chicago, Columbus, Los
Angeles, and New York City during the last decade.

Some

boycotts began because Korean shopkeepers shot Black
robbers, shoplifters, or innocent Blacks.

For example, when

a Korean shopkeeper shot a Black girl dead in 1991 after an
altercation between them, the Brotherhood Crusade, a Black
organization, began a boycott against the store.

Some other

boycotts stemmed from allegations of short-change,
mistreatment, or shoplifting.

Resentment of Korean
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shopkeepers is considerable among Black neighborhoods even
though many of Black residents do not participate in the
boycotts.1
The anger is also wide-spread among Korean shopkeepers
against Black shoplifting, robbery, and burglary.

Nineteen

Korean shopkeepers were killed in the Los Angeles area
during the period of 1988 to 1991 (Washington P o s t . Nov. 29,
1991).

Two to three Korean shopkeepers or their employees

per year were also killed in New York City during the same
period.2

The general perception of Korean shopkeepers in

poor Black areas is that they are serving Black consumers in
"dangerous" Black neighborhoods.3
What are the causes of this mutual anger and
resentment?

The killings are only a minor part of the

relationship between Korean shopkeepers and poor Blacks. For
the majority of them, the mutual distrust comes from their
everyday interactions.

The everyday relationship between

Korean shopkeepers and poor Blacks is also leading to more
conspicuous social tensions and conflicts between them.
1 For example, Korean stores were the major target of the
looting and arson during the 1992 L.A. riots.
2 The title of an article which dealt with a killing of a
Korean employee by a Black customer, who was denied credit
for a pack of cigarettes, was, "A Korean Employee Was
Stabbed to Death by A Black" (Sae Gae Shin B o . Dec. 2, 1986,
my underline added)
The title emphasized the Blackness of
the killer.
These kinds of articles in local Korean news
media made Korean shopkeepers heighten their negative
attention to the Blacks.
3 The killers of Korean shopkeepers are Blacks in most cases.
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Tension and Feelings in Everyday Interactions4
In a Korean green grocery store after 3 P.M. on a clear
Friday, the cashier lines were long.
owner and his wife.

The cashiers were the

The cashiers weighed vegetables and

fruits and received money from customers.

The customers

paid money and left the store with their plastic bags.

The

cashiers said hello to a few of customers whom they knew
well but had little interaction with the rest of the
customers.

The cashiers were watching corners of the store

carefully while weighing, packing vegetables and fruits, and
receiving money from the customers.

Suddenly, the owner

(husband) shouted in Korean to a Korean worker who was
trimming vegetables,
like a shoplifter."

"Watch that girl near you.

Some customers in the lines looked

around, wondering what had happened.
suspect carefully.

She looks

The worker watched the

She eventually bought some vegetables

and exited the store with apparent anger, murmuring,
"Fucking..." 5
4 For a further description of the meanings related to this
section, see chapter 6.
5 Because of prevalent stereo types and racism about Blacks,
many Blacks have similar experiences in other stores.
Harry
Mayo recounted his experience when he and his friend were
browsing, in order to buy a gift, a department store in
Washington D.C. A clerk was following them. "He (a clerk of
the store) went to check [the price] on a couple of things
and then he said, 'If ya'll aren't going to buy anything,
would you please leave the store.' He told us it was a
female store, and to see young Black males walking around
the store raised his concern.
My friend called him a racist
bigot and a white bitch." (Washington Post. Oct. 17, 1991)
Even a well dressed Black female professor was also accused
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One former Korean owner and cashier of a green grocery
store in Harlem described her experience,
When I opened a green grocery store in 1986, all kinds
of bums in the area came to my store to steal.
At the
time, I couldn't differentiate shoplifters from other
customers.
Some who wore coats put bottles of Mazola
in their pockets, some who brought a diaper box with
their babies stole Pampers and put them in the box.
They picked up fruits on the stall outside of the store
and ran away. When I caught them, they shouted me that
"Why did you catch me? I just picked up a few things
when you, Chinks, make big money in my country." And
they often shouted at me to go back to Korea.
Once I
start to argue about why it is your country, the
argumentation and fighting would continue.
Because of
my English problems, it was very difficult for me to
win the verbal fights. Gradually, I could find who the
shoplifters were and understood how they steal.
The
shoplifting decreased gradually when I became more
familiar with people. At the peak, the amount of
stolen reached two tenth of total sales.... Many
ordinary customers also tended to steal when we didn't
watch them carefully.
Some Korean store-workers also complained about Blacks'
attitudes in their everyday interactions.

One female Korean

fish fryer in Harlem complained,
It is like a war everyday to deal with Blacks here.
Every morning, I drag my foot to the store because I
know I have to come here and fight for my living.
Literally, I fight everyday.
I am exhausted after 12
hours' fighting everyday.
They don't pay money when I
do pay attention to another customer.
They insist they
paid when I didn't really receive.
Sometimes they run
away.
If one complains, others follow without any
apparent reason.
Similar complaints are also common among Korean
shopkeepers in other poor Black neighborhoods.

Mr. Hong in

of changing price tags for clothes in Saks in Fifth Avenue,
New York City, even though the change, in fact, had been
done by a clerk. (New York Times, April 30, 1991)
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Brooklyn reported that he argued and struggled everyday with
Blacks.

He experienced three burglaries within 10 days

after he had opened his green grocery store.

Local "bums"

of the area victimized him because he was a new face.
he bought a toy gun and carried it always.

Thus

He often

polished the gun and showed it to many customers.

After

that the area gang did not bother him (Sae Gae Ilbo. Sept.2,
1988) .
A daughter of a Korean shopkeeper in Brooklyn described
her parent's experience more vividly:
Of special horror is a group of children, 10- to 14year-olds, who rush into our store chanting anti-Asian
slurs, making fun of my parents' English and touching
everything in sight. Asking them to leave would be a
joke. My father, in his limited English, usually
resorts to raising his voice to somehow intimidate
these wild things into leaving.
Of course, another
barrage of colorful words and gestures toward my
parents follows before they are finally out of the
store.
Every time that happens, my mother tells me, her
heart pounds and her whole body shakes so badly she
stays paralyzed for minutes. She often loses sleep over
such events. We chide her for worrying, but we feel
worse. There is nothing more painful than knowing that
your parents feel degraded and helpless.(Cindy J. Suh's
letter to New York T i mes. May 18, 1990)

But some Koreans have a different perspective from the
majority of Korean shopkeepers.

One Korean shopkeeper well

respected by Black residents in Harlem said,
I have had a business here almost 20 years.
I think
Blacks are very good people.
I am very close to them.
If you treat them well, they will treat you well.
Because Koreans don't concern about Black people and
only make money from Blacks, Blacks don't like us. New
Korean shopkeepers made trouble because they are in a
hurry to make money quick.
Because they are scared by
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the possibility of failure, they don't want to lose
even one cent and are very aggressive.
They only make
money and don't want to give anything to Blacks. We
have to give something to them to win their mind.
We
have to be more flexible to shoplifters. They are
poor, and they need food and clothes.
Give them what
they want.
They will be graceful to us. The amount of
stolen goods is only a small portion of our profit.
For Korean stores, like other business,

extreme

security is one of the key aspects of business in Harlem.
Jewelry stores and bank branches are well protected with
bullet proof glasses and alarm systems. The bulletproof
barriers cut the physical contact between the jewelry
shopkeepers and the customers.

Other stores also have

monitors, protected cash registers, security guards, or
watchmen.
For example, one Korean green grocery store employs a
Black watchman.

His duty is to watch customers and

passersby all day long in front of the store.

Although, he

primarily deters shoplifting by his presence, he also
sometimes catches shoplifters.
mediate.

His other role is to

When there is an argument between Black customers

and Korean shopkeepers, he is expected to intervene.

The

Korean shopkeeper expects him to get rid of the Korean
owner's possible nuisance with Black customers.

Thus the

Korean owner can avoid direct arguments or fighting with
black customers.
Most Korean shopkeepers in Harlem agreed that the
newcomers among them are more aggressive.

One of the
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newcomers in Harlem explained that he and his wife were very
anxious when they began their business.

They worried that

they would fail and then have to start again from nothing.
I am scared to death about the possibility of losing
all of my investment.
If I lose, I have to work like
hell again from the bottom. If you experienced the
bottom, you know what I am saying. That was not the
life of a human being.
Fourteen hours of physical work
without any rest just for a little money1 Those
unstable days scared me very much.
I was really mad
whenever I saw someone shoplifting.
I really wanted to
beat them. They could ruin my business and my life,
not only me but also my family, you know.
I admit I am
very harsh to Black shoplifters.
But it happens
because they steal.
If they didn't steal, I wouldn't
bother them. They deserved it. I know the Korean old
timers accused me of mistreating Blacks.
But they have
already made enough money.
I have nothing. They don't
understand me.
However, this is not a full story.

He not only

mistreated shoplifters but also showed the cold shoulder to
ordinary shoppers.

Most other Korean shopkeepers are also

very suspicious about Black shoppers.
Black shoppers as possible shoplifters.

They suspect most
When I started to

work in a clothing store in Harlem in 1988, the first thing
that the manager of the store told me was "Suspect and watch
all shoppers carefully. If we don't watch them, they tend to
steal.

We have to give them no opportunity to steal."

Every shopper was watched as a possible

shoplifter.

When

Black shoppers, particularly, young Black shoppers, came
into the store, a sales clerk would follow and watch them.
This suspicion creates tension between Korean shopkeepers
and Black shoppers.
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Black customers know that they are watched and
suspected by Korean shopkeepers in their own "home turf."
Usually Korean shopkeepers do not greet Black shoppers as
they come in.

This silence is an expression of the social

distance which Korean shopkeepers try to create between them
and poor Black shoppers.

During a study conducted in Los

Angeles, many Black residents stated, "I get so tired of
being watched all the time like I'm some kind of criminal,"
"As soon as you walk into the store, they watch you until
you leave," and "You can tell by the look on their faces
when you go into those stores that they don't want you in
there. I wonder why they set up businesses here in the first
place"

(quoted in Stewart 1989:94).

A Black woman who

participated in a boycott against Korean shopkeepers in
Brooklyn said that she was angry because all Blacks were
considered to be shoplifters (WLIB, a news in Feb. 6, 1990).
The majority of Korean shopkeepers not only suspect
Black customers but also degrade them.

Korean shopkeepers

and Koreans in general think that they are superior to
Blacks.

Because they think poor Blacks are inferior, Korean

shopkeepers do not want to treat poor Blacks as their
equals.

Some Korean shopkeepers are also anxious about

their degraded social status because some of their fellow
Koreans in Korea and in America as well as many Whites look
down on Korean shopkeepers because they are staying in
"decayed," "crime-ridden,"

and "dangerous," neighborhoods
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where 'socially degraded' people are living.
Black residents often feel that Koreans are offenders
who cannot even speak English correctly.

Black residents

consider the Koreans as "arrogant and rude"
1989:5).

(Veneroso

They also think Koreans are very suspicious.

feel unwelcome in Korean stores.
also watched and treated badly.

They

They know that they are
The suspicion of Koreans

and the anger of Black residents often result in violent
altercations.

In other cases, the offended shoppers endure

the humiliation and stop using that specific store.
One Black in Harlem complained, "They [Koreans] talked
to me like I was a fool, like I couldn't count money.
so mad I wanted to slap his face.

I never bought anything

from there [Korean green grocery store] again"
Benjamin 1990:39).

I got

(quoted in

Another Black resident recalled,

...I found myself in a confrontation with a Korean man
in a fish market..., where an elderly, dignified black
lady got in a dispute with a Korean man who ended up
calling her a niggerI Without giving the matter a
thought I asked, 'Who are you calling a nigger
muthafucka?' and demanded an apology.
He said it was
none of my business, I invited him to kiss my ass, he
went for his fish knife, and I went for my boxcutter
razor... That was when I decided to chill out on
Korean markets. Except for [a] dry cleaner, with whose
service I was superbly satisfied...
Koreans wouldn't
get a dime more of my money.(quoted in Benjamin
1990:39)
Lloyd Williams, the Black president of the Uptown Chamber of
Commerce which covers all Harlem, explained,
Black anger arises from high unemployment and
gentrification: developers buying whole blocks of
Harlem to put up luxury condominiums. Rising rents
drive out the local residents and merchants who have
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been there for generations. And although they are
responsible for neither the unemployment (65 percent
among Harlem's Black youth) nor the gentrification, the
Koreans are the most visible beneficiaries of Harlem's
revitalization... The [Korean] newcomers are the
problem. They come with a poor sense of history and a
negative attitude toward blacks: shiftless, lazy, on
drugs and don't want to work, (quoted in Veneroso
1989:5)
Many Blacks resent Koreans for siphoning money out of the
Black community.

Blacks see Korean shopkeepers as outsiders

who come into their neighborhoods and become wealthy whetted
helping any community cause.

Lloyd Williams continued,

"But

we couldn't convince the Koreans that their interest should
go past their store fronts into the community. When the city
threatened to close down a local hospital, we couldn't get
the Koreans interested"

(quoted in Veneroso, 1989:4).

This

kind of complaint is irrelevant for many Korean shopkeepers
since such community problems, Korean shopkeepers believe,
should be solved by the local residents themselves and
governments rather than the shopkeepers.
The anger of Black residents is often expressed in
graffiti.

The graffiti on the walls and gates of Korean

stores includes "Bloodsucker," "Jews," "Fuck," "Vice," etc.
However, many Black residents are indifferent to the race of
store-owners - or at least they still use Korean stores.
One Black woman in Harlem who used a boycotted Korean green
grocery store explained that, "it's convenient."

Because of

the convenience, Black residents like to shop at the closest
stores rather than Black stores even if they sympathize with

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

148
the Buy Black movement.

And, in fact, they often do not

have an alternative; most green grocery stores in poor Black
neighborhoods are Korean-owned.

Many Blacks in Brooklyn

said, "they found the Koreans rude, but felt they had no
choice because most nearby fruit and vegetable stands were
Korean-owned " (New York Times. Dec. 21, 1988).
Because of this resentment, individual Blacks stop
using Korean stores or start their own picketing.

For

example, a Black shopper had fought with the fish market
owner because of a problem in change before the boycott.

He

brought a sign of boycott and shouted "boycott, boycott" in
front of a Korean fish market in the afternoon.
day, he did not appear.

The next

Some others threaten Korean

shopkeepers to boycott without actually boycotting.

Because

boycotts are expensive in terms of both money and time, it
is difficult for a boycott by an individual to succeed,
of money and time, it is very difficult for an individual to
succeed.

Individual boycotts generally fail to change the

attitudes of the targeted shopkeepers.
In general, a shopkeeper can exert more power than a
poor customer in the shopkeeper-customer relationship in
poor neighborhoods.
customers per day.

A shopkeeper deals with hundreds of
Thus, one customer cannot affect the

sales of a shopkeeper much.

A shopkeeper can refuse to

serve and can show disrespect to a customer while a customer
does not have many alternatives.

The customer can complain,
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shout foul language, or resort to violence.

Most customers

simply swallow the humiliation rather than resist.

Other

options include avoidance of that specific store or pursuit
of legal action.

But courts are not concerned with minor

mistreatment or disrespect.

It also costs a lot of money

and energy to bring a case to court.

Thus, poor customers

are not protected from routine minor mistreatment or
humiliation.

One potentially effective customer reaction is

collective action.
One such collective action is a sriot.7

On August 4,

1990, about a hundred Black residents rioted and destroyed
part of the R & M fruit store in Brooklyn after an
altercation between two Black women and Korean shopkeepers.
Some young Blacks raided the store, beat a Mexican worker,
and fired guns.

However, a sudden riot, without a long-term

boycott, is often dismissed as immoral violence.

Thus, it

is the riots rather than the mistreatment and humiliation by
a specific shopkeeper drew the attention from the public and
the state agents.

But when the boycott is well-organized,

the situation is very different.

The Beginnings of Boycotts
Boycotts in Harlem
Because of the pervasive racism in America, many Black
grass-roots groups have been organized to protect the rights
of Blacks and to achieve more equal social relationships.
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Black churches have also been traditionally important
organizations for Black movements.

These groups often

organized boycotts against some shopkeepers and companies.
During recent years, PUSH, organized by Rev. Jesse Jackson,
boycotted NIKE, because NIKE, PUSH insisted, did not hire
enough Blacks even though Blacks constituted a sizable share
of NIKE consumers.
The first Black boycott against Korean shopkeepers in
Harlem started in July 1982.

Members of the Universal Negro

Improvement Association, a Black nationalist group which was
originally organized by Marcus Garvey in 1914 in Jamaica and
flourished in the late 1910s and 1920s in Harlem and other
Black areas in the United States (Martin 1986:xv),
"distributed leaflets asking black residents to boycott
Korean shopkeepers on grounds that they didn't employ Blacks
and pushed out other minority-run small businesses"
1983:198).

(Harris

Rumors such as the assertion that Koreans got

resettlement money from the U.S. government when they
entered the United States exacerbated the resentment of
other minority small businessmen against the Korean
shopkeepers in the area.

However, this boycott did not have

a specific target store.

In fact, the UNIA promoted

boycotts of all non-Black shopkeepers - not just Korean
shopkeepers (New York Times. Sep. 11, 1982).
The Association's coordinator of the boycott, Shaka
Zulu, said, "Our goal is for blacks to control the economic
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life of the black community"

(quoted in ibid.)*

Many Blacks

in the area also believed that the Koreans were favored for
Federal Business Loans over Blacks }

the rapid growth of

Korean business in the area further stirred this suspicion
from the Black residents in the area.6
Because of the tension heightened by the boycott in
1982, Lloyd Williams feared that,

"some hot day, a misguided

remark or an insult could trigger anti-Korean violence"
(Harris 1983:198).

In order to mediate the brewing conflict

between Harlem residents and Korean shopkeepers, a federal
conciliator stepped in.

The conciliator organized meetings

between Korean shopkeepers and Black shopkeepers.
meeting did not produce a meaningful result.

The

However, the

boycott by the UNIA did not last long.
Another organized boycott, this time, against a
specific Korean shopkeeper in Harlem started on Oct. 12,
1984.

I will quote a detailed story in order to show how

this boycott started from Lombardi's article in Daily News
Magazine, March 17, 1985.
Jinks(Black male) had bought a can of soda... He banged
the can on the counter and said he wanted his money
back.
He started to go outside... and changed his mind
again.
"Gimme the soda," he told Shi-Chen (Korean
owner's wife, cashier). Jinks got his soda and change
6 The total number of Korean shopkeepers reached more than
three dozen in 1982.
The number of Black small businesses
on the 125th St. was more than 60 at the time, according to
Malvin Locus, president of the 125th Street Business
Association (New York T i m e s , Sept. 11, 1982).
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and started to leave the store. He hesitated in the
doorway, turned again, and said he hadn't got all of
his change.
"I gave to youl" Mrs. Shin said. "You got it,
man!" One of the customers protested. "Go on now!"
Jinks rolled his eyes.
He said he was tired of
being short-changed, insulted and laughed at by these
Korean bloodsuckers.
He said some worse things.
Charlie [the Korean owner] went up to him and touched
his arm, urging him to leave. Jinks yelled at Charlie,
told him he shouldn't be pushing black folks around.
Then Bong Gu Lee, Charlie's brother-in-law, who
was helping out, began moving in. Jinks grabbed a
chair... and threw it, shattering the right side of the
store window.
By now a number of neighborhood people
were gathering.
Chung Lee, Charlie Shin's sister, who
was working next d o o r ... came out and angrily told
Jinks to leave.
... People were hooting and cursing, and Chung
L e e ... picked up part of the broken chair and threw it
at the crowd. Then Jinks, encouraged by some hotheads,
retrieved a piece of the chair and hit Chung Lee with
it...
Charlie Shin insists,
" ...he[Jinks] reach in
back pocket and come out with fold-knife. sWhy don't
you go back to Korea?' he says. We go into store. He
try to come in. I pick up mop..." (Lombardi 1985:1314)7
The account, like other stories of altercations which
caused the subsequent boycotts, is in dispute.

Whereas

Blacks emphasized the immoral aggression by the Korean
shopkeepers, the Koreans' stories emphasize the immoral or
illegal behaviors of Blacks.

In this case,

while B.B.

Wilson, a Black employee of a nearby Korean store, said, "he
[Jinks] wasn't drunk, Sjust mad,'" and "they [the Koreans]
were out there beating on the dude,"

the Shins insisted

7 Certainly, this story is not an objective observation. The
reporter (Lombardi) collected stories from various witnesses
and wrote it.
It seems to me that this story reflects the
stories of Koreans more than the stories of Blacks. The
subsequent story of the boycott of 1985 in Harlem is based
on Lombardi's article (1986).
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that Jinks was "juiced" and that they were only trying to
scare Jinks off, acting out aggressive moves.

According to

Rev. Juanita Hagan, who started a boycott next day against
the Korean green grocery store, the Koreans were armed with
"long sticks" and one was carrying "a long knife."

Other

Koreans in the area agreed that the Shins were tough guys
and guick with their fists (Lombardi 1985).8
The next day, Rev. Hagan started a boycott and others
joined.

She said, "one of those Koreans ran a cart across

my foot and didn't even apologize!"

Rev. Hagan felt "the

brother in the street was outnumbered," though she admitted
she did not see the beginning of the argument.

But from her

experience, she believed that she knew what would have to
happen.

She said,

the Koreans needed to be taught a lesson.
They have a
bad attitude about Black people in Harlem.
They watch
you like you bound to steal. They givin' you 45 cents
when it should be 50, and three-quarter pound of string
beans instead of a pound. After all, this is our
neighborhood...

8 A Korean shopkeeper told even in 1989 that the Shins had
hot tempers and were aggressive. The blacks thought the
Shins beat Jinks. Of course the Shins denied any wrong
doing. The Shins also denied that they have a history of
violence: "They say we beat up an old black lady! We
wouldn't have lasted three years on this street if true...
people wouldn't come to us. In clothing business or fish
business, not so easy to steal as with potato or apple, so
they don't know... We see someone steal, we say 'Put'em
back'; sometimes they throw fruit or vegetable on floor and
call bad name... sometimes we know someone hungry, we give
soda and bread...but you can't give everything away"(quoted
in Lombardi, 1985:14).
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On the second day, a group of people joined the line
and were unusually vociferous and angry.
they were dominating the picketing.

By the third day,

Rev. Hagan didn't know

them and planned to stop the boycott on the third day.

But

the unknown group took over the boycott and started
picketing several Korean-owned stores.

The leader was

Mantide Evans, a political organizer from Elmhurst, Queens;
he headed an "umbrella group" calling itself the "Concerned
People of Harlem" which included members of the old Marcus
Garvey back-to-Africa movement, a Buy Black movement group
founded by Carlos Cooks, some members of the Black Muslims,
and a few Communists.

He stated that the picketing was "a

training process to educate Harlemites about the business
world."

He said that "we are trying to raise the

consciousness of our race" to the understanding that Blacks
should own 50% of the businesses where they reside and that,
short of leaving Harlem, there was little the Koreans could
do "to placate the community."
Leaflets handed out on the street urged neighborhood
people to "Buy Black... Boycott all non-black merchants in
the black community... koreans, arabs, east indians,
hispanics and europeans"(sic).

An open letter circulated in

1982 demanded an "apology" to the community in the form of
turning over the leases of four Korean businesses to the
Concerned People of Harlem, for free.

The letter also

required the 125th Street Korean Merchants' Association and
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the Korean Produce Association to agree to restrain their
members from entering the fish or fruit-and-vegetable
business in Harlem altogether.

Other leaflets referred to

"bloodsucking Koreans" who "think blacks are stupid" and
take profits out of the community to "their luxurious Korean
homes... and laugh1"(Lombardi 1985:15).

The boycotters also

demanded the employment of Black people in Korean stores (W.
Kim 1986:227).9
This boycott was the first long-term boycott against
Korean shopkeepers in Harlem.

The Korean shopkeepers were

very scared because they realized that they were politically
very vulnerable and that the anger of the Black people was
directed towards them.

They saw that unlike what the

9 It is not clear whether the boycotters really represented
the Concerned People of Harlem or another independent
organization.
Lombardi (1985:15) reported that "A man at
the Concerned People of Harlem headquarters at 29 E. 125th
St. who calls himself Marcus Garvey III dismisses Evans(the
leader of the boycott) and disavows the demands, charging
they were authored by 'an agent of the Koreans.7 He says
the demands sdo not represent the views of the Concerned
People of Harlem.7" However, Marcus Garvey III accused
Koreans of "moving into the black community, uninvited, and
taking over small businesses, preventing blacks from
controlling their own economic destinies..." (Lombardi
i bid.).
Some Koreans believed that a female Korean shopkeeper
who had a bad relationship with the Shins instigated Rev.
Hagan and the boycotters.
Korean local newspapers also
reported similar stories.
But I think that the
circumstances show that the boycott was not instigated by a
Korean shopkeeper, because the demands of the boycotters
were not limited to the questions related to the Shins.
The
boycotters raised the questions about the presence and
attitudes of all Korean shopkeepers. The Korean shopkeeper
accused as an instigator denied the accusation.
However,
she was very critical to the attitudes of the Korean
shopkeepers in Harlem toward Blacks.
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authorities in their home country, Korea, would do in a
similar situation, the New York Police did not disperse the
boycotters.

They also found that the City Hall did not have

the power to solve the problem.

This experience made them

consolidate their local merchant association and more
actively solicit the support from politicians and government
officials.10
The same green grocery store, again, became a target of
Black boycott in 1988.

This time, the owner of the store

was another Korean green grocer.

The store owner was well

known for his violence against Black shoplifting
suspects.11

The boycott started because, the picketing

group claimed, the Korean store owners had physically
assaulted a Black couple accused of shoplifting in the
store.

The female owner said that the couple took some

grocery items and left without paying for them.
them from exiting and the altercation started.

She blocked
She also

claimed that the couple hit her with a frying fan when she
demanded that they return the stolen items.

However, the

news of this incident was soon relayed to Father Lucas of
the Resurrection Roman Catholic Church.
Father Lucas, the leader of the boycott, said he had
heard about the repeated assaults on Black people by the
10 This will be discussed in chapter 6.
11 The owner told me that he often chased shoplifters for
many blocks and grabbed stolen items back.
He often fought
and beat shoplifters.
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store owner.12

He also asserted that the Koreans

of

the

target store were racists because the owners beat old Black
women, disrespected Blacks, sold inferior produces, and said
to Blacks "why don't you go back to Africa?".

After

learning of the incident, Father Lucas announced a boycott
in his church.

This boycott was supported by the December

12th Movement which, at the time, also boycotted three other
Korean stores in Brooklyn and Queens.13
During the boycott, policemen were deployed everyday in
front of the store.

Six to twelve boycotters appeared from

6 to 8 P.M. on weekday evenings and all day long on
Saturdays.

They shouted "boycott, boycott, boycott" and

other slogans with megaphones, distributed leaflets, and
insulted and harassed those who entered the store.14

Their

boycott pursued various goals: to demand respect from Korean
12 Sabihya Prince interviewed Father Lucas for me.
13 Father Lucas said that he announced the boycott in his
church without discussing with the leaders of the December
12th Movement. Because he is one of the important leaders
of the Movement and they share the decision-making process
of the Movement (Hornung 1990b), I doubt his assertion. At
the time, the December 12th Movement organized boycotts
against Korean stores in Brooklyn and Queens too.
The
boycotts were manned by the December 12th Movement and all
leaflets distributed during the boycott were printed under
the name of the December 12th Movement.
Sonny Carson, a
leader of the December 12th Movement, claimed his group did
not lead four boycotts of Korean stores in New York City.
Instead, Sonny Carson asserted, the boycotts were the
"spontaneous reactions" of outraged residents and that his
group merely "supported" them." (Song 1989)
14 From the perspectives of the store owner and the police,
the boycotters was threatening the customers or local
residents rather than representing them.
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shopkeepers; to close the store; and to promote the NBuy
Black' campaign.
During the boycott, the sales of the store fell by 50%.
The Korean Produce Association of New York and the Korean
Merchant Association in Harlem tried to solve the problem,
but they failed.

The target store owner and the leadership

of the Korean Merchant Association of Harlem tried to reach
Father Lucas in order to forge a compromise, but Father
Lucas rejected the attempt.

In order to pursue a solution,

the Korean Merchant Association petitioned a meeting of the
community board of the area.

At the meeting, Father Lukas

accused Korean shopkeepers of being rude, violent, and
racist.

His views received applause from the attendees and

prevailed at the meeting.

The targeted Korean shopkeeper

was booed and humiliated by the attendees.

The targeted

Korean shopkeeper was furious that the other Korean
shopkeepers were apologetic and did not defend him
vigorously enough in the meeting.
14 months.

The boycott continued for

However, the store survived the boycott because

the sales during non-boycott hours produced enough profit to
survive.

Boycotts in Brooklyn
Before the Harlem boycott which I described above, a
boycott against a Korean green grocery store in BedfordStuyvesant, Brooklyn, started in August, 1988.

A 67-year-
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old Black woman and her daughter claimed that Koreans of a
Korean green grocery store had attacked them on Aug. 27,
1988.

The Korean store owner accused the two Black women of

stealing a package of codfish.
The City S u n , a Black newspaper, reported that "Witness
said the owner had lunged at the women with a knife, causing
the elderly woman to be hospitalized. Within minutes of the
incident, outraged area residents and local activists
descended on the store, demanding that police arrest its
owner"

(City S u n . Dec. 7, 1988).

However, the store owner

said, "the trouble... began... when his wife spotted a black
woman, Paulette Clark, shoplifting a piece of dried codfish.
When his wife confronted Ms. Clark, the woman punched
Mrs.Chung and fled outside.

Mrs. Chung followed, a couple

of other Koreans intervened, and by the time it was over Ms.
Clark was flailing away with a plastic bottle of fabric
softener and waving a knife" (Wall Street Journal, Oct. 26,
1988).15
One of the flyers distributed by the December 12th
Movement insisted that "Koreans are not our enemies, but we
cannot allow anyone to disrespect us or used against us"
(quoted in Amsterdam N e w s . Nov. 12, 1988).

Certainly other

flyers of the December 12th Movement promoted the boycott of
all Korean stores in the area.

One flyer, which featured a

15 I am not sure which description is correct. As usual,
both descriptions possibly exaggerated one aspect of the
confrontation.
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caricature of vampires in the center of the leaflet, read
"Boycott Korean Merchants1 Korean merchants are vampires 1"
The pamphlets also described Koreans as parasites and
profiteers.

The boycotters in front of the store shouted,

"Boycott, boycott...

Close'em down... pass'em by... let'em

die... Koreans out of Bed-Stuy"
26, 1988).

(Wall Street Journal. Oct.

The number of boycotters ranged from one half-

dozen to a hundred.
The most famous Black boycott against Korean
shopkeepers started on January 18, 1990, on Church Ave.,
Brooklyn, when a rumor that an old Haitian lady was severely
beaten by three Koreans in a Korean grocery store spread
throughout the neighborhood.
dispute.

Yet again, the story was in

The boycotters insisted that when a Korean

employee demanded that the Haitian women open her bag to see
if anything was stolen, she refused.
grabbed her and knocked her down.

Then, three Koreans

The Koreans said that

then she refused to pay the full price.

When confronted by

a Korean cashier, she threw a pepper at the cashier and
yelled "You fucking Chinese."

Thus the melee started.

The

hospital's record shows that she was treated for a small cut
on her cheek (Hornung 1990a:33).16
Some customers and residents soon appeared in front of
16 Since there is no evidence, it is hard to know what
exactly happened at the time.
Three Koreans who were
accused of the beating were eventually acquitted.
But the
question here is not the exact fact but how the reality was
constructed and why it was constructed in that way.
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the store to protest.17

The protesters were organized by

the Flatbush Coalition for Economic Empowerment.18

This

group "is concerned with bringing money and power into the
neighborhood," one leader of the group said.

In order to

manage daily mobilization for the boycott, they soon

17 The protest seemed to start right away after the
incident.
One woman in a next store recalled, "The
customers were mad and they went right after the store. They
never bothered us." While some remembered "a ragtag picket
line springing up within a hour," others said it appeared
the next morning. (Hornung 1980:33)
18 Right after the incident, the Flatbush Coalition for
Economic Empowerment distributed the below leaflet.
FLATBUSH COALITION FOR ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT
INCIDENT: WOMAN BEATEN BY RED APPLE OWNER
KNOWN FACTS
l.ON JANUARY 18TH ABOUT 6 P.M. A WORKING MOTHER ENTERED
THE RED APPLE MARKET LOCATED AT CHURCH AVENUE AND
ST.PAUL'S PLACE
2.THE PATRON(WORKING MOTHER) WENT IN TO PURCHASE
GREEN PEPPER, BEFORE SHE COULD DO THAT A FEMALE
EMPLOYEE ASKED TO LOOK IN HER SHOPPING BAG. THE PATRON
REFUSED AND WAS ACCUSED OF STEALING.
3.THE PATRON TOLD THE EMPLOYEE IF SHE WAS BEING ACCUSED
OF THEFT, THEN THE POLICE SHOULD BE CALLED. AT THIS
POINT 3 KOREAN MEN ASSAULTED HER, KICKING AND BEATING
HER UNTIL SHE WAS BLEEDING AND JUST ABOUT UNCONSCIOUS.
4.THE POLICE ARRIVED DURING THE ASSAULT. THEY SEARCHED
HER BAG AND FOUND MEAT PURCHASED ELSEWHERE. THE OWNER
WAS TAKEN TO THE 70TH PRECINCT ISSUED A DESK SUMMONS
FOR ASSAULT AND RELEASED.
5.THE VICTIM WAS TAKEN TO CALEDONIA HOSPITAL WHERE SHE
SAT FOR 8 HOURS WITHOUT ANY ATTENTION AND WAS SENT HOME
WHERE SHE IS STILL SUFFERING FROM INTERNAL INJURIES.
BOYCOTT MERCHANTS WHO DISRESPECT AND DON'T
SUPPORT THE COMMUNITY
MASS COMMUNITY MEETING
THURSDAY: JANUARY 25, 1990 AT 7:30 P.M.
AT ST.PAUL'S CHURCH-ST. PAUL'S PLACE & CHURCH AVE.
TEXTE FRANCAIS AU VERSO
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organized a group called the Flatbush Frontline Collective.
The two groups had a combined membership of 17 (Hornung
1990a:33).

"People automatically came out and gathered in

front of the stores once word spread that a woman had been
assaulted at Red Apple,

...due to the fact that the

community residents had constantly and repetitively
witnessed...

[p]hysical and verbal abuse " (Albert, spoke-

person for the Flatbush Frontline Collective, in 'Like It
I s 7 aired Oct. 28, 1990 by WABC).19
The Flatbush Frontline Collective soon reached Sonny
Carson, a famous community activist who led the struggle for
community control of the public schools in Brooklyn in the
late 1960s, or alternately known as the kidnapper who was
convicted for kidnapping in the 1970s.

Sonny Carson was

also a leader of the December 12th Movement which had
organized many boycotts against Korean stores.

He became

the leading strategist of the boycott.

The Boycott Process
Since physical violence could potentially strengthen
the moral position of the other group, the boycotters aimed
at the reduction of the targeted stores7 revenue.

The

shopkeepers and the Korean Produce Association of New York
similarly distributed propaganda that depicted the
19 Sabine Albert was the spoke-person for the boycotters.
She also asserted that what happen at the Red Apple is not a
solitary incident.
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boycotters as "reverse racists."

The boycotters' other aims

were to increase the participation of local residents, to
stir and heighten their consciousness, to garner pnblic
support, to secure equitable treatment, and to close down
the targeted stores as a lesson to other racist shopkeepers.
The store owners' options were: to increase police
protection, to decrease the moral legitimacy of the
boycotts, to get financial supports from other Koreans,
and/or to wait until the boycotters stop the boycotts.
Since the Koreans did not want to give up their businesses
and the boycotters did not want to compromise, the conflict
became a long-term stalemate.

Thus, the boycotts became a

routine demonstrations in front of the targeted stores.
The boycotts led to a 50% to almost 100% decline in the
daily revenues of the targeted stores.

During the first few

months of the boycott in 1985 in Harlem, about 7-10 people
(later only 3 people) picketed behind the police line.

At

the beginning, "they literally stood in the store's doorway
and followed customers up the block, berating them"
(Lombardi 1985:16).
In the 1988-9 boycott in Harlem, the picketers
stationed themselves behind the police-erected blue
sawhorses five feet away from front of the store.

The

boycott against the NaNa Fruit and Vegetable Market20 on
125th street had continued from September 1988 to October
20 The name of the targeted store is altered.
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1989.

The boycotters demonstrated from 6 to 8 PM on

weekdays and all day long on Saturdays.

During weekdays, 5

to 8 boycotters stationed in front of the store shouted
through the bullhorn,

"Don't shop- shut'em down," "Pass 'em

by- Watch 'em diel," "Boycott! Boycott!"
people participated in the boycott.

On Saturdays, more

Sometimes, they shouted

to entering customers that "the owner beat old Black lady."
"Don't buy here." "Boycott, boycott."
insulted those who defied the boycott.

They also booed and
When Joe Harris, a

carpenter who lived nearby, bought five lemons, the
boycotters shouted toward him "house nigger1" and "Uncle
Toml" (Amsterdam N e w s . Oct. 1, 1988).

Because of this

combative boycott, sales plummeted to almost zero during the
boycott hours.

To attract

more sympathy and participants,

the boycotters distributed leaflets which accused the store
owners of being violent racists.21

However, the

21 One boycott leaflet states,
9 MONTHS STRONG! THE BOYCOTT CONTINUES!
SEPT. '88
-Gap Dol Kim and U1 Sun Kim, owners of NaNa's Food Market,
125th St., brutally attack an elderly Black woman.
-The boycott begins.
NaNa'S MUST GO
Oct. '88
-Police from the 28th Precinct, working with the Kims, began
arresting boycotters on phony charges in order to break the
boycott.-Police began providing Nana's 24 hours a day/7 days
a week personal security.
NOV. '88
-Gap Dol Kim says, "Niggers should put their chains back on
and go back to where all Niggers come from.
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DEC. '88
-Gap Dol K i m proudly says he believes in the philosophy of the
KKK!
JAN. '89
-Ul Sun Kim says on Channel 13 that she would never hire Black
people to work for her because "all Black people are lazy."
FEB. '89
-The Kims and the Korean Merchant Association of Harlem go to
Community Board #10 and try to end the boycott.
They fail!
MARCH. '89
-Gap Dol Kim arrested for assaulting a demonstrator. He spends
7 hours locked up in the 28th Precinct, then released.
-The police, having upset the Koreans, arrest 2 demonstrators
for no reason at all.
APRIL 789
-The court dismisses phony assault charges brought by the
Kims.
MAY 789
-The Kims plead poverty in court. They say they are bankrupt
because of the boycott and ask for a tax-payer funded
attorney.
JUNE 789
-Gap Dol Kim falsely accuses young Black girls of stealing but
because community demands Gap Dol to be locked up instead,
police let the girls go.
-State Senator David Paterson publicly supports the boycott.
JOIN THE LINE! MAKE HISTORY IN CLOSING N A N A 7S
DECEMBER 12TH MOVEMENT
NO JUSTICE!- NO PEACE! ON TOWARD THE GENERAL STRIKE!
Another leaflet goes,
Buy Black, WE MUST CONTROL: OUR MONEY, WHAT WE BUY AND WHEN,
WHEN WE PRODUCE FOR THEM, AND WHEN WE DON'T!
ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE
Brothers and sisters, we are engaged in a struggle for our
very survival.
The boycott represents one aspect of our
continuing
struggle
for
self-determination
and
total
liberation of the Black Nation....
It is extremely important that we view the ongoing boycott of
NaN a 7s in its proper perspective.
Anyone or any group that
comes into our community must respect us; no exceptions.
Especially when it comes to the actuality of our spending our
hard earned money with them. Under no circumstance should we
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distribution of the leaflets failed to increase
participation.

They also displayed a big cloth screen which

showed a big, powerful Black fist.

This image symbolizes

the Black power and the destruction of the racist white
power.

The banner also carried the name of the group, the

December 12th Movement, which organized the boycott.
Another poster read "BUY BLACK" in large print and featured
the addresses of four Black fruit and vegetable stores (or
vendors).

One day there was a figure made of wood and paper

which carried a small sign that read, "Owners said, Black go
back to Africa."
But business during off-boycott hours was almost the
same as before the boycott.

Many Harlemites had on several

occasions ignored the pickets and patronized the store.
Some were afraid of being harassed by the protesters, and
had simply changed their shopping hours.

At times they

showed up as early as 8 A.M. or 9 A.M. before any pickets
arrived (Amsterdam Mews. Nov. 12, 1988).

Thus, the store

be subjected to verbal or physical abuse.
An attack on our
women and children should be an act of war. As a community we
should never tolerate disrespect.
The question or issue that we should focus our attention on is
not whether or not the boycott action at NaNa's is a correct
or incorrect strategy, but rather who is going to control the
vital life lines; and what are you doing about them....
As we enter into the 52nd week of the boycott, we say to our
bothers and sisters "NaNa's Must Go, join the boycott line."
We must consciously participate in the struggle to recapture
our community. No one is going to do for us, what we can and
must do for ourselves.
Never give up. We love you....
The Black Nation Must Be Free! FREEDOM or DEATH
[Original bold letters. I changed personal and store names]

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

167
could generate enough profit to survive during off-boycotthour s.

However, almost nobody came into the store during

the boycott hours.
The store owners also tried to placate customers by
explaining that they were not beating any Black.

A. poster

on a window of the targeted store carried an explanation of
the boycott from the perspective of the owner.
Dear Customer: They claim that Koreans have beat up
black people. But it is not benefit to Koreans to beat
up our customers and we have the evidence to prove this
fact. The management of "NaNa fruit market" will work
harder to serve our customers and Harlem community.
Dear Customer, the management of NaNa Fruit Market
apologizes for the shopping inconveniences caused by
December 12 Movement. The Dec. 12 Movement has been
boycotting Koreans for past four years. The Dec 12
movement are organization located in Brooklyn. Their
purpose of boycotting "NaNa Fruit" is solely to benefit
their movement, not to benefit the harlem c o m m u n i t y and
its people. They boycott us because we are Korean. [I
changed the store's name]
When troubles occurred in a fish market near the
boycott site, Black shoppers often threatened to boycott the
fish market.

This threat and the actual boycott of Korean

stores made the Korean store owners pay more attention to
Black shoppers.

Several Korean shopkeepers in the area told

me that they became more careful and polite to Black
customers after the boycott.

They also reported that

several Black shoppers threatened to boycott when the
shopkeepers did not satisfy them.

Other Black customers

also became more assertive.
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One college professor22 told me that a Black radical
group in Harlem had a list of stores whose owners were
mistreating Blacks and the group would burn down those
stores when a crisis started.

The professor informed me

that when the store owners mistreated Black shoppers, the
group collected such complaints from Black residents in
Harlem.

She also asserted that she dissuaded some of them

from setting one store afire during the boycott.
to her, they did not set the store on fire.
confirm this story from any other source.

According

I could not
However, two

Asian stores (the boycotted Korean store and one Yemenite
store) were set on fire during the boycott period.

Police

suspected drug related fights, but the Korean shopkeepers
suspected the boycotters.
The Brooklyn boycott against two Korean stores in 1990
drew great attention from local residents and the news
media.

After the altercation on Jan. 18th, 1990, the ranks

of the protesters grew swiftly.

The Flatbush Coalition for

Economic Empowerment soon distributed flyers in the area and

22 She was living in Central Harlem and teaching in a
college in New York City when I met her in Spring 1989. She
complained about the rudeness of Korean shopkeepers and
talked about many racist aspects of American society.
She
insisted that Koreans should get a preferable treatment from
White banks. According to her, without it, Koreans could
not expand their business so rapidly. When I explained how
Koreans mobilize capital within their ethnic community(see
chapter 4), she doubted my assertion.
However, she seemed
to have some connection with radical groups in Harlem
because she said she met them and discussed with them.
She
supported the activities of the boycotters.
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organized mass-community meetings and nearby rallies before
marches to the targeted store.

The Flatbush Collective

Frontline soon started to organize the boycott.

The members

called people through their networks and distributed flyers
in the area.

Their meetings and rallies drew hundreds of

local Haitian and Black residents.

The speakers included

various local and city Haitian and Black leaders.

The

December 12th Movement soon got involved into the boycott.
The Frontline got advice from Sonny Carson.

The December

12th Movement also participated in mobilizing people, and
members of the Movement were key speakers in rallies.

They

also organized rallies in Harlem and distributed flyers to
passersby in order to promote the Brooklyn boycott.
Policemen were deployed as the protesters' number grew.
Widespread media attention beginning in May 1990 also
increased the number of participants in the boycott.

At its

peak, about 600 protesters gathered and about 400 policemen
were deployed in front of the store.

New York City's Human

Rights Commission(Commissioner de Leon) intervened.
Eventually, the Mayor, courts, state politicians, FBI, and
federal politicians intervened as the boycott grew and got
more attention from the news media.

Carson advised the

protesters not to negotiate with the city until officials
arrested the three Koreans who had allegedly beaten the
Haitian woman.
The Korean shopkeepers in New York City thought that
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Carson organized a boycott against another Korean store
because of his political ambition.

The Koreans believed

that Carson exaggerated the incident to sell his nationalist
Black Power ideas and to drive Korean shopkeepers out of
from Black neighborhoods.

Thus, Koreans were determined to

support the Korean shopkeepers at any expense.

Koreans

supported the store owners with hundreds of thousands
dollars.

During the boycott, daily sales dropped from

thousands of dollars before the boycott to mere tens of
dollars.

The Ends and Impacts of Boycotts
There are several different reasons why the boycotts
eventually stopped.

First, some small individual boycotts

did not continue for a long time because the protesters
could not support them.

When a spontaneous boycott against

a Korean C-Town supermarket in Elmhurst, Queens occurred,
the Korean owner apologized right away and fired the
employee who was accused of beating a young Black who was
suspected of shoplifting by the employee.23

The owner also

sought help from local Black leaders; these leaders decided
that the boycott was not necessary because the owner had
helped many community causes.

The boycott did not continue

for even a week.

23 Again, the stories from the young Black and the Korean
employee were contradictory.
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In some other cases, local residents opposed boycotts.
Two 1988 boycott attempts by the December 12th Movement in
Jamaica, Queens, ceased within a month because participants
were harassed by local residents and the police severely
their boycott activities.

However, when organizations were

involved, the boycotts could continue for a longer time.
Boycotters and organizations behind boycotts needed
reasons not only for the beginning of the boycotts but also
for the end of the boycotts to maintain the sympathy of
local residents.

If the targeted store owners sold their

stores and left the area, the boycotters eventually stopped
their boycotts and could celebrate their successes.

They

stopped their boycotts in a 1985 Harlem boycott and in a
1988 Brooklyn boycott after the targeted store-owners moved
out.

However, there were also political pressure to stop

the boycotts from Black politicians.
The 1988-89 Harlem boycott supposedly ended under
pressure from then mayoral candidate David Dinkins.

Even

though the leader of the boycott denied this rumor, Dinkins
stated several times that he was influential in stopping the
boycott.24

The 1990 Brooklyn boycott might also fall into

this category.

When the court decided that there was no

evidence that three Koreans beat a Haitian woman and Mayor
Dinkins pressed hard on the boycott leaders, the boycotters
eventually lost support from the residents and stopped the
24 See chapter 6 for detail.
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boycott.
The first boycott in Harlem in 1982 stopped without a
closure of any Korean stores because the boycotters did not
target a specific store.

The distribution of flyers which

charged Koreans with getting preferential treatments from
the American government and White banks increased suspicion
of Korean shopkeepers among the area residents.

The Koreans

shopkeepers in Harlem were also scared after realizing that
they were described as vicious merchants. After the boycott,
the Korean shopkeepers started to participate in local
business associations and community affairs and to donate
funds to the Police Athletic League and other community
events in the area.

Eventually, the Korean shopkeepers in

the area organized their own business association to deal
with community relationships more effectively.
The 1985 boycott in Harlem led to economic disaster for
the targeted store owners.

They sold their building and

business to another Korean and eventually gave up their
green grocery business in Harlem.

They had to sell their

building at a discount price because of the stigma that
caused Black shoppers to avoid the store.

When the

boycotters expanded their boycotts against other nearby
stores, they did not get enough support from the local
residents.

Other shopkeepers survived without economic

hardship but developed deep resentment of the Black
boycotters.

One shopkeeper, whose store was boycotted in
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1985, said that he hated the demonstrators.

He also

insisted that the boycotters victimized Koreans in order to
heighten the political presence of the boycott organizers
among the Blacks.

Some Black residents in Harlem also

complained that the boycotters boycotted Korean shopkeepers
in order to increase their political influence in Black
neighborhoods.
Even though the targeted store owner in the 1988-1989
Harlem boycott survived, Korean shopkeepers in Harlem felt
that the boycott threatened all Korean stores.

The Korean

shopkeepers in the area noticed that Black shoppers had
become more assertive in their demands.

The Korean

shopkeepers also told me that they became more receptive to
the Black shoppers' demands and more careful about possible
conflicts.

The Korean shopkeepers were afraid of being

boycotted.

The Korean stores near the targeted store also

experienced a decrease in their revenue.

The targeted

shopkeepers and nearby Korean shopkeepers criticized the
boycott, the leadership of the Korean Merchant Association,
local police, and the city government very harshly.

They

tended to blame the problems of poor Blacks on the poor
Blacks themselves.25
25 It is not clear why they place the blame more on poor
Blacks than other Korean shopkeepers.
One explanation may
be that they experienced a decrease in their revenue because
of the boycott.
The other one might be that the nearby
Korean shopkeepers of the targeted store were young and
relatively new shopkeepers. They were more aggressive in
making money and more anxious about Black shoplifting.
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In all three Harlem boycotts, there were efforts to
solve the problems through negotiation.

In the 1988-1989

boycott, Father Lucas rejected any negotiation because he
thought that respect could not be the object of negotiation.
He and the boycotters insisted on the closure of the
targeted store.

In other Harlem boycotts, the demands from

the boycotters included the surrender of some leases of
Korean stores to Blacks.

The Koreans rejected the demands.

Thus, in fact, there was no successful negotiation between
Korean shopkeepers and Black boycotters in Harlem.
The only case where negotiation between the Korean
shopkeepers and Black leaders succeeded involved the 1988
Brooklyn boycott.

In this case, the actual boycotters and

the Black participants in the negotiation were different.
The Black participants were main-stream Black leaders such
as Assemblyman Al Vann.

Assemblyman Vann agreed with the

December 12th Movement-led boycott's charge that "Koreans
gave little or nothing back to the communities in which they
reap economic benefits."

Rev. Butts of Abyssinia Baptist

Church in Harlem explained the Black boycotts as "coupled
with a resentment of the Koreans' attitude, in resentment of
the fact that blacks have been unable to develop their
communities"

(quoted in Amsterdam N e w s . Nov. 12, 1988).

The negotiated resolution in the 1988 Brooklyn boycott

Because they worked hard, they considered others who did not
work hard more negatively.
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addressed a number of Black grievances in BedfordStuyvesant.

All 32 Korean merchants in the areas agreed to

open accounts at either Freedom National Bank or Carver
Savings Bank, two local banks owned by Blacks.

They also

agreed to donate money to community organizations and to
start a job training program for local youths.

The

resolution stipulated,
1). Korean merchants would contribute to a local
trust fund whose resources will help encourage
entrepreneurship, presumably for Blacks, in the area.
2). The merchants would utilize the services of local
Black-owned and/or operated banks.
3). The merchants would advertise their products and
services in the Black media.
4). They also would utilize the services of other
local business in the predominantly Black neighborhood.
5). The merchants would support financially and in
other ways cultural and educational programs aimed at
the youths of he two communities in order to promote
racial understanding.
6). The owner of the Tropic Market must sell his
business.
This resolution did not satisfy all factions of both
groups.

Sonny Carson and the December 12th Movement had

steadfastly refused to accept any negotiation and accused
the Black negotiators of "selling out".26

Many Korean

shopkeepers were also angry because they thought that the
Korean representatives had sold out the Korean shopkeepers.
They considered the resolution as a defeat which included
many unacceptable concessions by Korean representatives.
The targeted store owner was also dissatisfied with the
26 See chapter 6 for detail.
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resolution.
the ares.27

But he had no other alternative than to leave
After the resolution, the targeted Korean

shopkeeper gave up his business and left the area.
Accordingly, the boycott lost its steam, and the boycotters
eventually disappeared.

Despite the resolution, the

situation in the area did not achieve racial harmony.
education program for young Blacks was started.

No

Humiliation

and poverty continued.
This negotiation only revealed the chasms between
different social classes among Blacks.

Carson admitted that

his group has little support from the black middle
class. But Carson says he does not need their support,
who he calls 'sellouts' to the white culture (Song
1989*6).
The boycotters and some Blacks in the area also thought,
"the negotiators were selling out and not addressing the
major question of who will control business in black
neighborhoods" (New York Times. Dec. 21, 1988).

In

contrast, a Black participant in the negotiation said, "If
Mr. Carson won't accept the agreement, that's his
problem....

Mr. Carson is not the community.

had decided what it wants"

The community

(Song 1989:8).

In the case of the 1990 Brooklyn boycott, negotiation
27 The store owner's brother told me that the store owner
lost all investment in the store(more than 100,000 dollars).
The store owner's brother was very critical to the
resolution and considered that as a great defeat.
From his
discussion, I got the impression that the store owner
reluctantly admitted the selling out of the store.
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was not possible because the boycotters were successful in
mobilizing hundreds of protesters and because the Korean
leadership in Kew York City did not want to repeat the
"defeat" they experienced in the 1988 Brooklyn boycott .
The alleged victim of the beating brought the incident to
court.

However, a Jury of the State Supreme Court in

Brooklyn acquitted all of the accused Koreans.

Eventually,

support from area residents and the number of boycotters
decreased after the decision.

In Spring, 1991, the

boycotters seldom appeared in front of the target store.

In

Summer 1991, the targeted store owner sold his store and
left the area.
Even though the continuing boycotts failed to produce
any noticeable change in poor Black neighborhoods, many
Korean shopkeepers from Church Ave. Brooklyn to Harlem
admitted that they were more cautious and polite to Black
shoppers than before the boycotts.

The Black customers

became more aggressive in asserting their rights.

One

Korean shopkeeper near the targeted store on Church Avenue,
Brooklyn, said that the Black customers became more
aggressive, and that there were now even more problems in
business.

She also expressed her increasing fear of doing

business in Black neighborhoods.
expressed similar opinions.

Many Harlem shopkeepers

Black customers also noticed

the change of attitude in Korean shopkeepers.

As one

newspaper reported, "An East Flatbush shopper notices the
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Korean shopkeepers now smile more and always say sthank
you'"(Kwong 1991).
Korean newspapers also started their campaign for the
change of attitudes of Koreans toward Blacks.

One Korean

newspaper routinely carried a short slogan, "Don't use the
term, aumdunovi

[nigger]."

One Korean news article

suggested that Korean shopkeepers needed to understand Black
culture and to refrain from giving Blacks the impression of
insult or contempt.

Koreans also worried about the rumor

that some Blacks were willing to blow-up stores by injecting
propane gas into stores if they could get a few thousand
dollars

IChung

Ana Ilbo. May 16, 1990).

The December 12th Movement
A group which organized most prominent boycotts against
Korean shopkeepers during this period was the December 12th
Movement.28

The December 12th Movement frequently provided

key manpower, strategy, and ideology for the boycotts
against Korean shopkeepers.

This December 12th Movement is

an organization of Black community activists mainly in
Brooklyn and in Harlem.

28 The December 12th Movement has organized many protests
against police brutality and white racism, and boycotts
against many Korean shopkeepers.
They also promoted a
general strike in New York City.
Their main hero is Malcolm
X. (Hornung 1990b)
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Coltrane Chimurenga,29 Sonny Carson, and other Black
activists organized in 1986 the Black Men's Movement, an
amalgam o£ Block associations and neighborhood patrols that
organized around two issues: police brutality and the influx
of crack in Black neighborhoods.

This group led many

protest marches against New York City Mayor Koch and police
precincts (e.g. protesting the authorities' handling of
Howard Beach incident) after Michael Griffith was killed by
White mobs in Howard Beach, New York City.

This group also

protested police killing of Black suspects and marched
against crack dealers.

Carson and Chimuranga severed their

alliance with Revs. Al Sharpton and Louis Farrakhan because
of their differences in social philosophy and protest
strategies.30

They renamed their organization the December

29 Chimurenga holds a master degree in Education from
Harvard University.
He was one of New York Eight Plus who
were arrested as urban terrorists(planning a jail break and
armed car robberies) but eventually acquitted in 1985. The
eight were the first people to be held under a newly passed
National Preventive Detention Law, called the Bail Reform
Act of 1984. Chimurenga was a member of Republic of New
Afrika and associate of the Black Acupuncture Advisory
Association of North America which provided community health
care in Harlem and South Bronx (Churchill and Wall 1988:364365). Jiuliani, Republican candidate for the Mayor of New
York City in 1989, was the prosecutor of New York Eight
Plus.
As a self-styled communist, Chimurenga proclaimed
himself to be staunch opponent of capitalism, but he
insisted on Black neighborhoods developing their own network
of small businesses that would provide goods and services,
jobs, and capital for Blacks. (Hornung 1990b:29)
30 The December 12th Movement has a militant position
against social injustice and racism than other Black
politicians or activists.
See chapter 6.
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12th Movement to memorialize the separation date from Revs.
Al Sharpton and Louis Farrakhan.

The December 12th Movement

includes Marxists, community activists, a Father, and a
lawyer as its core leaders.
The December 12th Movement tried to provide Black New
Yorkers an alternative leadership to
the leadership offered on the one hand by Dinkins and
Jackson, modern-day Booker T. Washington who cut deals
and compromises that sell their people short, and that
offered on the other hand by Sharpton and Farrakhan,
Garveyite caricatures who use their pulpits to preach
false sermons of black nationalism...(Hornung 1990b:29)
Chimuranga further explained that the position of the
December 12th Movement is to make "us control our own lives,
and watch our own streets, begin and conduct our own
businesses, teach our own children, take care of sick and
old" (ibid.).

Thus, Sonny Carson expressed "We need men who

can come together and work, who can protect our community
and our families.
self-determination"

That's what we're all about, achieving
(ibid.:28).

Chimurenga also commented on the boycotts organized
and/or supported by the December 12th Movement.
It frames a number of very important ’ssues...
First,
an attack upon one of our women is an attack upon all
of us. Second, the boycott shows that we still do
something to take power away from people who don't give
us the respect we deserve. And third, we are showing
our own people that we do have power, purchasing power,
economic power, if we act together...
The boycott is
an issue of black people standing up... To the simpleminded, it's a matter of pitting black against yellow.
This statement shows that the December 12th Movement's
purpose is to protest various "racism" and "social
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injustice” against Blacks and to promote "Black Power."
However, various government officials considers them to be
"dangerous criminals."

Because of the movement's militant

position, the FBI and New York Police Department monitor the
members very closely.

Chimurenga said, "I have been

watched, bugged, followed, filed, and cross-filed for so
many years that I just consider it part of my life"

(ibid.,

p.28) .31

Conclusion
Because of humiliation and mistreatment by Korean
shopkeepers and because of anger and suspicion regarding the
sudden and rapid growth of Korean businesses, many Blacks
expressed their anger and initiated personal boycotts
against Korean shopkeepers.

However, these silent personal

boycotts did not affect the attitudes and revenues of Korean
shopkeepers.

But when organizations organized and supported

boycotts, boycotts could be sustained for long period of
time and seriously affect the financial situation of the
targeted stores.

The organizations mobilized people by

stimulating the resentment of racial injustice among Black
residents.

Flyers and rallies conveyed these feelings.

However, because some Blacks patronized the targeted stores
during the boycotts, it was very difficult for many Black
31 For the detail discussion of the relationship between the
December 12th Movement and the state agents such as police,
prosecutors, and politicians, see chapter 6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

182

residents to maintain moral enthusiasm during the long-term
boycotts.
The boycotts also demonstrated that there are many
people who are ready to fight against racism and organize
for a "justice" for Black people.

The December 12th

Movement includes such individuals.

This group is staunchly

resistant to racist practices and capitalism.

However, in

everyday practice, they emphasized not their anti-capitalist
ideas but their anti-racist ideas, propelling the latter
into the foreground of protests because anti-capitalist
ideas have less appeal than anti-racism among the Black
population.
Their boycotts were simultaneously a failure and a
success.

They did not achieve their original goals of the

closure of targeted Korean shopkeepers, the rise of Black
Power, nor the creation of a permanent Buy Black Movement,
and had to end their boycotts with no visible results.
However, they heightened the consciousness of many Blacks
regarding the attitudes of Korean shopkeepers and their
massive presence in Black neighborhoods as important issues
and caused Korean shopkeepers to change their attitudes to
some degree.

They also raised questions for many Blacks

about the racism in American society.
Whether the causes of the boycotts are minor
altercations between Korean shopkeepers and "suspicious”
Black shoppers or not, those incidents made participants
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examine the meanings of the relationship between the two
groups and the events in the context of American sQciety.
In the process of the conflict, various meanings and
interpretations were deployed and argued.

This contest of

meanings cannot be understood outside the context of power.
Some groups will try to spread certain meanings and
interpretations and other groups will counter with different
meanings and interpretations.
The challenge, toward existing social relationships,
not only with Korean shopkeepers but with White-dominated
society as well, was accompanied with related meanings and
interpretations of social relationships.

The challenge to

existing ideological, political, and economic social orders
by the boycotters and the December 12th Movement raised
questions regarding how the social order is criticized,
reconstructed, or maintained in relation to the existing
social forces and existing normative order.

These issues

will be dealt within the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
"BLOODSUCKER" vs. "THOSE NIGGERS": CLASHES OF
MEANINGS AND POWER

When a Black shopper wanted to get refund of his
deposited m o n e y ($20) for a lay-away suit, the
Korean shopkeeper responded to him, "no cash
refund." The conversation continued with tension.
B:(a young Black male customer) Why not?
A:(pointing a sign on a window) Look at over
there. You can just exchange. No refund at
all.
B:(hesitant with anger) You have to refund.
A:(with a flat face, pointing to a sign, "no
refund", on the window): Read the sign over
there.
B :(looks at the Korean shopkeeper with
apparent anger) ...
A:(no change of expression) ...
B : (finally choosing a pair of pants) It is
$19.99. No tax. O.K.?
A:(with a despising smile) No. Pay tax.
B:(with apparent anger) Where are you from?
A: America.
B : Japan?

A:
B:
A•
B:
A:
B:

A:

....

China?

«...
No money for tax.
Pay it.
(angrily) Japanese Jew.

....

B : (finally pays a 20 dollar bill and three
quarters and gets change, $19.11, from
A) Japanese Jew...
He spat out again "Japanese Jew" when he went out.
After he went out, the Korean shopkeeper also spat
out "michin saeki [crazy asshole]".

This story was the conversation between a Black shopper
and a Korean shopkeeper at whose store I worked in 1988.
'Japanese Jew,' 'michin saeki.' and other invective words
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express well the mutual mistrust and negative images,
separating these two groups.

This exchange occurred within

in the concrete political and economic environment between
the two individuals involved.

How can this individual

incident be interpreted in the context of the general
relationship of the two ethnic groups in New York City?
One of the posters on the walls on 125th street in
Harlem depicted a young Black sweating to pull a rickshaw
with a Korean in it.

Another poster depicted a Black hand

powerfully grasping and crushing something.

Why is it that

discontented Black shoppers or boycotters cannot crush
Koreans in reality as they do in drawings?

In this chapter,

I will explore how the meanings are expressed; how and what
kind of social relationships are mediated through the
meanings in the Black-Korean conflict; how both groups try
to achieve moral high grounds; how they contextualize the
conflict in relation to American society; and how their
efforts and presentations are limited by and related to
state agents, especially politicians and law enforcers.

The Stories of Boycotters and Blacks
There is a difficulty in measuring how many Blacks in
the poor New York City Black neighborhoods share the ideas
of the boycotters.

However, the boycotters' success in

closing several Korean stores and the degree of intensity of
the boycotts show that there is considerable sympathy for
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the boycotts in poor Black communities.

Views of the

boycotters and Blacks about Korean shopkeepers in poor Black
communities have certain core themes.

Koreans as Arrogant and Racist Individuals
The most common complaint of Black residents was that
Korean shopkeepers are rude to Black shoppers.

Blacks

explained their experience in Korean stores in a meeting
between Korean shopkeepers and Black local leaders in
Harlem.

"When Blacks stay in a store for a while in order

to look at commodities, Korean shopkeepers often said vif
you want to buy, buy it. Or go out'."

They also said that

Koreans do not say hello to Black customers.

Other

complaints also included, "Koreans don't treat us like human
being," or "Koreans don't smile to us." Similar complaints
can be heard in many areas where Korean shopkeepers do their
business.
One letter from a Black expressed the feeling.

"

You [Korean shopkeepers] look down upon us [Blacks] and
treat us like shoplifters.
You, in general, don't
greet us, don't smile, and are very scornful of us.
When you talk among yourselves, you don't call us Black
but qumdunqyi [nigger]. Many of us know what you mean
by that...
Of course you will point out that there are
a lot of drug, violence, and crime in Black
neighborhoods.
But the majority of the shoppers are
decent citizens.
How can you mistreat us like that
when we support your income? You have to thank us
because our difficult struggle for equality for a
century after the Civil War achieved an equality, at
least, before law...
How do you dare to show contempt
for us when you make money from our neighborhoods and
you are protected by the laws which resulted from our
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struggles?

We are really shocked and angry.1

When Black shoppers hear Korean shopkeepers and their
employees use Korean, the customers are often suspicious of
the Koreans' discussions.

They suspect that the Koreans are

attempting to cheat or insult them by using language
unintelligible to consumers.

Others Blacks complained that

Koreans put money on the counter instead of in the hands of
the shoppers.

One of the Harlem boycotters said they

boycotted a Korean store because "its owner showed
disrespect to Blacks, and we[the boycotters] heard a bunch
of complaints about the mistreatment by the store owner."
Reverend Calvin Butts, a pastor of a large Black church in
Harlem, said that Koreans came in with a very bad prejudice
instilled by media and other sources (Korean Times of Mew
Y o r k . Sept. 6, 1986).
Another complaint was that Korean shopkeepers are very
suspicious of Blacks.

When the Church Avenue boycott

started in January 1990, one Black women complained that
Korean shopkeepers are suspicious about Blacks.

It is

certainly true that Korean shopkeepers and, I think, other
shopkeepers too, consider Blacks, especially young Blacks,

1 This letter seemed to be translated into Korean by a
Korean Professor and sent to the Korea Times of Hew Yor k .
This letter appeared as a series in Feb. 1990.
I
retranslated those articles into English.
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to be potential shoplifters.2
Certainly, Harlem Korean shopkeepers knew about the
complaints of the Black residents in the area.

The former

secretary of the Korean Merchant Association in Harlem said,
"the complaints of Blacks are 'Korean shopkeepers pushed
Black shoppers to buy, pay, and go out fast.
not buy, Koreans would frown their face.'"

If they did
He continued,

"Koreans do not talk to a shopper if the customer seems not
to buy any thing...

Korean shopkeepers might be trying to

hustle shoppers through the checkout process as quickly as
possible to avoid hiring an additional cashier - as might be
necessary if they take the time to count change for every
shopper, as Americans do."

Other Koreans explained that in

Confucian culture women cannot touch male hands, thus female
(usually Korean) cashiers put change on the counter rather
than in the hands of male customers.
However, Father Lucas who led the boycott against a
Korean shopkeeper in Harlem in 1988 had a different idea.
"None of the boycotts started over 'cultural differences' or
'language barriers.'

Vicious assaults, especially against

African women and babies, were the last straws after long
patterns of disrespect and verbal abuse of African people"

2 Many young Blacks said whenever they enter a store they
find suspicious stares.
Some young Blacks stated that they
have reacted by splitting up to see who the clerks will
follow, or by pretending to snatch something from a shelf
and then laughing at a clerk when they reveal an empty hand
(Washington Post. Oct. 17, 1991).
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(Amsterdam M e w s . Oct. 6, 1990).

One Black man said he saw a

Korean chase a Black and beat him with Tae Kwon D o .3

This

seems true because one Korean shopkeeper said to me that he
chased shoplifters for many blocks and had sometimes kicked
them down.
Sonny Carson, one of the founders of the December 12th
Movement, says,
Some Korean merchants have taken on the attitude
reminiscent of the slave masters.
They have the same
racist attitude that they are superior.
They are
arrogant and suspicious...
I don't believe black people will ever get a free and
fair share of anything...
The Koreans are beginning
to attack our people physically. We are prepared to
fight by any means necessary.
I don't think there can
be any resolution, (quoted in Song 1989)
During the 1990 Church Avenue boycott, a Black nurse
wondered how Korean dare to beat a poor Black woman even
they thought she stole something.
she would not steal it.

"If she had enough money,

Even though I agree that the person

who stole did a wrong thing, the Koreans who dare beat those
poor people are very bad."

Koreans as Exploiters
Many Blacks think that the Korean shopkeepers are
concerned only about money.
all of us...

One Black said, "they suspect

They just try to make money.

concerned about nothing but money.
merchants.

Not good guys.

They are

We boycott those

There might be good Korean

3 Korean martial art.
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merchants.

We have no problem with them."

Butts succinctly summarized the view.

Reverend Calvin

"Because Koreans want

only to make money, the bad sides of capitalism are in
between the two groups"

(Korean Times of Mew Y o r k . Sept. 6,

1986) .
Black residents in the Church Avenue area in Brooklyn
said that some Korean shopkeepers overcharge Blacks at the
cash register and randomly raise prices,.

Many shoppers

complained that some Korean cashiers do not give them
receipts; their employees sometimes add a few extra dollars
to large bills, hoping that the shopper will not notice.
When a receipt is requested, the shoppers said, the Korean
employees retally and rebag the entire purchase, banging and
bruising the produce (New York Times. May 17, 1990).4
Shoppers also complained about the suddenly escalating
prices of produce in some Korean stores, especially before
major holidays.

For example, a shopper said that the price

4 During my fieldwork in Harlem, I didn't find any case
where a Korean cashier intentionally overcharged Blacks at
the cash register.
Sometimes the cashiers made mistakes and
the customers accused them of rip-off.
However, the Korean
shopkeepers used various tactics to maximize their profits.
For example, some store owners discussed among them about
the price of specific items in order to fix it. Certainly
the store owners wanted to mark the prices as high as
possible in order to maximize their profits.
But because of
the competition with other stores, they cannot mark the
price as they want.
One Korean grocery store-owner
regularly checked the price of fruits and vegetables in a
nearby supermarket. When the prices were high, customers
often mentioned the prices in other stores and complained.
Then, the shopkeeper would mark down his/her price because
of the fear to lose customers.
I think, this mechanism of
marking price is common for any shopkeepers.
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of potatoes in one store went from $1 for five pounds to
$1.29 for four pounds in one week.

Shoppers said that if

the market owners receive a particularly good shipment of
produce, they raise prices without informing shoppers, and
that mangoes and plantains were often sold by size and not
weight.

For example, one complaint was that each mango or

plantain could be marked with a "O," or an "X,” indicating
its price to the cashier but not to the shoppers (Mew York
Times, May 17, 1990).5
When shoppers complained about prices, Korean
shopkeepers often blames the price charges on wholesalers.
One Korean grocer explained, when tomatoes jumped from 69
cents a pound to $1.69 in the 1989 winter, he said,
incredulous customers asked him point-blank, "Are you
crazy?"

He said hardly anyone understood that the markup

wasn't his, but the result of freezing weather in Florida
(New York Times. May 17, 1990).

A fish market owner in

Harlem also frequently changed the price because the
wholesalers frequently changed the price.

However, because

of the possible resistance and anger from shoppers, the

5 I think this is particularly true for many green grocery
stores.
In order to get better price with better quality
vegetables, the grocers often go to the wholesale market at
Hunts Point of New York City at 1 A.M. The earlier he goes
to the wholesale market, the better vegetables he can get
with same price.
If they get better vegetables or fruits,
they will mark higher price on them. Any retailers can mark
as much as they want in America.
However, the Customer
Codes in New York City require that all prices be clearly
marked.
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owner did not double the price when the wholesalers doubled
the wholesale price because of a hurricane.6
Another common complaint was that Korean shopkeepers do
not refund.

In fact, most Korean shopkeepers in Harlem did

not refund.

They only allowed the exchange with a similarly

priced item.
shoppers angry.

This practice particularly made many Black
I saw many incidents where a Korean

shopkeeper and a Black shopper were shouting at each other
because of this refund policy.

Black shoppers usually gave

up and exchanged with another item because a sign of 'no
refund' is always attached to a counter or a window inside
stores.

Even though a shopper complained, the police, the

court, or other formal consumer institutions were not a
useful help for them because of the inconvenience of using
those institutions and the lack of information about them.
A letter from a Black succinctly summarized their view

6 The price determination is troublesome for many
shopkeepers. Korean shopkeepers complained that the
wholesalers marked up the price too high when the whether
changed or the harvest was not good. One fish market owner
always had problems to determine the price of whitings
whenever the wholesalers doubled the wholesale price (this
often happened when the whether of seas was not good)
because of the possible complaints from shoppers.
He and
other Korean fish retailers thought the wholesalers ripped
off Korean retailers.
However, the general rule of thumb
for the retail price was to double the wholesale price.
If
the wholesale price of an item is very expensive, say 200
dollars for a leather jacket, a shopkeeper cannot double the
whole price because only few shoppers will buy.
The retail
price would be determined at about 350 dollars.
If the
wholesale price is very cheap, say 50 cents for a pair of
ear rings, the retail price would about two dollars (four
times of the wholesale price).
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about how Korean shopkeepers exploit Blacks.

"You are

selling us poor quality goods, the prices are usually high,
and you are very reluctant in refunding even those goods
that have problems.

It seems to me that you are harvesting

a great profit from black neighborhoods"
Mew Y o r k . Feb. 1, 1991).

(Korean Times of

A resident in Flatbush, where a

boycott against two Korean stores was going on, expressed a
similar view.

"[T]he Koreans make money and leave the

neighborhood.

They do every night.

They drive up in their

Jaguars, they collect the cash, and then they drive out of
the community to where they live.

And that is wrong."7

Koreans as Outsiders
In the rally for the 65th anniversary of the birth of
Malcolm X in front of the State Building on 125th Street in
Harlem in 1990, Sonny Carson appeared and made a speech
about the general strike.

The leaflets about the 1990

Church Avenue boycott against Korean grocers were
distributed.

About 100 young Blacks gathered.

The main

theme of the rally was to take back "our street, our
culture."

The 1990 Church Avenue boycotters in Brooklyn

also responded with a shout, "our street," when their leader
shouted, "whose street ?"
When Korean shopkeepers appeared and established

7 CBS, "48
12, 1990.

hours:

Simmer in the City," broadcasted on July
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considerable business activities on 125th Street in Harlem,
they were viewed as outsiders by Black residents.
coordinator of the

The

1982 boycott in Harlem said, "the

Koreans have come into 'our' community, taking millions of
dollars sout'.... "(New York Times, Sept. 11, 1982, my
emphasis).

Accordingly, one member of the December 12th

Movement complained about the over-representation of Korean
shopkeepers on 125th Street.

"If you look at 125th Street,

which is the main microcosm of all the black communities,
there are 160 stores from river to river...
of them.

That

community how,

Koreans own 53

should seem strange to the leaders of the
in a short time, these people have come in

and grabbed hold of the economic life of the 125th
street"(New York V o ice. Dec. 3, 1988).

A letter from a Black to a Korean newspaper expressed a
similar feeling.
Even though you open your business in our
neighborhoods you don't want to be our true neighbors.
You are not living in our neighborhoods.
You don't
attend community meetings for the improvement of
neighborhoods and don't like to serve for these
communities.
You excuse yourself because of language
problem.
But I haven't heard that you don't make money
because of your lack of English.
And if you come into
this country, you have to learn language and culture of
this country.
Until what time will you excuse yourself
and hide behind the bullet proof glass ? " (Korea Times
of New Y o r k . Feb. 1, 1990)

Blacks as Generous
Many Blacks think that while only Blacks accept all
ethnic shopkeepers, other ethnic groups are more exclusive.
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One Black Muslim vendor on 125 Street contended that only
Blacks are open to other ethnic groups.

He explained that

Blacks cannot open businesses in White areas because Whites
would not use Black stores, but Blacks use any store here.
"We are open, but they are not.
ethnic merchants.

Only Blacks welcome any

Look around here [in Harlem].

see all ethnic merchants."8

You can

He implied that Koreans must

have problems in doing business in White areas because of
White racism and that Koreans are successful in Harlem
because of the Blacks' tolerance.
This tolerance is easily transformed a the feeling of
betrayal when Blacks believe that the reciprocal
relationship is violated.

One speaker during the meeting

for the 1990 Church Avenue boycotters asserted, "we are a
generous people.

In response to our kindness, the Koreans

charge us high prices, give us inferior goods, and abuse our
mothers and sisters"(Kwong 1990:29).

Koreans as Unfair Competitors
While many members of the December 12th Movement think
that the Korean shopkeepers took economic opportunities away

8 From a similar perspective, the president of the Uptown
Chamber of Commerce also agreed. "Nowhere are Koreans
welcomed in greater numbers- or with more open arms- than in
our communities. Everyone with an open mind knows this to be
true. ...The issue with the one store being boycotted is one
of insensitivity, arrogance, ignorance and racism, a fact
recognized by many Harlem residents- and other Korean
business persons"(Daily N e w s . July 2, 1989).
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from Blacks, some other Blacks think that the Korean
shopkeepers filled the vacant spaces and revitalized decayed
Black streets.

It is very difficult to prove whether the

Korean shopkeepers took economic opportunities away from
Blacks or not.

However, there is some indirect evidence.’

While the number of Korean shopkeepers was about three dozen
and the number of Black shopkeepers was more than 60 on
125th Street in 1982 (Mew York Times. Sept. 11, 1982),
numbers were reversed in 1990.

the

There were about thirty

Black shopkeepers and sixty six Korean shopkeepers in 1990
on the same street.

Even though the reversal of the numbers

of shopkeepers of two groups on 125th Street does not
directly prove that the Korean shopkeepers took businesses
from Blacks, Black shopkeepers feel the pressure from Korean
shopkeepers.
Black shopkeepers talk about and fear the
competitiveness of Korean shopkeepers.

Sikulu Shange, a

Black record shop owner on 125th Street, complains that "the
Korean businesses are jacking up the prices of real estate
sky high."

He added, "I am furious after hearing that a

Korean merchant had approached my landlord to buy my lease.
Why are they working around me to force me out?"

Shange

opened his record shop in 1977, when Harlem was what he
described as a "disaster area."

He built his business, he

says, through "raw courage and raw power."

Now it may all

be for nothing because Shange says that he cannot compete
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with the offers Koreans have been making to landlords
(Lombardi 1985).9

Korean shopkeepers are also aware of

their strength over Black shopkeepers.

They often expressed

the idea that Korean shopkeepers sell the same goods with
cheaper prices than Black shopkeepers.

Koreans as a Part of Racist America
When Black shoppers feel the suspicion and arrogance of
Korean shopkeepers, "they are reminded of how they have been
treated all of their lives and view the Korean
merchants/employees as just another racist element in
society and a part of a racist system contributing to the
perpetuation of discrimination against blacks in general and
low-income blacks in particular"

(Stewart 1989:93).

This

feeling is well expressed in individual complaints as well
as in boycotts.
The boycotters considered Korean merchants as "tools of
a general conspiracy by the U.S. Government to keep the
Black community's economic life in chaos and under outside
control.

The banks finance non-Black merchants, the police

protect them, and the politicians speak up for them"
boycott leaflet).

(from a

Thus, the overrepresentation of Korean

9 It is widely believed among Koreans in New York City that
the influx of Koreans in small business hiked rent very fast
during the 1980s. The fierce competition for a same
business spot among Korean shopkeepers was often reported in
Korean newspapers. The rent hike is also possibly related
to the economic boom of New York City during the mid 1980s.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

198
shopkeepers in Black neighborhoods is not simply the result
of the efforts of Korean shopkeepers alone.

There are more

general forces in America which limit Black business
opportunities but encourage the influx of Korean shopkeepers
into Black communities.
In relation to this issue, the most frequently raised
question is where Korean shopkeepers get money in
establishing their businesses in such a short period.
Black asked,

One

"Another question is where you got money to

open a store ?

...You must get special help from Korean or

American governments.

Most of us believe the existence of

preferential treatment of you and this makes us angry"
(Korea Times of Mew Y o r k . Feb. 1, 1990)..
shared by many people.

This idea is

One Black college professor, living

in Central Harlem, also insisted that Korean shopkeepers
'must' get some help from the American government or the
Unification Church.

For her, the rapid success of Koreans

is not possible without an external help.
Other agents of racist America are banks and
landlords.

One Black businessman said, "now they [White

landlords] see Asian merchants where Blacks couldn't get
in."

Father Lucas, the leader of the 1988-89 Harlem boycott

expressed a similar view,

"Koreans get loans from banks and

other financial institutions, insurance, as well as
commercial sites from the City and privately owned
businesses while the same treatment is systematically denied
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in general to Africans located in America" (Amsterdam M e w s ,
Oct. 6, 1990).10
Because of this racism, many Blacks think, only Blacks
are excluded from joining in businesses in their
neighborhoods.

"Why is influence and control of our

neighborhoods accepted everywhere except in the AfricanAmerican and Latino communities?

Many wish to bring control

of the economics of these communities into African-American
and Latino hands.

That's the way things work in Chinatown,

Williamsburg, Howard Beach or Little Italy- without a
whisper of racism being uttered"(Daily News, July 2, 1989).
Thus, according Sonny Carson,
any business."

"It's racist that we don't own

Father Lucas continued the story,

"What you

find in African-American communities is that some else
controls it.

The Koreans happen to be the people now.

Before, it was the Jews and the Italians"(New York Times Dec
12, 1988)
From the perspectives of the boycotters and many
Blacks, their anger against Korean shopkeepers is easily

10 That seems to be partially true in Los Angeles.
One
representative of Shell admitted that they prefer Koreans
because Koreans work for long hours and use their free
family labor (Bonacich 1992).
This also can be applied to
the practices of landlords who think that Koreans will not
be on default.
It is also possible that Koreans can get
loans from banks easier than Blacks.
I think this is
possible because Koreans are expected to be successful in
their business.
Koreans can also get more information about
small business from the City Hall or other government
agencies than Blacks because those information are
circulated through Korean newspapers and ethnic networks.
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related to their anger against the whole society because the
presence of Korean shopkeepers is the result of the
pervasive racism against Blacks.

Many Blacks felt that they

were degraded and rejected by the White society in general
and also by the Korean shopkeepers in their neighborhoods in
particular.

Thus, a leader of the 1990 Church Avenue

boycott said, "Now they [Koreans] are acting as agents of
the white racist establishment to control the AfricanAmerican community"(Kwong 1990:29).
In this context, Korean shopkeepers symbolize the total
social injustice against Blacks.

For the members of the

December 12th Movement and other Blacks, the rejection of
the Korean shopkeepers is one of the starting points for
rejecting American racism (Hornung 1990b).

Resistance for Education
Because the boycotters feel that there is a connection
between racist Koreans and the racist American government,
the boycott leaders think that the boycotts against Korean
shopkeepers is an effort not only to punish individual
racists but also an effort to educate people more about
pervasive racism of American society and American government
and an effort to establish and expand the bases of struggles
against pervasive racism.
One leaflet distributed during the 1988-89 Harlem
boycott stated, "The purpose of the boycott was to educate
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and organize our people to stand together as one and defend
ourselves and each other."

Chimurenga, one leader of the

December 12th Movement, says of the boycott, "we are showing
our own people that we do have power, purchasing power,
economic power..."

(Hornung 1990b).

Through the boycotts against Korean shopkeepers, the
leaders wanted to show Black people that Blacks can act as
protagonists, fight for self-determination, and control
their own neighborhood and its economy.

In order to show

their determination not only to Blacks and but also to power
elites and the Whites, they tried to shut down the Brooklyn
Bridge in 1990.

"We will take the bridge and shut down the

subways, stop traffic to show the racists in this city that
business cannot go on as usual.

We have power and we can

use it, make it grow," Chimurenga continued,
before we are acted upon.
to think.

"We can act

That's how we want black people

To think about their right to self-determination,

to reject the postcolonial mentality and build a life in our
own neighborhoods"

(Hornung 1990b).

Thus, Omo Wale Clay, a leader of the December 12th
Movement, concluded that the boycott has sparked a
"cultural" struggle in the community.

For one thing, local

residents are demanding that Church Avenue be renamed after
Toussaint L'Ouverture, the Black revolutionary who freed
Haiti from French colonial rule.

The boycott has brought

home the realization that Blacks, who are the overwhelming
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majority in the neighborhood, are underrepresented on
Community Board 14, where they hold fewer seats than Whites,
"It has also helped to expose David Dinkins," Clay said, "as
nothing but the tool of the white establishment"

(Kwong

1991) .n
Thus, the activists hope that through small but active
and determined protest against small 'racist' players and
their protectors, they reveal large 'racist' players in
American society to Black people.

Black rage is usually

directed at other Black people, Korean shopkeepers, and
other small players in everyday interactions.
These targeted expressions of black rage, though often
downright cowardly and petty, signify the social
invisibility and relative powerlessness of a people
toward whom American elites have been and are
indifferent... Most American elites, owing to narrow,
self-serving notions of freedom and justice, have been
flabbergasted at the expression of black rage (West
1990).

Buy Black Movements
"Buy Black" movements are another form of education
through resistance for Black activists. "Buy Black" posters
are found on many lamp posts or walls in Harlem.

The basic

messages of "Buy Black" movements include "Pool your
resources together and create your own business.

Buy from

Black-own business and keep the money in the Black
community, creating jobs for Black people" (Kwong and Lum
11 The events related to the Community Board
discussed in a later section of this chapter.

14

will
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1988:10).
During the 1988 Harlem boycott, the Afrikan Nationalist
Pioneer Movement distributed a leaflet on the 125th St. In a
leaflet, George Edward Tait, the administrator of the
movement, declared that the fact that Buy Black Movement had
not yet been successfully implemented is both "an indictment
of our collective intelligence and an insult to the record
of our race....

For over forty years, we continue to

witness the economic exploitation and ensuing erosion of
Harlem by the arrogance and avarice of aliens," he
continues,
It is highly ludicrous that a campaign must be
launched to trigger the transference of economic power
in the black community from non-Black control to black
control; other ethnic communities automatically
establish and relentlessly maintain their economic
sovereignty. But we have allowed Harlem to be made
into an interracial economic prostitute for Italian,
jewish, Arab, and Asian pimps who take the money and
raise their families, build their communities, develop
institutions, and win their wars.

For him,
“Buy Black7 is not concerned with working for the alien
business in the community; it is targeted toward
removing the alien business from the community.
It is
not the private program of any individual, organization
or institution but rather a family business venture for
Afrikans from Afrika, the Caribbean, the Americas and
elsewhere. The 'Buy B l a c k 7 campaign solicits the
strength of community support for the sake of community
survival."
The 'Buy Black7 movement was started more than 75 years
ago by Marcus Garvey in Harlem.

The "Buy Black" campaign is

also one of the crying issues for the December 12th
Movement.

Their efforts to place control of economic life
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of the Black community in Black hands haven't had a serious
impact on the development of Black business.

Self-Critics
Certainly Blacks don't speak with one voice.

A Mew

York Mewsdav (June 15, 1990) poll showed that while 27% of
Blacks were sympathetic with the Church Avenue boycotters
only 6% of Whites were sympathetic with the boycotters.
While 37% of Blacks were sympathetic with the store owners,
68% of whites were sympathetic with the store owners.12
However, this poll did not say how much of the poor Black
population has complaints against Korean shopkeepers in poor
Black neighborhoods where Korean shopkeepers maintain their
daily interactions with Black shoppers.

Supports or

opposition to the boycott do not tell how those respondents
actually experienced their contacts with Korean shopkeepers
and thought about their relationships with Korean
shopkeepers.
During my fieldwork, some said they objected the
boycott but also insisted that Korean shopkeepers did not
treat Blacks well.
were doing too much.

One Black complained that the boycotters
Another Black person thought that the

12 This result was affected by the continuous negative
description of the boycotts by major newspapers in New York
City and by the denouncement of the boycott by Mayor
Dinkins. It seems to be true that even though the boycotters
did not get support from the majority of Blacks, they have
considerable support among poor Blacks.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

205
boycotters demonstrated because they wanted to expand their
political base.

However, this did not mean that they had

positive images of Korean shopkeepers.
There are some Blacks who have more positive views of
Korean shopkeepers.

One retired Black said, "Koreans are

united and working very hard.

We [Blacks] are lazy,

divided, and consuming drugs.

We have to learn from

Koreans...
society.

The professional Blacks try to enter the White
They betray the poor black.

like Koreans."

We are not united

The Amsterdam News (Oct.8, 1988) carried

some criticism of Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers,
even though the newspaper is usually supportive of the
boycotts.

One reader pointed out that Koreans did not come

to exploit Blacks but came to open their business with their
hard work and money in vacant buildings, that Blacks should
not attack Koreans from Black chauvinism, and that the
boycotters were parasites seeking to satisfy themselves
through so called struggles against racial discrimination.
Another reader insisted that Blacks cannot revive the area
if Blacks expel all Koreans
Jim Dowdy, a long-time
of a

business organization

in Harlem.
Black business leader and head
in Harlem, said,

"I absolutely

deplore the harassment of these [Korean] people [by the
boycotters]...

They have the same rights on 125th Street

that I have on 42nd"

(Lombardi 1986:16).

He and one Black

community board member are very popular among Korean
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shopkeepers in Harlem.

According to several Korean

shopkeepers, they are very supportive of Kprean causes.

The Stories of Koreans
Blacks as Crimogenic13
The robbery and shoplifting by Blacks were very often
mentioned by Korean shopkeepers.

One Korean shopkeeper said

that when she opened a new green grocery business in Harlem
all kinds of tramps and shoplifters gathered in her store.
She thought that the shoplifters tested how the new Korean
family could handle shoplifting.14

Most Korean shopkeepers

in Harlem recited very often how they caught shoplifters or
how Blacks stole in their stores.

One time in my presence,

a Korean fish market employee darted out and came back.

He

said a Blpck took a bunch of red snappers without paying
money.

Thus, even when they have lunch or work at a cash

register, their eyes usually stare at all corners of their

13 I took this term from Michael Lewis (1978).
Many Whites
believe that minorities have the innate tendency toward
crime. According to Lewis (1978:76), "our [Whites's]
interest in crime [in minorities] is a function of a
culturally induced need to distinguish ourselves from
criminal deviants so that we may claim a measure of moral
superiority for ourselves."
14 See her story in chapter five. The most frequent target
of petty shoplifting was green grocery stores.
It seems to
me that not tramps but poor people stole vegetables and
fruit because they have no money to buy them.
The prices of
stolen vegetables are usually small.
However, the Korean
shopkeepers believed that if they do not catch petty
shoplifters, more shoplifters and their friends will come
back to steal.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

207
stores.15

It is said that some Korean shopkeepers gave up

their business because of shoplifters (Sae Gae Ilbo, May 20,
1989).
One Korean shopkeeper knew some Black thieves who were
living in the same building where the Korean shopkeeper
opened her business.

She lamented that the thieves stole

from her store and other stores very often.

The members of

the family who were thieves were arrested and put in jail
again and again.

According to her, when one member of the

family was released, she gave some money to him as pocket
money.

Because she thought it was better to bribe them than

to be robbed, she regularly gave the thieves pocket money.
She mentioned that after her "help" for the family, they did
not steal from her store again.

They also guarded her store

from other thieves.
For Korean shopkeepers, the fear of burglary was not
limited to "strange” Blacks.

In the store where I worked,

15 According to one policeman, Koreans are extremely
sensitive to shoplifting.
He said He did not understand why
Korean shopkeepers did not charge ordinary shoppers more.
To charge ordinary shoppers more for stolen goods is a
general practice of most retail businesses. In fact, Korean
shopkeepers charge as much as other shopkeepers. But Korean
shopkeepers want to gain extra profit by limiting
shoplifting as far as possible.
However, more established
Korean shopkeepers were more tolerant and less sensitive to
shoplifting.
But new and small Korean shopkeepers were most
sensitive to shoplifting.
Because their businesses were
not established yet, when they found shoplifting they sensed
the possibility of failure of their businesses.
They knew
that the failure would make them do long hours of labor and
extreme sacrifice of their family lives again.
This thought
makes them anxious and fearful of shoplifting.
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the wife of the shopkeeper took care of the store when her
husband visited Korea.

She told me not to tell her black

employees that her husband visited Korea because she feared
that the Black employees would relate the news to Black
thieves whom they knew.

She thought that the Black

employees were not unsterustworthy.

When a box of leather

jackets was stolen during one night after her husband had
come back, she wondered whether there was a connection
between her employees and the thieves.
Gangs of young Blacks often smash jewelry store windows
and grab cjold rings and necklaces, especially during
Halloween days.

In one case, young Blacks cracked one

Korean jewelry store window with a large stone and grabbed
some gold jewelry.

In another case, three Black youths

successfully robbed a Korean jewelry store with a machine
gun at about 10 A.M.

Because of this and other problems,

all Korean jewelry stores at 125th Street were covered with
bullet proof glass.

When a bunch of young Blacks passed a

Korean jewelry store, the Korean store owner said that there
is nothing to expect from vgumdunovi'rnigger1.16
There was a riot on 145th street in northern Harlem in
July 7, 1992.
said,

The Korean owner of a looted sneaker store

"as many as 10,000 pairs of Nike, Reebok and other

16 In fact, some young Blacks "delighted in descending on a
small store in a large group and stealing." One young Black
said "it was the only time he felt happy and
stimulated." (New York T i mes. Nov. 19, 1992)
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high-priced sneakers, the entire fall inventory, were stolen
by looters in the early morning of July 7.

A rioter

swinging a pickax broke through the new metal security
shutters." Spatters of blood here and there attested to the
intensity of the shoving and grabbing.

A son of the owner

cried, "they used a demonstration [against the police
brutality] as an excuse to go out and rob other people of
their dreams.... " (Mew York Times. July 8, 1992).

Another

shopkeeper described how he was robbed by a Black with a gun
in his store and how his body had trembled with fury.
One Korean female shopkeeper explained that Blacks were
originally cursed by God.

According to her story, there

were three sons for Noah.

Because Ham, the youngest son,

saw his father naked and told his brothers the news, he was
cursed by God.

Because Ham was cursed, his descendants are

always living with difficulty.
descendants are Blacks.

According to her, Ham's

Thus, Blacks are always poor and

commit crime and violence.

She concluded, "it is in the

blood of Blacks."17
Many Korean shopkeepers believed that the conflict
between Blacks and Koreans started from Blacks' innate

17 See Genesis 9 of the Bible for a related story.
Ham's
son- Canaan, not Ham himself, was cursed not by God but by
Noah.
There is no mention in the Bible that Ham's
descendants are Blacks.
She also mentioned that God gave
power to Whites, intelligence to Yellows, and physical
ability to Blacks. Accordingly, Whites got the power of
this society, Blacks excel in sports, and Yellows excel in
studies.
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criminality and their jealousy of Korean success.

For

evidence, many Koreans frequently claimed that most Blacks
tend to steal.

One Korean shopkeeper said that it is silly

that the large conflict between Blacks and Koreans always
started from a small shoplifting.

One Korean salesclerk

said, "because there are always Blacks who steal, the bad
relationship between Koreans and Blacks is inevitable."
When boycotters accused

Koreans of beating Black women and

children, the president of the Korean Merchant Association
stated, "it is deplorable that shoplifting is justified by
boycotters."

Thus, while boycotters emphasized that Korean

shopkeepers abused Black people, Korean shopkeepers
emphasized that Blacks were stealing.

Blacks as Haive and Irrational
A drycleaner in Harlem said,
a Black brought a coat with a cut which I didn't check
when I got the coat.
He insisted that I made that cut.
He demanded compensation.
I know I didn't do it
because there are many Blacks who do same cheating.
His demand drove me crazy.
However, I refunded him
because, if I fight, the image of my store will be
damaged. If a quarrel starts, Blacks always support a
Black even though they don't know nothing about why we
started."
The belief that Blacks always support another Black in a
dispute with Korean shopkeepers regardless of the cause was
well shared by most Korean shopkeepers.
Another common belief about Blacks is that Blacks
cannot succeed in business because they are naive, that is,
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Blacks do not have enough intelligence to manage complex
business interactions.

Some Korean shopkeepers thought that

Blacks are naive because Blacks do not think of their
future.

They commonly noted that "if Blacks have money they

do not save it but spend it soon."
Other Korean shopkeepers argued that Blacks are naive
because many Blacks wanted to get refunded for products even
though the items were purchased several months before and
they were sometimes deliberately damaged to get the refund.
However, "in comparison with Whites," says another Korean
shopkeeper, "Blacks are not hard to please." He meant that
Blacks did not pay much attention to quality and neatness of
vegetables and fruit like Whites and that Blacks did not
complain like Whites.

Thus, for him, it was easier to deal

with Blacks than with Whites.

He interpreted this as

naivety of Black people.18

Blacks as Lazy and Welfare-Dependent
Several Korean shopkeepers who once employed Blacks
complained that the Black employees did not work hard.
continued,

They

"when they got weekly wage, they didn't come to

work for several days because they had money to spend."

18 He had had his green grocery store in a White area before
he opened his business in Harlem. According to him, Whites
didn't buy if the quality of vegetables were not at their
expectation and Whites were difficult to satisfy while
Blacks were easily pleased if he paid "only a little
attention" to them.
He mentioned, however, there were more
petty shoplifters in Black area than White area.
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Especially, Blacks were not employed for intensive labor.
Green grocery workers or fish cleaners were required to work
diligently for twelve hours per day.

Because illegal

Hispanics did not demand high wage and worked very hard,
such work was usually given to Hispanics.
employed for hard jobs.

Koreans were also

When one green grocery store owner

was asked why she did not give an employ to Blacks, she
answered,

"Blacks cannot do the job."

Other Korean

shopkeepers also shared the idea that Blacks do not work
hard.

Many Koreans considered employing Blacks a waste of

money.

However, this is not true in many other cases.

In

one store where a Black was employed as a cook, the Korean
store owner said that her employee was an exception to the
rule.19
One Korean female shopkeeper said, "Blacks from Africa
or the Caribbean area try to establish their own small
business.

Vendors in this area [they are all Blacks] are

from foreign countries.

But American Blacks are lazy.

Because of their tradition acquired during the period of
slavery, they don't work voluntarily.

Rather, robbers are

19 When I asked a young Black why he did not work for a
Korean store, he answered that because the wage was very low
and Korean owners did not share their profit with Blacks. A
Black watcher in the store where I worked also complained
that the pay was too low.
He got 180 dollars per week in
1988. He worked six days per week and eight hours per day.
In fact, he worked more than eight hours a day because the
store owner kept his store open till late. There was no pay
for overwork.
The Black watcher once told me that he worked
only as much as he paid.
Thus, for him, he worked slow
because he got low pay.
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more diligent because they have tp plan and execute the plan
by themselves."
Another Korean shopkeeper said, "80-90% of Black who
receive milk, cheese and other things from welfare agencies
or from churches sell them o u t ."

Many Korean shopkeepers

believed that Blacks depend on welfare and bear more babies
to receive more welfare money.

One fish market owner said,

I work hard for paying tax which support welfare for
Blacks.
Because of the welfare, Blacks are a little
bit more quiet. If there is no welfare, they will rob
and steal more.
Since they are lazy, they want more
babies to get more welfare.
It is a good world for
them because the governments give them welfare.
Koreans wouldn't get welfare, because it is shameful.
One jewelry store owner explained that he could not
understand why young Blacks waste their money on gold and
diamonds.20

He lamented that because the Blacks waste

their money they could not establish their own businesses.
Many Korean shopkeepers often mentioned that Blacks do not
know how to save, that Blacks spend everything for the
moment, and that Blacks enjoy now and do not think of the
future.

Blacks Became Jealous
Because many Korean shopkeepers thought that Blacks
were responsible for their own problems, when they
experienced the Black boycotts against Koreans, they

20 He excused his jewelry business by saying, "I open a
jewelry store, because there is a demand.
If I don't open,
other people will open."
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impugned the motives of the boycotters.

One Korean

shopkeeper in Brooklyn said, "Blacks want to disrupt our
businesses because they cannot do what we have done."
Korean intellectuals have similar views.

Many

One Korean

lecturer at Columbia University said, "Blacks are jealous of
us because we have done in 15 years what they were unable to
d o . ...

They are angry because we took away their excuse"

(quoted in Veneroso 1989:13).
Certainly, the success of Koreans where Blacks have
failed puzzles many Blacks.
businessman, charges,

Lloyd Williams, a Harlem

"I know for a fact that the Korean

mafia is financing a lot of their businesses"
1989:13).

(Veneroso

The rapid expansion of Korean shopkeepers

throughout New York City continues to confound many New
Yorkers - particularly Black residents.

However, the

suspicion of the origin of money for the establishment of
Korean small businesses was often interpreted by many
Koreans as a result of Black jealousy.

Koreans as Victims of Reverse Racism
According to Sung Soo Kim, the president of the Korean
American Small Business Service Center of New York, Inc.,
"at the beginning, boycotters demanded jobs, scholarships,
our participation in community affairs, communication of
both cultures.

In 1984 Harlem boycott, they want to get

more budget for the development of Harlem by making Koreans
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scapegoats.

They seems to appeal to the city and the state

to distribute more welfare to Harlem by exposing problems"
(Chung Ana Ilbo, Feb. 15, 1985).

However, the boycotts were

eventually organized by more radical Black nationalists who
demanded that Korean shopkeepers sell the boycotted stores
to Blacks or close.
When Blacks started their boycotts at Church Avenue and
in Harlem, other Korean shopkeepers said that they
recognized that even though the Black activists boycotted
only one or two stores, their intention was to scare away
all Korean shopkeepers.

Certainly, after the boycotts, many

un-boycotted Korean shopkeepers also became more careful in
dealing with Black people.

Because the boycotters also

distributed leaflets which demanded Blacks boycott all
Korean shopkeepers and described all Koreans as racists,
many Koreans felt that they were condemned as racists just
because they were Koreans.

Many Koreans believed that the

Black activists had become reverse racists because of their
frustration in this society.
Sung Soo Kim, who tried to negotiate resolutions to the
Harlem and Brooklyn boycotts, angrily called the Black
boycotts against Korean shopkeepers
and racist"(Song 1989:9).

"obnoxious, outrageous

He also demanded "black community

activists resist the easy temptation to target ^orean
merchants in venting their justifiable frustrations, using
us as scapegoats"

(Daily N e w s . July 2, 1988).

Other Korean
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shopkeepers described Sonny Carson and other protesters as
racial hate-mongers,

The Koreans involved emphasized to

city officials and the news media that the protesters wanted
to expel all Korean shopkeepers from Black neighborhoods.
Even the boycotted store-owner on Church Avenue told the
news media that he did not know why the boycotters boycotted
him.

Thus, he presented himself as an innocent victim of

Black racism.
Many Koreans even saw the boycotts as a Black
conspiracy to destroy Korean business in order to achieve
the Black self-determination.

One group of Korean

businessmen sent a letter to Mayor Dinkins and complained
about "a pattern of an overall plan [by Black activists] to
force us out of New York."

An article from the

Village

Voice reported that "their[Koreans'] position was not to
give in on the demand to close the [boycotted] store, thus
preventing a vdomino effect.' ...The hard-line Koreans see
this struggle as their fight for civil rights, which they
must win, ironically, from the blacks." (Kwong 1991)

Koreans as Victims between Whites and Blacks
Henry Hong, who organized the travel of Black pastors
in New York City to Korea in 1990, said, "Black nationalists
try very hard to find any excuse to express their
discontents and explode the discontents toward Koreans who
are relatively powerless.

Thus, the discontentment of
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Blacks toward Koreans is in fact the discontentment toward
the American government and the Whites"(Korea Times of
Washington. D.C.. Now. 27, 1992).
This feeling was well expressed when many Black looters
targeted Korean stores during the L.A. riot of 1992.

During

the riot, many Koreans said that the Los Angeles police gave
up Koreatown while they protected White enclaves like Rodeo
Drive.

Because of this racism, many Koreans believed,

Koreatown was set ablaze.

One Korean in L.A. said,

[L.A.P.D. chief] Daryl Gates wanted the blacks to let
out their outburst toward the Koreans, because he knew
that the blacks didn't feel very good toward the
Koreans. I do believe thers1'must have been some
conscious politics, because [the police] just weren't
there, (quoted in Kim and Yang 1992)
Many New York Korean shopkeepers think that the situation
they see in L.A. is also possible in New York City.

Koreans as Serving Blacks
Many Korean shopkeepers felt anger when the boycotts
against Korean shopkeepers started because they thought that
they had come to serve Black consumers when most of the
other ethnic shopkeepers had left.

Korean shopkeepers that

thought they maintained their stores in spite of the dangers
of poor Black neighborhoods.

One Korean shopkeeper

responded to a Black boycott,
Blacks make us their target of the anger because we are
powerless. They cannot stand up against a White store.
They failed to open their own stores when this area had
plenty of vacant stores. Now they complain about that
we are working hard to serve them.
If we leave here,
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who want to come to this dangerous
street a busy commercial street.

place?

We made this

A female Korean shopkeeper also responded,
'Buy Black' movement won't work because Black
shopkeepers sell lower quality goods with higher prices
than we do. They [Black activists] talk empty talk
because we serve them [Blacks].
They told us to close
our stores during a [day of outrage] demonstration. We
didn't close at all. They just try to threaten us.
Koreans as Hard Working People
The Korean shopkeepers are so proud of themselves for
reviving the community or the streets that they exaggerate
the difficulties and dangers of the inner city Black
communities.

Here, the important issues is not whether or

not the Koreans really revived the streets in poor Black
neighborhoods, but that many Koreans believe that they
revived "dead" neighborhoods.
One former Korean fish market owner in Harlem
mentioned,

"We came to a 'dead' neighborhood.

stores, and buildings were vacant.

There were no

Koreans came here and

managed their businesses with determination.

Eventually the

businesses became 'alive' and the neighborhoods too.
feel proud of what we are doing for this country...

We
I am

very grateful to God who made hope and joy possible in this
evil, miserable, and decayed place"

( Korea

Times of Mew

Yor k . July 30, 1986, my emphasis added).

Cultural Miscommunication as the Cause of the Conflict
In many cases, cultural and linguistic barriers further
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contributed to escalating tensions between Black shoppers
and Korean shopkeepers.

However, the degree to which

cultural differences attributed to the conflict is not
clear.

Despite the problem of understanding the role of

cultural differences, many Korean leaders mentioned cultural
differences as a major cause of the tension between Blacks
and Koreans.

Ordinary Korean shopkeepers emphasized

language problems more than cultural difference.

In fact,

an English language problem is very serious for most Koreans
not because they cannot sell goods but because they often
cannot grasp nuances and meanings of English words.

Many

Korean shopkeepers failed to respond to Black shoppers
because the Korean shopkeepers did not understand what the

Black shoppers said.
Sung Soo Kim responded, when many Blacks complained
Koreans are rude,
Confucian teachings dictate that a woman may not touch
a man's hand - that it is deemed unseemly. Many
cashiers often plunk down change on the counter,
avoiding the customer's proffered hand.
Some customers
interpret this as a personal insult when none was
intended.
In addition, the meager grasp of English of
many Koreans often comes across as 'rudeness' and
'arrogance.' (Daily N e w s . July 2, 1988)
He also said,

"you must understand that in Confucian culture

we don't smile very much..."
1AAA

\

(New York Times. May 17,

21

21 It seems to me that even though the existence of cultural
and language barriers is certain, the Korean leaders
overemphasized the role of cultural and language
miscommunication in the conflict between Blacks and Koreans.
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Self-Critics: Koreans as Racists
Certainly Korean shopkeepers do not speak with one
voice.

One Korean shopkeeper in Harlem was very critical of

other Korean shopkeepers.
bad things to Blacks.

She said, "We [Koreans] did many

Some Koreans are really bad.

Even

though I am a Korean, I can tell you that Koreans are
racists.

They consider themselves superior to Blacks.

should change their attitudes.

They

They are wrong, not Blacks."

One shopkeeper in Harlem commented on the shopkeeper
who had been a target of the 1988-89 Harlem boycott.
said, "he beat many people.

He

I told him not to beat poor

Blacks who steal because they are hungry and need food.
didn't listen to me.

He was notorious in the area.

now much better after the boycott.

He

He is

Blacks didn't boycott

all Koreans...."
One Korean reader commented on the L.A. riot of 1992,
"If we can live in a White suburban neighborhood and send
our children to good schools, we'd better express our thanks
to Blacks before we despise them....
we feel superior to Blacks.

I feel shameful that

Blacks and Koreans are all

colored in the eyes of Whites"(Korea Times of Washington.
The cultural miscommunication is a good excuse for the bad
relations between Blacks and Koreans. However, this emphasis
cannot explain why some Koreans who cannot command English
well get maintain a good relationship with Black shoppers. I
think, the attitudes of Korean shopkeepers are more
important than the cultural and language barriers for the
conflict.
One Korean shopkeeper in Harlem whose English was
very poor had a good relationship with her Black customers
because she showed her sincerity to Black customers.
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D.C.. May 13, 1992).
Ethnic Hews Media
During the boycotts of Korean shopkeepers in poor Black
neighborhoods, Black and Korean news media showed almost
opposite views on the conflict.
Sonny Carson and other boycott supporters appeared on
WLIB, the most popular Black radio station in New York City,
and expressed their opposition to the mediation of the
conflict, their determination to close down two Korean
stores, and their opposition to Mayor Dinkins's efforts to
peacefully settle the conflict.

During its news hour, WLIB

frequently reported the opinions of the boycotters but not
of the boycotted Korean shopkeepers or other Korean
shopkeepers.

WLIB often reported Black residents' anger

about the beating of Black women by the Korean shopkeepers
and the pervasive prejudices of Korean shopkeepers against
Blacks.

During the boycotts, they accused the White media

(television channels and major newspapers in New York City)
of having biased views against Blacks.
The Korean television and radio stations reported the
boycotts from an opposite view.

They reported only the

opinions of the boycotted Korean shopkeepers and business
leaders who emphasized that the Black radicals sought only
to expel Korean shopkeepers from Black neighborhoods.

The

Korean television reported that Korean shopkeepers and
leaders considered the Black boycotters to be extortionists
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and extremists without the support of Black residents.

In a

television news program, an anchor woman explained that the
Korean shopkeeper targeted by the 1988 Brooklyn boycott
closed his store because of the "absurd” demands from the
boycotters and the "ill advised" negotiation between Korean
leaders such as Sung Soo Kim and Black leaders including
Black assemblyman Albert Vann.

The Korean television and

radio news programs usually concentrated on the "reverse
racism" and "unreasonable demands" of the boycotters rather
than on the prejudice of Korean shopkeepers in poor black
neighborhoods.
In printed news media, the situation was almost the
same as in the ethnic electronic media.

However, newspapers

printed some opposite views which did not appear in
electronic news media.

The Amsterdam M e w s , the leading

Black newspaper in New York City, usually reported the
alleged beatings of Black women by Korean shopkeepers as
facts even though the involved Koreans denied the
allegations and were later found not guilty.22

While

Korean newspapers always described the Church Avenue boycott
as dangerous and threatening, the Amsterdam News described
the same boycott as successful.
The Amsterdam News carried a story about the Church

22 The decision by a Jury does not mean that the Koreans
involved did not beat the Black woman.
It just mean that
there is no evidence to prove that the Koreans beat the
Black woman.
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Avenue boycott on the front page on May 19, 1990.

"Some 800

persons marched and rallied... to highlight their
determination to carry on their boycott against two Korean
fruit and vegetable stores..."

In an editorial article on

the same day, the Amsterdam Mews accused a Black high school
teacher who crossed the picket line with his students of
creating negative ideas about the Black protest in the minds
of black children.

The article also accused the White news

media of using the boycott breaker to "discredit and vilify
any black person who stands up for his rights and his
dignity in this racist land we call America."
Articles in the Black news media usually presented
Sonny Carson, Father Lucas and the boycotters as determined
opponents of racial injustice.

However, the boycotters were

also often criticized as too harsh toward Black Mayor
Dinkins, who tried to mediate the conflict.

The Amsterdam

News also reported opinions of the boycotted Korean owner in
the case of 1988 Harlem boycott and the views of some Black
opponents to the Church Avenue boycott.

But the number of

anti-boycott articles was very limited.
Korean newspapers emphasized that the boycotts were a
political excuse for Black radicals to convey their
political messages to Black residents.

The Sae Gae

IlbofJan. 25, 1990) reported that the boycott organizers
fabricated the fact that two Korean shopkeepers beat a Black
woman.

The Chung Ana Ilbo (Sept. 15, 1988) analyzed the
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forces behind Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers in
1988.

It continued,
The boycotts till now were simple protests by local
hoodlums. But Sonny Carson began to involve when large
number of hoodlums participated in the boycotts.
He
and other local activists organized local organizations
to continue the boycotts and the United Africa Business
Association, a Black muslim organization, also joined.
They are basically extortionists. They demanded money.
Thus, to Koreans, the boycotters were not ones who

sought justice but ones who disturbed social order with
absurd demands.

The "Buy Black" movement was also described

as a racist attempt by Black activists to expel all nonBlack businessmen from Black neighborhoods.

Even the

Amsterdam Mews was described by an article in a Korean
newspaper as a radical newspaper that promoted the
enhancement of Black consciousness and enlightenment.

(This

implies that black consciousness and enlightenment cause
problems.)

The article continued,

"accordingly, many

organizations in Harlem influenced by the Amsterdam News
began to support the boycott and other Black newspapers also
reported the boycott."

Thus, the Black hostility against

Koreans spread through Black activism and the Black news
media.

Prom this point of view, the Korean news media

reported that the boycotts did not have community support
and that the boycotters were outside agitators.
Because of articles in the Korean news media, the
crimogenic theory of Blacks was not limited to individual
Koreans who experienced Black crimes.

One article of the
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Korea T im e s of New York (Mar. 9, 1991) emphasized that
Koreans have to pay attention to Black robbers.

The title

of the article is "Crime Is Much on the Minds of Manhattan's
Korean American Merchants."

In the article, one Korean

shopkeeper expressed his thought that police cannot stop
crime because "nobody knows when it will strike."

He

continued, each businessman has to find a way to protect
himself, suggesting that a merchant has "to be on guard
every minute."

Another news article was entitled,

"The

Rapid Increase of Robbers Aimed at Koreans in All New York
City."

The Chung Anq Ilbo (Jan. 7, 1989) used "Blacks

Frequently Threaten Koreans in Harlem" for an article.

The

article reported that Korean shopkeepers closed their eyes
when Blacks openly shoplifted because the Koreans were
afraid of possible threats from Black mobs.

An article23

in the Korea Times of New York was entitled "One Out Of Four
Among Black Men in Their Twenties Are In Jail."

Subtitles

included "Education from Fellow Criminals Rather Than in
Schools," and "Half the Criminals in Jail Are Black."
While Black newspapers called the "White" news media a
racist element in society after it continuously called for
the active intervention of Black Mayor Dinkins in the
boycotts and described the boycotts as racist provocations.
Korean newspapers, however hailed pro-Korean news from the
"main-stream” news media and frequently carried the Korean
23 The date is unclear in my news clip.
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translation of supportive articles.

Korean newspapers also

exaggerated the support of Whites for the boycotted Korean
by describing active expressions of support from a few
individual Whites as a support from the majority of Whites.
For example, when a White sent letters to Mayor Dinkins and
President Bush in order to complain about the inaction of
the government, it was reported in an article entitled
"American Citizens Support Koreans in the Church Avenue
Incident"(Sae Gae Ilbo. Mar 1, 1990).
However, Korean newspapers also reported dissenting
views.

Many articles in Korean newspapers admitted that

common problems for Korean shopkeepers include lack of
respect for the Black residents, failure to greet customers,
and tendencies to "throw" change to the shoppers (e.g. Chung
Ang Ilbo. Mar. 27, 80).

Through frequent discussions of the

problems between Koreans and Blacks, the advised Korean
people on how to behave and how to respond to shoppers.

One

Korean newspaper even proclaimed "Don't Call Them
vgunidunqyi'."
views.

These views were, however, not pro-boycott

While they tried to point out the problems of Korean

shopkeepers, their main emphasis was on the problems of
Black grass-root activists and lack of protection of Korean
shopkeepers by the city government and the police.

Mainstream Mews Media
Hew York City has two daily national newspapers which
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have considerable influence not only on city residents but
also in the national scene.

There are three daily local

newspapers which have daily circulations totalling hundreds
of thousands copies in and near New York City.

National

weekly news magazines such as Newsweek. T i m e , and Money also
dealt with the conflict.

They devoted different amounts of

attention to the conflict between Koreans and Blacks and had
different views and analyses of the conflict.
The New York Post had the most anti-boycott views.
They consistently called Sonny Carson and the boycotters
racists.

Some Blacks complained that the New York Post is

also the most anti-Black news paper in New York City.

The

Wall Street Journal, which also had a fierce anti-^boycott
view, did not devote much attention to the conflict.

The

New York Times provided very detailed and fair description
of the discontent of Black residents against Korean
shopkeepers from the early 1980s.24

However, the New York

Times also expressed negative views against the Black
boycotters.

The Daily News and the New York Newsdav also

continuously expressed their anti-boycott views.
However, I will not deal with the individual
differences among the main stream news media here, because
they, in fact, expressed considerably similar views and
analyses of the conflict between Blacks and Koreans.

The

24 For example, as early as Sept. 11, 1982, the title of an
article was "Korean Merchants Face Ire in Harlem."
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several main stream television stations will not be
differentiated either.

Because they are owned by Whites and

influence the thoughts of many Whites, they were called
"White news media" by many Blacks.

The "White news media"

or "main stream news media" had tremendous effects on the
views of the Whites and the directions of the city
government policy.

These influences created the social

condition where the Black boycotters, their sympathizers,
and the Korean shopkeepers expressed their ideas and
contested against each other for media support.

Therefore I

will now focus on how the main stream news media, in
general, dealt with the conflict.

Koreans as Model Minority
Most main stream newspapers expressed their curiosity
as to why Koreans were successful in small business even
though they had immigrated just one or two decades
beforehand.

In the early 1980s, they wondered who provided

capital for Korean shopkeepers.

The Newsdav once reported

in 1981 that the Korean green grocers were supported by the
Unification Church.

However, the main stream news media

focused more on the Korean shopkeepers' hard work than the
external sources of financial support for Koreans, because
Koreans raised capital themselves rather than receive any
preferential financial treatment from external sources.
Thus, the success of Korean shopkeepers was described
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as the results of self-help efforts.

According to a New

York Post editorial (June 25, 1990), "the secrets of their
[Koreans'] success are plains a capacity for hard work;
loyal families that labor as units and stick together; the
ability to save small amounts of capital to increase the
wealth of the entire community. It is a formula for success
and advancement which other American ethnic groups have
pursued in the past...."

An article about Koreans in the

New York Times (Sept. 24, 1989) summarized the success story
of Koreans with its title, "Success and Its Price: The
Koreans' Big Entry Into Business."
This description of Koreans as a model minority not
only exposed Korean success but also highlighted the
failures of other groups, especially poor Blacks.

For

example, an article from Newsweek (May 18, 1992), after
analyzing the 1992 L.A. riot, rejected the opinion that many
minorities fail because there are no jobs and money in
America because Koreans proved that they can succeed without
money.

Thus the Newsweek article insisted that violence,

crime, and poverty in inner cities cannot be justified.

For

the author of the article, solutions to the problems of the
inner cities (thus of Black residents there) lay with
individual responsibility, family values, and respect for
labor.
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Black Resentment
By contrasting Korean successes with Black failures,
many news reporters described the conflict between Koreans
and Blacks as a result of Black resentment of Korean
success.

One article in the Mew York Post (Feb. 9, 1990)

described that,

"on one side are immigrants who are

pursuing the American dream, using the time-tested recipe of
saving money and hard w o r k . ... On the other side are
professional race-baiters like Sonny Carson, engaging in
group defamation...

[T]he underlying issue is who has

economic opportunity and control...."

Another article (New

York Times. Sept. 24, 1989) stated, "In Los Angeles as in
New York, the Koreans' success at taking over small
businesses has stirred resentment in black and Hispanic
neighborhoods, and many complain that they disregard
American laws on working conditions and w a ges."
In the same context, Harris(1983), in his "Making It:
How the Koreans Won the Green-Grocer Wars" in Money. said,
The success of Koreans has stirred resentment in Harlem
and other run-down neighborhoods.
Last summer[1982]
the Universal Negro Improvement Association, a small
black-power group, distributed leaflets asking
residents to boycott Korean merchants on grounds that
they didn't employ blacks and pushed out other
minority-run enterprises. (Money, March 1983)
A n editorial in the New York Times (Mar. 3, 1992)
described Black boycotts as a result of perceived economic
challenges from Koreans.

The editorial implied that the

oversimplication of Asian-Americans as a "model minority"
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caused racial bigotry and violence against Asian-Americans
by Whites as well as Blacks.

Thus, the Black boycotts

against Korean shopkeepers were also interpreted as
manifestations of racial hysteria and bigotry caused by the
stereotypical perception of Asian success in America.
According to an article in the Wall Street Journal (Oct. 26,
1SS8), "it is probably that some blacks would respond with
suspicion and resentment toward a small, readily
identifiable group that seems to be doing well while
everyone else is going downhill."

Koreans as Rude
The Mew York Times often investigated the everyday
tensions between Koreans and Blacks in poor neighborhoods
while other newspapers and television news programs focused
more on overt aspects of the conflict.
For example, a long article on May 17, 19S0 in the New
York Times focused on the stories of Black shoppers at
Church Avenue, Brooklyn about Korean shopkeepers.

Main

stories in the article included that Korean shopkeepers
often accused innocent Black shoppers of stealing, cheated
shoppers, changed prices without apparent reasons, sometimes
did not mark the prices,
Another article in the

and were very rude and arrogant.
New York Times (Dec. 21, 1988) also

reported that "many blacks said they found the Koreans rude
but felt they had no choice because most nearby fruit and
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vegetable stands were Korean-owned."
One short article in the Daily News (May 11, 1990)
emphasized that "Brooklyn boycotts aren't anti-Korean."
writer quoted Lloyd Williams.
white media...

The

"Koreans work well with the

To portray this as black against yellow is

an absolute lie...

The December 12th Movement should be

applauded for keeping these issues in the forefront;
somebody ought to do it.

This is an issue of community

control and an issue of community respect."

According to

the story in the article, the boycott is only aimed at
specific Korean stores whose owners showed disrespect to
Black shoppers.
However, in the New York Times as well as in other
major news media, the main theme of the articles related to
the conflict between Koreans and Blacks was the "extremism"
of the boycotters.

Thus, the articles about the problems of

Korean shopkeepers were buried in the avalanche of anti
boycott news reports and articles.

Boycotters as Reverse Racists
During the mayoral election of 1989 in New York City,
the New York Post (Oct. 24, 1989) described Sonny Carson as
"a Klansman in black face," when the controversy over Sonny
Carson in connection to Dinkins' campaign for Mayor erupted.
At the time, Sonny Carson professed to be anti-White.

His

fierce anti-White ideology and activities became a campaign
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controversy during the mayoral election campaign.

At the

time, major main stream news media described Carson very
negatively and caused trouble for Dinkins' campaign.
However, Democratic Candidate Dinkins defeated Republican
Candidate Giuliani.
Former Mayor Koch of New York City harshly criticized
Mayor Dinkins during the Church Avenue boycott in 1990.
Koch complained that Mayor Dinkins did not condemn the
racist tones of the boycotters, that some city officials had
defended the demonstrators' free speech, and that the police
did not enforce the injunction order to move the boycott
fifty feet away from the target stores.

Mr. Koch frequently

expressed similar views, as a guest editor, in the New York
Post and also appeared in several television news programs.
The New York Times' article (July 30, 1990) accepted Mr.
Koch's message as morally correct even though the article
said Koch was not an ideal messenger.
The New York Times (May 8, 1990) described Sonny Carson
as a racist provocateur in an editorial article.
nothing

,s[T]here is

ambiguous about the behavior of Robert (Sonny)

Carson, the convicted kidnapper and racial provocateur who
is leading the boycott.... The boycott... recalls
inflammatory efforts by Mr. Carson and others against Korean
merchants in Harlem, the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of
Brooklyn and Jamaica, Queens. NIn the future,' Mr. Carson
says crudely, 'there'll be funerals, not boycotts.'

...Race
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fires are alight."

After the Church Avenue boycott started,

an editorial of the New York P o s t I Feb. 9, 1990) maintained,
"that [boycott] campaign is as ugly as anything we've seen
in New York economic life.

Indeed, it is all too

reminiscent of the early stages of Nazi rabble-rousing
against Jewish shopkeepers- the constant group slanders...."
In an editorial article in Time (July 23, 1990),
Krauthammer accused Black radical activists of being
rejectionists.
For them mainstream American values are inherently
oppressive and racist, to be rejected at root....
The
rejectionists have nothing to offer the black community
beyond the momentary satisfactions of articulated rage.
To the whites they shake a fist at, they are a mere
nuisance.
But for blacks to whom they promise the
world but offer nothing, they are a cruel deception.
In the same context, an article in the Wall Street
Journal (Oct. 16, 1988) was titled,
Self-Defeating War Against Koreans."

"Black Neighborhoods'
It said, "by driving

Asians out of business, neighborhood activists will wind up
making things harder for black consumers while doing nothing
to create jobs for black workers."

Thus, the Black boycotts

were described not only as pursuing "the expulsion of all
Koreans" but also as being counter-productive for Black
welfare.

Because of their "reverse racism," the boycotters

were "probed for criminal violations," as a title of a news
article indicated (Newsday, May 15, 1990).

The article

reported that the FBI opened its investigation of the
boycott for possible violations of federal civil rights laws.
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Blacks are Divided
Many news articles described the boycotts as acts of
racial hate by Black extremists.

The White public, which is

certainly influenced by the main stream news media, resented
Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers.

Because of the

anti-boycott views of the White new media and public, some
Blacks who opposed the boycotts against Korean shopkeepers
became celebrities in the White news media.
When the president of the Congress of Racial Equality
brought 14 local women to sue the boycotters at Church
Avenue in May 1990, their stories were carried by most White
news media.

Their stories recounted how the boycotters

threatened the local shoppers with insults and abuse.
Claims that the Black boycotters often threatened and
hassled Black shoppers were frequently carried in major news
papers.

The implication of such reports was that the

boycotters maintained their success with threats rather than
voluntary participation of local residents.
Thus, after Mr. McCray, a Black high school teacher,
crossed the picket line with his students in May 1990, he
was hailed as a hero and became an immediate celebrity in
the main stream news media.

He appeared in major television

news programs and talk shows, and newspapers put his story
on the front pages.

He was described as a brave,

courageous, decent citizen seeking racial harmony.

Along

with him, many others who condemned the boycotters were
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interviewed and featured in news articles.
Because of the pressure from main stream news media,
politicians, White and Asian New Yorkers, Mayor Dinkins also
crossed the picket line in September, 1990.

His espousal of

racial harmony, his condemnation of the Church Avenue
boycott, and his crossing the picket line provided steady
headlines for the mainstream news media.

This development

further eroded moral support for the boycotters among the
Black population.

Efforts to Influence the Views of Main Stream News Media
Korean community leaders and the targeted shopkeepers
tried hard to persuade the mainstream news media to describe
Koreans as victims of radical Black nationalism.

When the

targeted store-owner in the 1990 Church Avenue boycott was
asked whether he knew why his store became a target of the
boycott in an interview with a television reporter, he
answered "I don't know, I don't know, I want to know." Thus,
he could present himself as an innocent victim.

Other

Koreans interviewed by main stream news media and letters
sent by Koreans to the main stream news papers insisted that
the causes of the conflict were Black jealousy, cultural
misunderstanding, black shoplifting, or Black nationalism.
One Korean leader emphasized that Koreans should be careful
when they expressed their views to the mainstream news media
and that the focus should be on the problems of the
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boycotters.
Black boycotters and their sympathizers also tried to
reach the main stream news media.

They continuously pointed

out that the target of the boycotts were specific Korean
stores whose owners abused or beat specific Black shoppers.
They also pointed out that the Korean shopkeepers in general
had been rude and did not contribute to local affairs, and
that Blacks were victims of pervasive racism.

However, they

had a difficult time finding friendly ears in the main
stream news media.

Responses to the Main Stream News Media
The focus on the 1990 Church Avenue boycott in the
mainstream news media coincided with the time when Al
Sharpton and other Blacks marched into Bensonhurst to
condemn the racist killing of Yusef Hawkins by White youths
and the reluctance of a hidden eyewitness to the killing to
come forward.

It also coincided with the extreme Black

anxieties over the sentences that would be given to the
White youths in New York City.

Some Blacks complained that

the sudden, overblown reports of the Black boycotts by the
"White" news media intended to appease the moral anger of
Blacks by showing that Blacks were not only racial victims
but also racists.

According to the complaints, the boycott

was used to demoralize the legitimate anger of Blacks over
the racist killing of a Black by the White youths.
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It will never be known whether the main stream news
media really wanted to defuse the overblown racial tension,
especially Black anger, by focusing on the Black boycott.
However, coverage of the boycott in main stream news media,
especially television, suddenly increased when the Black and
White tension over the killing of Yusef Hawkins was at the
highest in May 1990.

This was possibly and partially a

result of the sensationalization of the racial tension by
the news media to draw more viewers and readers which would
draw more advertising revenue.

When other events such as

Nelson Mendela's visit to New York City drew attentions from
New Yorkers, the spotlight on to the boycott eventually
faded from the mainstream news media.
Some Black activists thought that Koreans had a strong
influence on the main stream news media, and thus they
reported the conflict between Blacks and Koreans from the
perspective of Korean shopkeepers.

Others considered the

main stream news media as dividing minorities to conquer
them.

For example,

"once again, it's 'divide and conquer' -

- with people of color pitted against each other.

Many

Koreans and other immigrants are programmed prior to coming
to the U.S. to look with disdain on black and Hispanic
customers"

(News D a y . July 2, 1989).

Other Blacks accused

the mainstream news media to try to divide Blacks.
Some Korean leaders also considered the mainstream news
media as dividing minorities for a different reason.
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Korean business leader said that the mainstream news media
divided Blacks and Koreans by describing Koreans as a model
minority and chiding Blacks failing to do same thing that
Koreans did in this country.

But most Korean leaders and

news media focused on the contents of the mainstream news
reports and carried Korean perceptions on the same events in
their news media.

When the mainstream news media focused on

the negative aspects of the Black boycotts against Korean
shopkeepers, Koreans in New York City were somewhat
relieved.

Koreans were very afraid of the possibility that

Whites, mainstream news media, and the city government could
make Koreans scapegoats in order to please the Black
population.

Korean Efforts to Expand Their Moral Base
Korean shopkeepers and leaders understood that they
needed some allies and support from the Black population in
order to overcome the discontents of the poor Black
population after the 1982 and 1985 Harlem boycotts against
Korean shopkeepers.

They also tried to establish

connections with Black politicians and local leaders.

They

also sought to participate more in local affairs in order to
persuade poor Blacks that Koreans were also concerned about
the problems of Black communities.

Here I will focus on the

Korean shopkeepers' effort to expand positive relationships
with poor Blacks.

The efforts to establish connections with
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Black leaders will be dealt in another section in this
chapter.
After the boycotts of 1984, 1988 in Harlem and of 1988,
1990 in Brooklyn, Korean leaders intensified their efforts
to participate in local cultural activities with Korean
dances or martial art groups.

Through cultural exchanges

and participation in local affairs, the Korean leaders tried
to appease Blacks and also, in some cases, to persuade Black
people to consider the cultural differences to be the cause
of the conflict between the Korean shopkeepers and poor
Blacks.

Harlem Week
Since 1988, the Korean Merchant Association in Harlem
has participated in the annual Harlem Week Festival which
draws several thousand spectators from all over New York
City.

The Harlem Week is the biggest annual festival in

Harlem and most participants of the festival are Black.
Lloyd Williams, one of the organizers of Harlem Week,
invited the Korean Merchant Association in Harlem to join
the festival.

For the International Carnival program of the

festival, the Korean shopkeepers in Harlem paid their own
money to bring a traditional Korean dance troupe which
performed various traditional Korean dances.25
25 These traditional Korean dances are not performed any
more in everyday life in Korea. Thus, the dances are called
"classic dances" in Korea. While they are performed as
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In the 1989 Harlem Week, the Korean shopkeepers joined
the festival again with the traditional Korean dance troupe.
At the time, a boycott was continued two blocks away from
the place where the International Carnival program was held.
The Korean dance performances assumed new meanings after the
boycott did start.

In 1989, Korean shopkeepers worried

about the possibility that the Black spectators might boo
the performance because of the boycott against a Korean
shopkeeper.

When the spectators did not boo, one Korean

shopkeeper said that she was very relieved.

She recognized

the possibility that the Korean dance performance symbolized
not only Korean culture but also Korean shopkeepers.
This is one of the reasons why Korean shopkeepers
brought a very colorful and exotic Korean dance troupe to
Black neighborhoods.

Through the performance of very exotic

dances, the Korean shopkeepers could give the impression to
Black spectators that Korean culture is very different from
American culture.

This implies that if Korean shopkeepers

behave differently from Americans, that might be the result
of the unique Korean culture.

On another dimension, the

symbol of the tradition in Korea, they are performed as
symbol of the uniqueness of Korean culture in America.
Because of its colorfulness and exotic flavor, those dances
were adopted for the symbol of Korea in America even though
most Koreans in Korea do not perform the dances.
Nowadays,
most Koreans except the elderly population enjoy Western
style dances.
In short, Korean dances are 'Korean' dances
only for foreigners while those dances are 'classic' dances
for Koreans.
That is, the 'Korean' dances are reproduced in
a different context with different meanings.
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presence of colorful Korean culture in the Black festival
may lend legitimacy to the presence of Korean shopkeepers in
Black areas.

The president of the Korean Merchant

Association in Harlem explained that the reason why they
participated in the festival was to enhance the friendship
between Koreans and Blacks.

Thus, the performances of

Korean dances are culturally mediating the social
relationship between the two groups.
The Korean shopkeepers also participated in other
programs during Harlem Week.

They donated 500 dollars to

fund programs for the elderly.

They also donated money to

the president of the Uptown Chamber of Commerce for the cost
of the festival.

Other Black Festivals and Parties
Koreans participated in the Brooklyn festival held in
Prospect Park in June 1990.

Two Korean dance troupes

performed for spectators of different races.

The motto of

the festival was racial harmony and the banner behind a
Korean food table proclaimed "We Are One."

Koreans provided

free food and the Korean Produce Association donated fruits
and snacks for the festival.

Howard Golden, Brooklyn

Borough President, attended the festival and spoke about
racial harmony.
A Korean-African-Caribbean festival was also held in
September 1991 in northern Brooklyn.

An NAACP chapter
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director, presidents of Korean shopkeeper associations in
Brooklyn, and the president of the New York Korean
Association also attended.

Koreans provided food.

A Korean

dance troupe performed Korean dances and a Tae Kwon Do group
demonstrated Korean martial art.
The Korean Produce Association held a cultural event in
April 1990 near Church Avenue where Blacks were boycotting
Korean shopkeepers.

The event included programs which

explained Korean culture, Black culture, the civil rights
movements,

Koreans' view on Blacks, and so on.

The

intention of the event was to increase cultural
understanding of each other.

The organizer expected that

through cultural understanding, the two groups could
decrease the misunderstanding and conflict between Blacks
and Koreans.
In order to establish friendly relations with some
Black leaders, about thirty Korean leaders in New York City
participated in an annual party given by a small Black
newspaper, the New York V o i c e , which had been relatively
friendly to Korean shopkeepers in 1988.

The newspaper

remained relatively a friendly to Korean shopkeepers during
the Black boycott on Church Avenue in 1990.

Donations to Black People
Fourteen Korean church members distributed about one
thousand and five hundred blankets to homeless people,
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mostly black, in Manhattan.

They distributed them through

the nights of December 22nd, 24th, and 25th in 1990.
blankets were called "Blanket of Love."

The

This name certainly

indicates that Korean people "love" Black homeless.

It was

reported that Black homeless repeated "Nice Korean" or
"Thank you."

This event was organized by the Korean Afro-

American Friendship Group (its president was the first
president of the Korean Merchant Association in Harlem) and
the Pastors' Association for Peace (Korea Times of New Y o r k .
Dec. 27, 1990).
The Amsterdam News carried two photos on August 27,
1990, which showed that the Korean Merchant Association in
Harlem sponsored an end-of-program party for the kids of
Phipps Day Care Center of the 28th Police Precinct.

The

Korean Merchant Association also donated to other activities
of the police precinct, such as the police athletic league.
The Korean Merchant Association donated food for the annual
party for the elders in Harlem.
various other groups and events.

They also donated to
For example, one fish

market owner was asked to donate for a cultural program of
the National Alliance Party.

Even though he did not know

about the party and the cultural program, he donated 75
dollars without question.
The Korean Drycleaners' Association in New York
collected and donated about ten thousand articles of
clothing every year to New York City government which
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distributed them to poor residents.

The Korean Produce

Association donated thirteen thousand pounds of fruits and
vegetables to the homeless in 1990.

The Korean Produce

Association also donated enough food to feed 400 homeless
persons to the Council of Brooklyn Churches for Thanksgiving
Day in 1990.

At the ceremony, the president of the Produce

Association said that the food was sending the love of
Koreans to their neighbors in Brooklyn.

Brooklyn Borough

President Howard Golden said that charitable efforts of the
Korean Association could break down walls between ethnic
groups and promote harmony (Korea Times of New Y o r k . Nov.
26, 1990).

Black History Month Celebration
The Korean Produce Association of New York and the
Uptown Chamber of Commerce organized an evening of culture
exchange in February, 1990 at the Schomburg Center for
Research in Black Culture.
New York Daily News.
water."

This was also sponsored by the

The theme was "hands across the

Korean shopkeepers in Harlem, members of the Korean

Produce Association, Black

members of the Uptown Chamber of

Commerce, and a few Black politicians participated in the
cultural exchange.
around seventy.
Association.

The number of the participants was

The expense was paid by the Korean Produce

There were various performances of traditional

Korean dances by a Korean dance troupe and a jazz
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performance by a Black jazz trio.

David Paterson, a New

York State Senator, Sung Hwan Kim, a former president of the
Korean Produce Association,

Won Duk Kim, a former president

of the Korean Merchant Association of Harlem, and Gerobin
Gilbert, a Vice President of Program Development in WNBC-TV,
received awards from both organizations.
The president of the Korean Produce Association
announced scholarships for two Black students chosen by the
Uptown Chamber of Commerce.

He said,

The event, this evening, during Black History Month,
NAn Evening of Cultural Exchange' is a further
demonstration of the various ethnic groups in our
community working together to share our cultural
differences, and learn from one another. We are
pleased tonight to honor several persons in the Black
and Korean communities who have demonstrated their
commitment to ethnic groups working together to achieve
positive goals.
At the end of the celebration, Lloyd Williams, president of
the Uptown Chamber of Commerce said that even if he tried
hard to work for the unity of Blacks, there would still be
those who said bad things against him.
Blacks, have to unite."

He emphasized, "We,

He implied that Blacks had to unite

in order to deal with Whites and Koreans effectively.
In fact, the meeting was a celebration for Lloyd
Williams.

The meeting gave an opportunity to Lloyd Williams

to show his influence to Koreans and to Blacks.

Koreans

seemed to beg help from Lloyd Williams by offering him to
choose the scholarship recipients.

Lloyd Williams invited

Black dignitaries to the program to demonstrate his
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influence in the Black community to Korean shopkeepers.

He

organized the cultural exchange program at the expense of
the Korean Produce Association.

Koreans used this cultural

exchange program during the Black History Month Celebration
as an excuse to meet with Black leaders.

Code of Ethics for Korean Shopkeepers
In order to avoid further deterioration of the
relationship between Korean shopkeepers and Black residents,
Korean business leaders, especially the Korean American
Business Center organized hearings to draft an ethical code
for Korean shopkeepers in New York City.

At one hearing in

a Korean church in Queens, a panelist suggested that Korean
shopkeepers should understand the three hundred year history
of Blacks in America and establish an impartial and
cooperative relationship with other ethnic groups.

However,

this effort to make a code of ethic failed, because there
was no enthusiasm among ordinary Korean shopkeepers.
Local Korean newspapers also campaigned for a better
relationship with Blacks.

One Korean newspaper devised a

code of ten rules for Korean shopkeepers
New Y o r k . Sept. 28, 1991).

( Korean

Times of

The rules include "1) do not use

the term, aumdunqvi [nigger], 2)do not shout and do not
point your finger to shoppers, 3)do not behave like a rich
person, 4)participate actively in local affairs, 5)do not
chase shoplifters out of the store, 6)restrain the use of a
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gun, 7)study English and Spanish, 8)do not answer with no,
9)always think that Black is beautiful,

and 10)do not think

that Blacks are naive."

Other Efforts
The Korean shopkeepers of the Korean Merchant
Association in Harlem advertised their association in the
Amsterdam H e w s .

The contents included "The Korean Merchants

Association of 125th Street extend their[Koreans'] best
wishes to our[The Amsterdam News'] numerous friends and
customers for a happy Thanksgiving and look forward to your
continued support in the future (Nov. 19, 1983)" or "we
[Korean shopkeepers in Harlem] too are a part of the Harlem
Community and join in the celebration of Black History Month
(Feb. 11, 1984; Feb. 16, 1985)."

Kim Won Duck, president of

the Korean Merchant Association at the time, explained that
if he had advertised more in the newspaper, the newspaper
would have written friendlier articles about Korean
shopkeepers.

He believed that if Korean shopkeepers want to

construct a good relationship in Black communities,

"we

[Koreans] have to make Black newspapers report even when we
contribute a very small thing to Black communities."
However, the advertisements of the Korean Merchant
Association in the Amsterdam News did not continue.
The Korean shopkeepers, on several occasion, in Harlem
also attended a Black church, one of whose pastors was
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Korean.

When they attended they presented small donations

to the church.

They also joined in the celebration of one

hundred years of the Central Hospital of Harlem in 1988.
The president of the Korean Merchant Association said, "even
though we don't use the hospital, the party is a good
opportunity to communicate with Black community"
Ilbo, Apr. 20, 1988).

(Sae_Gae

Reverend Jesse Jackson and

Representative William Gray also attended.
Many Korean shopkeepers in Harlem tried to appease
Black shoppers by displaying their photos with Black
dignitaries such as Jesse Jackson and David Dinkins or
photos of Martin Luther King, Jr. or other Blacks.

One

store was decorated with photographs which showed that the
owner participated in many local affairs and donated several
things to local organizations and parties.

In another

store, the Korean owner was photographed with Jesse Jackson
and David Dinkins.

Other stores also have drawings of Dr.

Martin Luther King, Jr. or Black mothers and children.
However, no Korean stores displayed photographs or drawings
of Malcolm X.

On the street, however, posters and tapes of

Malcolm X and his autobiography were sold by several Black
vendors.
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Local Police, the Courts, and Law
Police and District Attorneys
Local police are supposed to maintain social order in
everyday life.

However, their abilities are limited.

They

have to follow laws and codes and are influenced by local
politics.

For Korean shopkeepers, the police are a major

ally even though Korean shopkeepers hesitate to report petty
crimes to the police because of various nuisances.26
However, local policemen are the only people who physically
protect Korean shopkeepers from criminal or angered Blacks.
In Harlem, community policemen continuously patrolled on
foot and by car on 125th Street.

The policemen sometimes

visited stores and asked the store owners if there were any
problems.
Local policemen are also supposed to protect local
residents.
matters.

However, their protection is limited to criminal
In civil matters, policemen cannot intervene.

During my work in a Korean store, two black customers came
in a store and asked the Korean store-*owner for a refund.
The Korean store owner refused.

The two women finally

26 Most Korean shopkeepers did not want to close their store
for the appearance to the court or the police as eyewitness
(it will take several hours or one day. It means he/she
cannot make money for the time). They were also afraid of
retaliation from those who commit crime.
They also thought,
once commodities were stolen or mischief happened, there is
no way to recover in the case of petty crimes.
Even when
they reported, they complained, the police did not concern
about petty crimes and policemen were not kind to Koreans
either because of racism or because of language barriers of
Korean shopkeepers.
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summoned two policemen and complained that the Korean
shopkeeper refused to give them a refund.
told her, "I can't do anything for you.
matter to a small claims court."
a rage.

One policeman
You can bring this

She and her friend left in

Although the two women sensed the moral injustice

in the store owner's refusal to refunding, the policemen
considered it a civil matter.
Whenever there were Black boycotts' against Korean
shopkeepers, local police were deployed.

In the 1988-89

Harlem boycott, two or three policemen were always standing
near the store and a police car was always parked near the
i

store.

They came from a nearby police precinct, two blocks

away from the store.

During the 1990 Church Avenue boycott,

about a dozen officers from the Brooklyn South Task Force
patrolled outside the stores; about six hundred police
officers were mobilized during the peak of boycott.
of police cars filled the street.
guard atop nearby roofs.

Dozens

Police officers stood

In the 1988 Harlem boycott, about

50 police officers patrolled the vicinity of the boycotted
store.
The police presence minimized physical confrontation
between the boycotted store owners and the boycotters.

When

physical contact between them occurred, the police officers
intervened and often arrested perpetrators if there was any
damage to body or property.

Thus, the boycotters were

limited to a certain area and could only shout slogans.
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When boycotters shouted outside of a designated area or
resisted the police, they were arrested on charges of
criminal contempt, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, or
other misdemeanors.
The police protected the rights of both sides: the
right of free speech for the boycotters and the right to do
business in any place for the Korean shopkeepers.

They also

protected shoppers who wanted to shop at the boycotted
store.

In June 1990, when the president of the Congress of

Racial Equality led about twenty shoppers to the two stores,
police officers escorted them as the protesters, who
numbered about fifty, were shouting.
Thus, the dominant confrontation form in everyday
boycotts was limited to shouting matches or the enchanting
of slogans such as "boycott, boycott."

Sometimes, the

boycotters insulted the shoppers who tried to use the
boycotted stores.

The boycotters also begged, persuaded, or

threatened the customers to dissuade them from using the
stores.

Often the boycotters, the shoppers, and the

targeted shopkeepers exchanged foul languages and ridiculed
each other.

Some boycotters called the shoppers "house

nigger," or "Uncle Tom"; the Black boycotters complained
that the Korean shopkeepers called them "niggers" and told
them "go back to Africa."

The Korean shopkeepers complained

that the boycotters called them "yellow monkeys,"
"bloodsuckers", and that some boycotters made lewd gestures,
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and shouted, 'G.I., two dollars.'27
The police tried to mediate the conflict through
informal meetings and connections.

On many occasions, the

police advised targeted Korean store owners to close their
stores for several days to cool down the angry mood of
boycotters, or they invited both sides to compromise.
Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes once conferred with
lawyers of both parties in the Church Avenue boycott.

That

meeting focused on efforts to resolve two criminal
complaints as a step toward ending the boycott of two Korean
stores.

The first complaint involved the Haitian woman's

assertion that she had been assaulted in the Red Apple
grocery store on Church Avenue.

The second complaint

involved the wife of the owner of a boycotted store who
asserted that a demonstrator punched her on February 1, 1990
( Mew York. Times. May 17, 1990).

Both had filed criminal

and civil complaints to seek several millions of dollars in
compensation for damages.
The police also tried to find out who had organized the
boycotts and to investigate the involved organizations.
Some members of the December 12th Movement were allegedly be

27 The wife of a boycotted store owner explained that the
"two dollars, G.I." implies that Korean women sold their
body cheap to American soldiers during the Korean War. That
meant, said she, that she is a product of the cheap sexual
intercourse, or that she would sell her body cheap to the
boycotters.
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shadowed by detectives.28

Even though the police denied

it, the Village Voice reported that one member of the
December 12th Movement was shadowed by two detectives.

The

police also possibly have the files for Black nationalists
(Hornung 1990b).
When the boycotts against Koreans continued in Brooklyn
and Harlem, federal investigators stepped in.

In the 1990

Church Avenue boycott, the Department of Justice inspected
the possibility of racial discrimination by the boycotters
in March 1990.

U.S. Attorney General, Dick Thornburgh,

instructed Brooklyn U.S. Attorney, Andrew Maloney, to
investigate the boycott for the violation of federal civil
rights law.

Andrew Maloney directed the Federal Bureau of

Investigation to investigate the boycott.29

The F.B.I. in

Manhattan opened a preliminary inquiry into possible civil
rights violations in the boycott in May, 1990 (Newsday. May
15, 1990),

They conducted a similar investigation in the

1984, 1988-89 Harlem boycotts.

In the case of the 1988

Brooklyn boycott, the F.B.I. was said to have investigated a

28 The December 12th Movement organized many protests
against the police brutality over Blacks in New York area.
In Harlem, the Movement once organized a protest against an
alleged police beating of two Black youths in front of the
precinct which deployed police officers in front of the
boycotted Korean store. Members of the Movement considered
the police as an occupied force of Black neighborhoods.
29 According to Attorney Maloney, the federal civil rights
law applies to any two or more people who conspire to
deprive someone of any federally protected right, such as
conducting business in inter-state commerce.
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possible extortion charge against Sonny Carson.

However,

federal prosecutors have not yet charged anyone in relation
to the Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers.
The views of district and federal law enforcement
concerning the December 12th Movement were well expressed by
federal attorney Giuliani in the early 1980s. "Throughout
Giuliani's early years as New York's top federal prosecutor
he painted Chimurenga30 as Public Enemy N o .1"(Hornung
1990b:27).

Top city officials and federal prosecutors

characterized the Church Avenue boycott as an illegal act
masterminded by the December 12th Movement.

The F.B.I. and

police reports described the group as "a para-military-style
group that poses a serious threat to public safety"
(ibid.:28).

One police officer considered the 1990 Church

Avenue boycott to be a mountain made from a mole-hill.

He

thought there were no beatings at all from the beginning,
and that the boycott organizers used the incident as an
excuse to mount their nationalist political campaign.

The

December 12th Movement, whose members included boycott
leaders such as Sonny Carson and Father Lucas, may be under
surveillance by the New York City Police Department and the
F.B.I.

(ibid.)'.31

30 Chimurenga is an ideological leader of the December 12th
Movement.
31 In fact, FBI and NYPD had various surveillance units and
files in the past.
The present existence of those units
were denied by them.
The wording of what follows is from
Churchill and Wall (1988) where no other reference is cited.
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The members of the December 12th Movement responded by
impugning the motives of law enforcement officials. Sonny
Carson accused the F.B.I. of intervening in a peaceful
boycott.

"The police will always use something to portray us

as violent criminals or terrorists," said Chimurenga.

He

continued,
They will move to stifle dissent and shut down our
voices, tell us we don't have rights. But the boycott
will continue....
The police know t h a t . They know
that we don't commit crimes, that we present a point of
view that threatens them and their power.... Our
message is rooted in the neglect and anger experienced

COINTELPROs: FBI domestic Counterintelligence Programs
designed to destroy individuals and organizations the FBI
considers to be politically objectionable. Tactics included
all manner of official lying and media disinformation,
systematically levying false charges against those targeted,
manufacturing evidence to obtain their convictions,
withholding evidence which might exonerate them, and
occasionally assassinating "key leaders." The FBI says
COINTELPRO ended in 1971; all reasonable interpretations of
FBI performance indicate it continues today, albeit under
other code-names.
JTTF: The Joint Terrorist Task Force, created in the late
1970s as an interlock between the FBI and New York city red
squad to engage in COINTELPRO-type activities.
Key Agitator Index: The list of FBI files devoted to
individuals considered so politically objectionable by the
Bureau that they must be "neutralized" for "internal
security."
Racial Matters Sections: The COINTELPRO components of FBI
Field Offices aimed at black political organizations.
Security Index: The listing of all FBI files devoted to
individuals considered politically objectionable by the
Bureau.
Black Desk:a section of the NYPD to gather information
about "radical" Black activists. The existence was revealed
in 1988.
Unusual Occurrence Addendum files: secret files on crimes
and crime victims used by Brooklyn and Manhattan Borough
Command offices (Amsterdam N e w s . June 9, 1990). They are
not official files.
The existence of the files was revealed
by Newsdav in May, 1990.
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by black people. They want to make us look like
crazies for expressing that anger.
They say we're
criminals because we want what's rightfully ours, not
the promises of puppet politicians.... We want the
political and economic power to run our communities and
run our live. We won't be intimidated. (Hornung
1990b:35)

Court and Law
The court does not help Blacks with everyday
humiliation because it is difficult to build up enough
evidence of discrimination from everyday humiliation and
harassment to produce a guild verdict.

The constitution

guarantees the right of free speech for all Americans.

When

the boycotted store owner in Harlem brought the boycott
matter to a court in order to stop it, a judge decided that
boycotters have the right to express their ideas.

The judge

also said that the boycotters could not bother the store
owner and individual shoppers.

Thus, the boycotters have

the legal rights to boycott and the store owners have the
legal right to do business.
In the 1990 Church Avenue boycott, the owner of the
targeted store sought an injunction from the court in order
to stop the boycott.

New York State Supreme Court Judge

Held gave the store owner a restraining order which did not
stop the boycott but kept the boycotters fifty feet away
from the store in May 1990.
to enforce the order.

The judge also directed police

When the judge chided the boycotters

for refusing to negotiate and awarded an restraining order
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to the Korean shopkeeper, Sonny Carson, who sat in the
courtroom, shouted to the judge, "why don't you have those
men [the involved Koreans] arrested?"

When the judge

ordered him removed from the chamber, he again shouted to
the judge, "you're a racist."

Outside of the court, one

Black, not related to the boycotters, burned an American
flag.
However, the police did not enforce the restraining
order because, according to the police, the police are not
obliged to follow civil court decisions like the restraining
order.

The boycotters affirmed that they would continue

their boycott no matter what happened to them.

Thus, the

intensity of the boycott was not influenced by the court
decision.

The Korean shopkeepers sued the New York City

police department because the police did not enforce the
restraining order in June 1990.

Judge Held of the State

Supreme Court ordered the New York Police Department to
enforce the restraining order he had imposed in a civil suit
by the store owners.
In appealing, the city argued that the police were not
obligated to enforce court orders in civil cases between
private parties.

But the Appellate Division of the New York

State Court affirmed, in September 1990,

Judge Held's order

on the reason that the executive branch is obliged to
enforce a court order by the constitution.

Top city

officials (possibly Mayor Dinkins) decided not to appeal any
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more and to execute the restraining order.

At the time,

Mayor Dinkins was about to cross the picket line himself and
decided to take the side of the boycotted Korean shopkeepers
under pressure from the mainstream nev/s media, the White
majority, and the Korean shopkeepers.
1990,

From September of

the boycotters who shouted "boycott" or distributed

fliers within fifty feet distance of the targeted stores
were arrested by police officers on misdemeanor charges such
as criminal contempt or disorderly conduct.
During the Church Avenue boycott of 1990, an increasing
number of Blacks insisted that they fell down in Korean
stores and brought the incidents to the court.

However,

these suits did not achieve their goals because no judge
ordered any Korean shopkeeper to compensate for damages.
The Korean who was accused of beating a Haitian woman in the
Church Avenue boycott was also acquitted in January, 1991.
In a response to the Judge's holding on the restraining
order, one demonstrator shouted through a bullhorn on the
following day, "they tell us we can't protest, what they
fail to understand is they can't tell us what we can do and
can't do... We'll be here everyday..."

After the Appellate

Court upheld the order to the police to enforce the
restraining order, one Black man said, "this court decision
is no different than the court decision that said we are
three-fifths of a person, or the decision that said we are
separate but not equal"

(Daily N e w s . Sept. 19, 1990).
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Father Lucas also commented,
this system....

"Blacks can't get justice from

And we don't want the court decision to

encourage the Koreans to think they can go back to doing the
same thing. So the boycott has to continue, until the store
closed down"(Kwong, 1991).
In 1991, the New York State legislature passed a law
supported by Governor Cuomo and Mayor Dinkins which
prescribed heavier sentences for collective hate crimes.
Thus, the politicians created another law in order to
control collective hate crimes.

Certainly the law was

phrased in general terms and intended to regulate any
violent racist crimes; the bill could be used to regulate
not only White "racist" attacks on Blacks but also Black
"racist" attack on other groups.
definition of "racist."

The problem lies with the

In general, law, law enforcement

institutions, and the court limited the actions each party
could take.

However, the shopkeepers' private rights of

property and their rights to do business were protected
while the demonstration of the boycotters was regulated.

Koreans' Efforts for Connection with the Police
The police are important power in relation to
shoplifting and robbery, because they protect shopkeepers
from any physical violence or property damage and limit the
range of expression of anger from the discontented shoppers.
Therefore* Korean shopkeepers tried very hard to make the
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police their friends.

Because the police also needed

friends in local areas, the police, especially the section
for community affairs, also tried to reach out to Korean
shopkeepers.

Because the police are obliged to protect

various rights of individuals which include private rights
of property and freedom to pursue legitimate business,
Korean shopkeepers considered their close relationships with
the police beneficial to their business activities.
The Korean Merchant Association in Harlem donated money
and T-shirts to the Police Athletic League (PAL) where the
police organized athletic events for young Blacks in the
area.

According to a Korean shopkeeper., some young Blacks

who joined the PAL told the Korean shopkeepers that they
would protect Korean stores and teach a lesson to the
boycotters.

The Korean Merchant Association in Harlem also

donated to the small community services' of the nearby police
precinct.
The New York City police has a Community Patrol Officer
Program.

Police officers of the Harlem precincts patrolled

on 125th Street and visited stores.
stores and asked about problems.

They often entered

These visits decreased the

anxiety of Korean shopkeepers in "alien" areas with
relatively high crime rates.

During th,e 1988-89 Harlem

boycott, the president of the Korean Merchant Association in
Harlem often met police officers from a nearby precinct to
discuss the boycott and get advice from them.
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However, there seems to be no special working
relationship between the Korean shopkeepers and the police
officers of the nearby precinct.

They maintained their

relationship as ordinary police officers and ordinary
businessmen.

The police protection given to the Korean

shopkeepers during the boycott was a necessary police
activity to protect legal social transactions.

Because the

police are more oppressive to the groups which try to break
laws or to disrupt social order, the police officers were
hostile to the boycotters.

Police activities focused on

regulating the activities of the boycotters during the
boycott.
Local Korean news papers encouraged Korean shopkeepers
to join advisory committees of local police precincts. In
order to get advice from local community leaders, police
precincts organized advisory committees consisting of
various community and ethnic leaders.

This provides the

police with access to the local and ethnic communities and
to solve problems and tensions through the advisory members.
In the case of Flushing, Queens and Jamaica, Queens, Korean
shopkeepers joined the advisory committees of respective
police precincts.
At the city level, the relationship with high ranking
officers of the police department was more important because
police responses to irregular incidents such as black
boycotts against Korean shopkeepers depends on the decisions
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of high ranking police officers.

The relationship with high

ranking police officers is also important because they
decide which complaints they will investigate.
There are several Korean members in the advisory
council for the New York Police Department.

The executive

director of the Asian American Advisory Council of NYPD is a
Korean.32

He also participated in 1982 efforts to solve

the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and Blacks in
Harlem.

He helped to organize the Asian-Black Association

and suggested to Korean shopkeepers that the employment of
blacks, the use of black banks, and the donation to black
organizations might help solve the conflict.

Under his

leadership, the Korean Advisory Council was created in the
NYPD.

The Korean advisory council members, according to

themselves, tried to achieve some objects:

the

establishment of hot lines in police stations for Koreans;
scholarships for model students; and friendship with local
police officers(Cho Sun I l b o , June 9, 1989).

They wanted to

create an active connection between the Korean community and
the police department.

The president of the Korean Merchant

Association in Harlem was also a member of the standing
committee of the Korean advisory council of the NYPD in
32 He was also selected as a person of the year by the
Congress in 1990. He worked as a chairman for the Asian
Coalition for Bush in the East in 1988. He is also a vice
chairman for the Asian American National Republican Assembly
(Korea Times of New Y o r k . Mar. 15, 1991). Thus, he has a
considerable influence in political arena, more than any
other Korean in New York City.
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1990.
The Asian-American council of the NYPD organized a
meeting between city police leaders and Korean leaders in
July 1990 at the peak of the Church Avenue boycott.

The

president of the Korean Merchant Association in Harlem, the
commissioner, and vice commissioners of the NYPD attended
the meeting.

Deputy Commissioner Holliday, who was in

charge of community affairs at the NYPD, actively
participated in many meetings with Korean leaders; she
received several awards from various Korean organizations.
She organized meetings between city police officers, local
police officers and Korean leaders and related Korean issues
and problems to the NYPD.

In one meeting, she promised to

continue supporting Korean community activities.

Local and Federal Governments and Politicians
In the 1984 Harlem boycott, then City Clerk David
Dinkins tried to mediate the conflict.

The presidents of

the Korean Association of New York, the Korean Produce
Association, and the Korean Merchant Association in Harlem
attended a meeting with David Dinkins and City Comptroller
Golden in November 26, 1984.

The president of the Uptown

Chamber of Commerce also attended a later meeting.

Dinkins

suggested that the boycott was not helpful to the
revitalization of Harlem.

However, the boycott continued

through 1985 and attracted wide attention from the news
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media and politicians.
When the boycott continued, demands included the
selling of the boycotted stores to Blacks and support of the
"Buy Black" campaign.

Some politicians, especially White

politicians, were very critical of the boycotts.

State

Senator Franz Leichter33 (D, Manhattan) asserted in a news
conference that pickets at Korean green grocers in Harlem
were pointing "an economic dagger at the hearts" of the
Korean shopkeepers.

He stated, "we34 firmly believe that

shopkeepers are entitled to locate anywhere in the city
without regard to race, religion, country of origin or sex.
We deplore the picketing of shopkeepers if the aim is to
prevent them from carrying on a lawful business. We believe
that the picketing of certain Korean greengrocers on 125th
St. is not a proper way to deal with the various problems
that have arisen"

(Daily M e w s . Jan. 31, 1985).

Leichter called for the involvement of the Institute
for Mediation and Conflict Resolution in the dispute, even
though the representatives from that group were already
holding talks with Harlem politicians and civic leaders.
Because the Korean Merchants Association in Harlem had
already agreed to sit down with the boycotters while the

33 State Senator Leichter was mentioned as a possible
candidate for City Comptroller at the time. The protests on
125th Street was conducted outside the boundaries of his
district.
34 He represented several politicians in the news conference.
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boycotters refused, the blame was put heavily on the
boycotters by politicians.

For a White politician who

aspired to a city-wide political position, this was a good
opportunity to get attention from news media and also from
the White voters who resented Black nationalism.
During a 1988 Brooklyn boycott, then Mayor Koch invited
Korean leaders including the president of the Korean
Merchant Association in Harlem to a meeting with city
officials.

The Human Rights Commissioner, and Police

Commissioner and other related officials also participated.
They agreed that the boycotters exaggerated the altercation
between a Korean shopkeeper and two black women and that the
boycotters might be acting illegally.
Black Assemblyman Albert Vann, whose district
encompassed the area, was negotiating with Korean leaders
during the boycott.

Sonny Carson, who led the boycott in

1988, departed from the Black negotiating team because of a
difference in opinion.

Even though Albert Vann accused

Koreans of being hostile and discriminatory, he wanted to
negotiate.

Assemblyman Albert Vann met Sung Soo Kim, who

represented the Korean merchants of the area, and both
declared the conflict a local incident.

Albert Vann agreed

with the boycotters that the Koreans should change their
attitudes.

He once agreed that the boycott leaders tried to

enhance the Black political power by changing the passive
attitudes of Blacks through the boycott fSae Gae Ilbo.
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Sept. 30, 1988). After several meetings, Albert Vann and
Black business and religious leaders reached an agreement
with Korean business leaders.

After the agreement, the

boycott dissipated.
Black politicians usually agreed that Korean
shopkeepers mistreat and are rude to Black customers.
However, White politicians thought that the problems should
be peacefully resolved through mediation or court action?
they believed the protests to be unnecessary.

The lawyer

for the targeted Korean shopkeeper was a White assemblyman
who volunteered his help and opposed the boycott.

He said

that he would bring the matter to court if the boycotters
insisted on boycotting Korean shopkeepers rather than a
single individual because that kind of boycott clearly
violated civil rights law.
In the 1988-89 Harlem boycott, then Manhattan Borough
President David Dinkins invited Korean representatives to
his office.

The president of the Korean Merchant

Association, a boycotted fish market owner, and the
presidents of various Korean organizations participated in
the meeting.
resolution.

They discussed the possibilities of peaceful
City Hall also organized a meeting that a

targeted store owner and other local shopkeepers attended
along with city-wide Korean leaders.

The city officials

said that they warned the boycott organizers that if the
boycotters violated the law, the authorities would react
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forcefully to enforce the law.
Mayor Koch, on November 1st, 1988, announced his
position on the boycotts against Koreans in Harlem and
Brooklyn. He thought that the boycotters boycotted all
Korean stores and that those activities were illegal and
violated the human rights of Koreans.

He said that the

boycott in Brooklyn clearly violated the law.

The Human

Rights Commissioner of the city government declared that he
would bring the boycotters to court.

Benjamin Ward, Police

Commissioner, said that it is illegal to obstruct the
business activities of Koreans.

The Police Commissioner

also said that he would enforce regulation of the police
line very strictly to protect customers (Chung Anq Ilbo.
Nov. 3, 1988, and Sae Gae ilbo. Nov. 2, 1988).
However, the boycott in Harlem continued until the
mayoral election in 1989.

During that period, as a mayoral

candidate and Manhattan Borough President, David Dinkins
tried to mediate the boycott.

Although the boycotters

rejected any mediation, they disappeared about two weeks
before the mayoral election.

Mayor Dinkins said later that

he had influenced the boycotters to stop the boycott.
Another Black boycott against Korean shopkeepers on
Church Avenue, Brooklyn in 1990 presented a difficult
challenge to the newly-elected Mayor David Dinkins.
Councilwoman Susan Al ter(D-Brooklyn) first attempted to
bring the boycotters and Korean shopkeepers together;
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Brooklyn Borough President Howard Golden brought
representatives of both sides together. However, both
mediation efforts fell through.

Deputy Mayor Bill Lynch,

the Mayor's Community Assistance Unit, and the City's Human
Rights Commission worked to bring about a resolution.

In

April, Dinkins set up a fact-finding committee to
investigate the boycott, and in the weeks after the incident
letters were sent to Dinkins by Korean leaders, attorney
Colins Moore, Alvin Berk, the Chairman of Community Board
14, and board member Ollie McClean asking the Mayor to help
resolve the problem (Newsday, May 15, 1990).
However, Mayor Dinkins and city officials tried to
mediate the conflict from a neutral position at the
beginning.

This position reflected Mayor Dinkins' narrow

victory over Republican candidate Giuliani in the 1989
mayoral election.

His narrow victory stemmed from

overwhelming support from Blacks and Hispanics and
considerable support from Whites in New York City? he
couldn't afford to alienate any group.35

This made his

35 While 91% of Blacks and 65% of Hispanics voted for him,
29% of Whites voted for him (Windhoff-Hertier, 1992:50).
About 54% of Asians voted for him. According to an informal
statistics, Koreans were equally split between Giuliani and
Dinkins.
In a victory speech after the election, Dinkins
emphasized the contribution of Jewish votes for his win.
Dinkins later said, "What helped me win was a coalition,"
including about a third of the white vote, "most of which
was Jewish, although in the general election, more Jews
voted for my opponent than voted for m e . " (The New York
Times. Feb. 21, 1990)
It is known that Black grassroots activists such as
Sonny Carson have considerable followers in Brooklyn.
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position difficult. On May 11, 1990, he condemned the Black
boycott in a broadcasted speech.

But days later, Mayor

Dinkins also said, "I'm confident that this [boycott] is a
legitimate dispute," and "I believe the boycott has gone on
too long, but it's important to remember that a picket is as
American as apple pie" (New York Times. May 16, 1990).
At the time, the racial tension was very high because
of the trial for the Bensonhurst killing of a Black by White
youths, the aftermath of the Central Park jogger case(a
White jogger was raped and beaten to almost death, allegedly
by young Blacks), and a physical attack on three Vietnamese
by Blacks in Flatbush (they might have misidentified the
Vietnamese as Koreans).

Al Sharpton marched into White

Bensonhurst with several hundred Blacks and several hundred
other Blacks marched to boycott two Korean stores on Church
Avenue.

In these circumstances, mainstream news media,

Whites, and Koreans were mounting their pressure on Mayor
Dinkins to take a firm opposition to the boycotts and other
Because of the influence of Sonny Carson among poor Blacks,
Dinkins paid 9,800 dollars to Sonny Carson and his
organization for a mayoral campaign for Dinkins in 1989.
However, Giuliani and his adviser described the payments as
"a payoff" to Sonny Carson.
Dinkins's campaign manager,
Bill Lynch, said that he had paid them to produce a large
turnout of Black voters in housing projects in BedfordStuyvesant. He said, "I was hiring an organization that has
roots in the community. The New York T i mes. Oct. 18, 1989)
Those Black politicians who were elected by Black
majority tended to have relatively more pro-boycott
positions.
For example, Assemblywoman Rhoda Jacobs of East
Flatbush said that because of injustice done by Koreans,
Black people responded to the boycott.(WABC-TV, 'Like It
Is,' Oct. 21, 1990)
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"racial" demonstrations.
While some of the demands (i.e., community control over
Black neighborhood economy and the closure of the targeted
stores) of the Black boycotters were beyond the accepted
ideas of American capitalism, some other demands (i.e., the
intimidation of clients by protesters in front of the
stores) were considered by state agents as illegal.

The

boycott was painted as a threat to Koreans' civil rights and
public order by mainstream news media.

Finally the

increasing number of crimes and racial tensions caused
Dinkins' approval rate to plummet by 20% among Whites,
Queens residents, people making more than $50,000 a year,
and college graduates during his first nine months.

One

Bensonhurst White female responded, "the thing with the
Korean market was a disgrace.

He [Mayor Dinkins] should

have gotten in there and done something"

(Newsdav. Sept. 28,

1990).
The Koreans in New York City also rallied near City
Hall on September 18, 1990, urging an end of the Black
boycott against two Korean stores and the active
intervention of the mayor.

Many Koreans brought signs

reading, "Our Seoul brothers are your soul brothers,"
"Boycott Bigotry," and "racial harmony."
arrived, the Koreans booed him.

When Mayor Dinkins

Dinkins said the city

police would enforce a court order keeping boycotters fifty
feet away from the target stores.

Maxine Paige, a Black
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singer, sang "The Star-Spangled Banner" and "We Shall
Overcome."

After the rally, Deputy Mayor Bill Lynch had a

meeting with a delegation of Korean- and ChineseAmericans.36
Because of the mounting pressure, Mayor Dinkins
declared in September 1990,
It was appropriate that mediation be given a full
opportunity here.
This protest, however, has proved to
be different... They wish only to beat these store
owners into submission and to force them out of
business.
Whatever may have happened here in January to
touch off the boycott... forcing these shopkeepers out
of business amounts to cruel and unusual punishment,
(quoted in Hornung 1990a)
The police also started to enforce the restraining
order and Mayor Dinkins crossed the picket line by himself.
This infuriated the black boycotters and their supporters.
Father Lucas said, "after the earlier goof of branding the
boycott racist, Dinkins made the latest ill-advised gaff of
going to the Red Apple and Church Street markets making some
small purchases with lots of press coverage and gigantic
symbolism to the African community. It is perceived as a
response to the challenge of the likes of Mel Miller

36 Chinese leaders in New York City actively supported
Koreans during the boycott. Many Chinese crossed the picket
line in order to show their support for the boycotted
Koreans.
Chinese and other Asian Americans seemed to
perceive the boycott as anti-Asian.
However, a few Chinese
criticized the boycotted Korean shopkeepers as rude and
expressed their sympathy toward poor Blacks.
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(majority leader of the State Assembly)37 which was in fact
a challenge to show how removed the Mayor is from the
thinking, behavior, and wishes of Black folks" (Amsterdam
News, Oct. 6, 1990).
As one of Mayor Dinkins's advisors admitted, "They [the
boycotters] have enough support in the community to stand up
to the police, the courts, and the mayor"
1990a:31).

(quoted by Hornung

Thus, the boycotters could withstand mounting

pressures not only from "White" media and White politicians
but also from Black politicians such as Mayor Dinkins.
When Korean-American leaders visited President Bush in
June 1990, the president of the Korean Association of
Greater New York explained Black boycott at the Church
Avenue to President Bush and asked his consideration of the
matter.

However, there was no intervention from the White

House in the boycott.

Efforts to Establish Connections with Politicians
Because of the continuing tension between Korean

37 He blasted the inaction of Mayor Dinkins in a hearing of
City Council. City council members, a Congressman in
Brooklyn, and other politicians also criticized Mayor
Dinkins because Mayor Dinkins did not try to solve the
conflict.
The Korean consular general in New York City also
visited Mayor Dinkins on June 26, 1990 and suggested Mayor
Dinkins intervene in the conflict. Governor Cuomo didn't
take a side on the boycott. When Gov. Cuomo visited
Flushing, Queens for his informal re-election campaign, he
urged Asian shopkeepers to understand the unique history of
Blacks in America.
He also visited Korean stores in
Flushing.
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shopkeepers and poor Black residents, Korean shopkeepers
needed support from politicians during the crisis.

In order

to achieve that, Korean shopkeepers and business leaders
tried to establish various connections with politicians.
Korean leaders and shopkeepers in Harlem and in New York
City tried very hard to establish good relationships with
Black politicians.

One Korean leader said, "we have to

learn by heart that a group without political power will be
victimized even though that group has big money," and "we
have to meet politicians again and again in order to
establish political connections."
In the 1988 democratic primary for the American
presidency, Koreans organized a fund-raiser for Jesse
Jackson in April. 1988.
for Dukakis and Bush.

Koreans also organized fund-raisers
However, the organizer of the fund

raiser for Jesse Jackson was the Korean-Americans for Better
Racial Relations,38 which promoted unity and mutual
understanding between Koreans and other ethnic groups,
especially Blacks, in New York City.

Their leaflet stated,

"the reasons why we support Reverend Jesse Jackson are that
he has paid attention to Korean problems and that he will be
a very important source for us to solve the problems
confronting Korean-Americans [the Black-Korean conflict]."

38 The president of the Korean Merchant Association in
Harlem also joined the group as an executive committee
member.
Presidents of various merchant associations were
the backbone of the organization.
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They collected about twenty thousand dollars for Jesse
Jackson.
The president of the Korean Merchant Association in
Harlem joined in the Asian-American Coalition for David
Dinkins for Mayor as one of nineteen chair members.
19 chair members were Koreans.

Mine of

Koreans also organized their

own independent campaign organization for David Dinkins.
The Asian-American Coalition for David Dinkins was dominated
by Chinese and had a close relationship with the KoreanAmericans for Dinkins.
The Korean-Americans for David Dinkins group was
organized in April, 1989, when then-Mayor Koch and thenManhattan Borough President Dinkins ran against one another
in the democratic primary for Mayor.

It was the first time

that Koreans organized an independent organization to
actively participate in an election campaign for a White or
Black politician.39

They mobilized Korean traditional

dance troupe to campaign in poor black neighborhoods and

39 Because of the Black boycotts in 1988 and 1989, Koreans
wanted to have more close relationship with Black
politicians.
That was the reason why Koreans actively
participated in the campaign for David Dinkins.
One
participant in the Koreans for David Dinkins said, "The
reasons why we support David Dinkins are to impress Blacks
with our active campaign for David Dinkins and to mitigate
the hostility of Blacks against Koreans. The conflict
between Koreans and Blacks just started and will be worse.
We need more fundamental strategy and one of them is to
support Black politicians such as David Dinkins."(Sae Gae
Ilbo, Oct. 13, 1989). The president of the organization also
said that the purposes of the campaign were to enhance the
civil right of minorities in his Harlem campaign.
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Asian neighborhoods for Dinkins.

Their campaigns were held

in Harlem, Jamaica, Bronx, and Flushing.
The Koreans for Dinkins and local Korean shopkeepers
organized a campaign in Harlem in May 1989.

Five local

Korean shopkeepers and about twenty other Koreans
participated in the campaign.

A traditional Korean dance

troupe came to Harlem and performed at several locations for
about two hours.

The Korean shopkeepers distributed

leaflets to blacks on the street.

Blacks on the streets

expressed their curiosity and thanks when the exotic dance
troupe campaigned for David Dinkins.

However, two

Blacks40 said to the Koreans during the campaign, "get out
of here" and "God damn."

The Korean shopkeepers attached

campaign posters supporting Dinkins on walls and windows in
all Korean stores.

They also collected registration cards

for the election from Black shoppers.
After the exotic campaign in Jamaica, Queens, the
president of the Korean Merchant Association in Jamaica
said, "I couldn't achieve any real communication with Blacks
for the last fourteen years.

But when I talked about

Dinkins and campaigned for him, we [he and Blacks] feel very
close."

He expressed that campaigns for Dinkins were a good

opportunity for Koreans to communicate with Blacks.
guessed that about 90% of Blacks supported Dinkins

He
( Sae

Gae

40 They wore shabby clothes.
I got the impression at the
time that poorer blacks might be more hostile toward
Korean(or toward Asian or aliens) presence in Harlem.
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Ilbo. June 17, 1989).

Even though the Korean shopkeepers in

Harlem did not express the same excitement, they smiled and
expressed their pride when they campaigned for Dinkins.

The

efforts of Koreans to support David Dinkins, thought many
Koreans, were appreciated in Black communities

( Chung

Ana

Ilbo. Nov. 6, 1989).
The campaign for Dinkins was, in fact, a public
relation effort in the Black-Korean relationship.

The

Korean shopkeepers did not sincerely believe that Dinkins
could bring peace for the troublesome relationship between
Black residents and Korean shopkeepers.

However, all Korean

shopkeepers but three on 125th Street between Saint Nicholas
Avenue and Lenox Avenue displayed various campaign posters
for Dinkins inside and outside of their stores.

One

shopkeeper said, "because the sure majority of Black
residents support David Dinkins,

it[to carry campaign

posters for David Dinkins] is a sure sign that we are on the
side of Blacks."

At the bottom of most campaign posters,

vthe Korean- Americans for David Dinkins' was clearly
printed.

The Korean shopkeepers also wanted friendly

politicians in the City Hall.

The president of the Koreans

for Dinkins said, "he [David Dinkins] believes that Koreans
revived the local economy in poor black neighborhoods."
However, there were different voices too.

One Korean

shopkeeper in Harlem was worried about the possibility that
the election of David Dinkins would embolden Blacks to
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demand more.
The Korean-Americans for David Dinkins for Mayor also
organized two fund raisers to support David Dinkins.

One

was held on August 31, 1989, in a Korean restaurant in
Queens. More than two hundred Koreans attended the party and
most Korean leaders in New York City also attended.
Korean shopkeepers in Harlem attended.

Several

Black politicians

such as Mayoral candidate David Dinkins, Representative
Charles Rangel from Harlem, and several state legislators
also attended.

David Dinkins emphasized that he would try

hard to abolish all racial discrimination, protect small
business, increase security on the street, and so on.
asked for active support from Korean community.

He

Other Black

politicians also addressed similar themes at the party.

An

earlier fund raiser with Korean supporters on May 12, 1991,
in a Korean restaurant, David Dinkins had said that he would
do his best to solve ethnic conflicts and end racial
discrimination.

He also promised Koreans that he would hire

more Asians and Koreans in the city government.
After the election, Koreans pushed Mayor Dinkins to
appoint more Koreans in the city government.

Because of the

lack of qualified people and also the lack of a potent
lobby, only a few Koreans were appointed in the mid-echelon
positions of the city government.
positions were given to Chinese.

Many higher and better
This was possibly because

more Chinese people voted for Dinkins than Korean people in
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New York City, both in terms of numbers and rates.
The Korean Produce Association honored David Dinkins
for his support of Koreans in 1989.

In the annual party of

the Korean American Small Business Service Center which
included most Korean business leaders as its members,

David

Dinkins proclaimed December 1st as "Korean-American Small
Business Day."

In a proclamation, read in his absence by

Deputy Mayor Sally Hernandez Pinero, Mayor Dinkins declared,
"Korean American entrepreneurs make important contributions
to our city's economy and to the health and well-being of
their fellow New Yorkers."

Several City officials and

council members were also honored for their support for
Korean small businessmen.

In the case of the 1990 annual

party, the Korean Produce Association awarded the woman of
the year award to New York City Comptroller Holtzman and
other awards to Brooklyn Borough President Golden,
Manhattan Borough President Messenger, President Williams of
the Uptown Chamber of Commerce in Harlem, and other city and
state officials.

The Korean Seafood [fish retailer]

Association, the Korean Drycleaners' Asisociation, the Korean
Nail Salon Association, and other business association of
Koreans invited and honored city officials, local leaders,
city and state politicians in their annual parties.41

41 However, prominent politicians usually sent their
representatives.
For example, Mayor Dinkins did not attend
any annual parties of Korean associations in person in 1989
and 1990.
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However, Korean shopkeepers soon discovered that they
were disappointed, for example, after the 1990 Brooklyn
boycott because the Mayor Dinkins did not forcefully
intervene in the boycott.

The Sae Gae Ilbo (Apr. 6, 1990)

titled a story about David Dinkins, "Dinkins Treats Korean
Community Coldly."

The article reported that Dinkins did

not appoint Koreans to city government posts and did not pay
enough attention to the Church Avenue boycott.

In a rally

Koreans organized for 'racial harmony' near the city hall in
Sept. 1990, Mayor Dinkins was booed.

Right after the rally,

he personally condemned the Black boycott as a racist
boycott and crossed the picket line as an expression of his
support for the boycotted Korean stores on Church Avenue.
After this event, he was enthusiastically welcomed by
thousands of Koreans in a Korean folk festival organized by
the Korean Produce Association of New York.
Korean shopkeepers also tried to build a productive
relationship with less powerful local politicians.

There

was a call from the office of a Black a s s e m b l y w o m a n in the
area to the president of the Korean Merchant Association in
Harlem in May 1990.

The president called Korean shopkeepers

in the area and told them to bring soft drinks and fruit to
the office of the assembly-woman.

They delivered five boxes

of coke, two boxes of apples, and two boxes of oranges for
free.

The secretary of the a s s e m b l y w o m a n receive^ the

presents and expressed her appreciation.

The beverage and
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foods were used for the excursion of elderly constituents of
the assembly-woman.

The Korean Merchant Association in

Harlem also donated fruit and beverages to other politicians
such as city council members and state legislators in the
area.
Because of lack of support from other politicians and
because Koreans needed their own representatives in local
governments, at few Korean persons ran for elective
positions.

One Korean who ran for City Council in 1991 said

that the boycott of Church Avenue could have been resolved
immediately had political power been available to Koreans.
His campaign promises included resolving racial disputes,
especially between Koreans and Blacks.

However, he and

another Korean council candidate were defeated.

No Korean

politicians have been elected in New York City or New York
State yet.

Local Leaders
One Korean leader in Harlem said that the best way to
solve the tensions between Blacks and Koreans is to meet
with community leaders frequently.

One Korean business

leader recommended as early as in 1985,

"Black people

respect their local organization, church leaders, doctors^
artists, and politicians and community leaders.

We need to

communicate with them in order to prevent the escalation of
the problems and to solve the problems.

We need to
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establish good relationships with them rather than starting
contacts after a conflict occurs"

(Chung Ana Ilbo, Feb. 15,

1985).
A

similar view was also expressed three years later.

After the 1988 Brooklyn boycott, Korean shopkeepers near the
boycotted store organized their own formal association in
September, 1988.

The temporary president of the Association

said, "all thirty-two Korean shopkeepers in this area should
become diplomats to overcome this difficult time...

One of

the reasons of the escalation [of a trivial altercation into
a big boycott] is

that we didn't establish frequent

contacts with community organizations"

(Sae Gae Ilbo. Sept.

23, 1988).

Korean Trip of Black Local Leaders
During the Church Avenue boycott, Korean business
leaders led by a Korean shopkeeper in Harlem and Korean
ministers led by the Cross-Cultural Pastors Association for
Peace organized the Korean Afro-American Friendship Group in
order to communicate with Black community leaders.

The

first work of the Friendship Group was to send Black
community leaders, mostly ministers of various Black
churches in New York City, to Korea.

The Korean leaders

expected that the Black leaders who visited Korea would have
a good impression about Korea and Koreans and thus would
mitigate the Black hostility toward Korean shopkeepers in
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poor Black neighborhoods.
The Friendship Group was established by the former
president of the Korean Merchant Association of Harlem who
also gave a liberal financial support for the visit of Black
church leaders to Korea.

One chairman of the board of the

Korean Merchant Association in Harlem also donated two
thousand dollars, and the president and other members of the
Korean Merchant Association in Harlem donated another two
thousand thirty dollars for the event.
Thirty-nine Black leaders visited Korea during Oct.22 Oct. 29, 1990.

They were greeted by the Mayor of Seoul, top

leaders of the ruling party in Korea, Korean ministers in
Seoul, and bureaucrats.

The ministers said in a departing

news conference at Kimpo international airport in Seoul that
they would inform their parishioners of the Korean tradition
and its culture.

"Koreans are not used to smiling at a

person they don't really know, especially women don't
contact other people with hand" said one minister.

"We will

tell our church members that the Korean character is not
directed against Blacks."

Another visitor also said that

"we'll be the peace-promoters between New York's Korean and
Black communities"

(Korea Times of New Y o r k . Oct. 31, and

Nov. 2, 1990).
The former president of the Korean Merchant Association
in Harlem who organized the visit said, "the Korean-Black
relationship worsened by the Church Avenue boycott will be
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somewhat relieved by this visit...

When there was a trouble

between Korean merchants and Black peddlers in Harlem, a
Black minister who visited Korea mediated and solved the
trouble."

He concluded by emphasizing that a good

relationship with the Black community and Black ministers
was very important for Korean shopkeepers.

Having evaluated

of the visit, the former president announced that the Group
would solidify good relation between the Korean and Black
communities through cultural and sport exchanges and more
visits of Black leaders to Korea.
Sonny Carson, a leader of the Church Avenue bpycott,
criticized the visit of Black ministers to Korea as a
ridiculous gesture.

In response to a Korean university's

offer to provide a one and half million dollar scholarship
fund for Black students who want to study in Korea, Carson
said that Blacks do not beg anything from Koreans but demand
respect fNewsdav. Oct. 26, 1990).42

The Cross-Cultural Pastors' Association for Peace
Those who visited South Korea for nine days in October
1990 were from the Cross-Cultural Pastors' Association for
Peace, an inter-racial group of Protestant pastors from the
New York metropolitan area, founded in 1988 after a Black
boycott of Korean grocers in Brooklyn.

The Association's

42 Four Black students were invited by a Korean university and
they began to study in Korea from 1993.
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president was the Korean-born Reverend Henry H. Hong and its
120 members are mostly Black pastors.
Rev. Hong ministers to a Black congregation and heads
Black churches in Queens and the Bronx.

He is working with

several religious leaders to bridge the cultural chasm
between Koreans shopkeepers and the Black communities they
serve.

Rev. Hong urged Korean shopkeepers to hire Blacks.

He said, "because you make money here, you better hire
here."

He also received a Korean Dr. King title from the

Amsterdam News (Aug.2, 1992).
When he organized the Korean trip of Black pastors in
1990, he said that Black pastors would play a major role in
bridging the gap between New York City's Korean and AfricanAmerican communities and in dispelling misunderstanding.

"I

don't know what's going to come out of it, but at least
we're going to make a try [at easing racial friction], and
that's what it's all about," said Rev. William Price, pastor
of Mount Sinai Helping Hand Church in Harlem and a member of
the Association.

In the spring of 1990, the Association

held an interracial church service and prayer rallies in
front of the boycotted Korean grocery stores on Church
Avenue (Korea Times of New Y o r k . Aug. 8, 1990).
A Korean pastor in a Black church in Central Harlem
often visited the president of the loca,l Korean Merchant
Association to solicit attendance and donations for special
services from the Korean shopkeepers in the area.

The
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Korean Merchant Association also donated food and other
things to the homeless through Black churches.

However,

Korean shopkeepers in Harlem did not establish any stable
relationship with Black religious leaders.

Community Boards
Alvin M. Berk, the White chairman of Community Board 14
in Brooklyn commented in a letter to Mayor Dinkins that
Mayor Dinkins' silence about the boycott raised questions
about City Hall's commitment to racial harmony in February
1990.

He distributed the letter to all community board

members and to local residents.

Black community board

members returned his letter with anger; one local Black
leader responded that Blacks demonstrated for justice and
human rights.
With anger, some people who supported the Church Avenue
boycott disrupted the activities of the Community Board 14.
The protesters demanded more Black members in the Board.43
Only eleven of the 50 members were Blacks even though the
Black population comprised 46% of the district's population
in 1990.

The protesters charged that the board had too few

Black members and could not represent the interests of the
Black population.

The protests became embroiled in the

boycott of two Korean grocery stores in the district.

Some

43 The members are recommended by City Council members
appointed by the Brooklyn Borough President.
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of the same people who led the boycott were involved in the
protests.

The organizer of this protest was Mr. Foster, the

chairman of the African People's Political Club of Flatbush.
The disruption continued well into 1992 as the protests
of Black community activists caused racial controversy in
the area.

The board's district manager said, "Their agenda

is to obstruct and perpetuate a deep racial mistrust in this
community."

But the protesters said, "Right now I see

Flatbush just like South Africa. The majority are [Blacks]
here, but we have no power, economically or politically."
The chairman of the Community Board responded that "This
board is not about race.

This board is about delivering

services to the community without regard to race.
delivery is not racial."

Service

While the protesters disrupted

several board meetings, accusations of racism, racial slurs,
and anti-Semitic remarks were exchanged.

The police

arrested several protesters, but Mr.Foster vowed that
protests would continue until Blacks were given an adequate
representation on the board [New York Times. Feb. 10, 1992).
In Harlem, the Black dominated Community Board 10 held
a hearing about a Black boycott against a Korean store in
February 1, 1989.

About one hundred Blacks and several

Korean shopkeepers attended.

The hearing was dominated by

the boycotters and their leader, Father Lucas.

When one

Korean shopkeeper explained cultural differences, and the
resulting misunderstandings as the causes of the problems,
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the Blacks at the hearing booed her and demanded that the
Koreans leave Harlem.

Father Lucas drew enthusiastic

applause from the audience by emphasizing that many Korean
shopkeepers were rude and racist, that Korean shopkeepers
took economic opportunities from Blacks, and that Black
communities needed Black business.
The Korean shopkeepers did not have many friends on the
Community Board.

However, one Black female board member had

a very close relationship with Korean leaders in the area.
Some Korean shopkeepers said that she supported "capitalist
ideology" and supported the presence of Korean shopkeepers
in Harlem as beneficial for Blacks in the area.

After

talking to the board member on the street, a female Korean
shopkeeper told me, "she is on our side."

The board member

also had a close relationship with a Black business leader
who maintained frequent contacts with Korean shopkeepers and
opposed the 1988 boycott.
Efforts for Local Organizations
The president of the Korean Merchants Association in
Harlem and some other Korean shopkeepers joined local
business organizations whose members were mostly Black.

For

example, the Korean shopkeepers joined the Uptown Chamber of
Commerce and the 125th Street Local Development Corporation,
both led by Black businessmen, in order to establish good
relationships with Black business leaders.

Even though the

Korean shopkeepers did not participate in the Chamber of
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Commerce meetings, the president of the Korean Merchants
Association pushed Korean shopkeepers to join the Chamber
and pay dues as a gestuire of friendship.

About a dozen of

Korean shopkeepers paid a $ 200 membership fee to join the
Uptown of Chamber of Commerce without attending any of the
organization's meeting.
The Korean Produce Association of New York City, which
represented the boycotted store in Harlem, also tried to
garner the friendship of Black leaders.

The organization

twice awarded the president of the Uptown Chamber of
Commerce in order to get his support.

However, as I

mentioned earlier, Lloyd William, President of the Chamber,
remained ambivalent towards the Korean shopkeepers in
Harlem.

The president of the 125th Street Local Development

Corporation was well known for his pro-Korean and pro
capitalist position among the Korean shopkeepers in Harlem.
As I already mentioned, the Korean Merchant Association
bought space from a Black newspaper for advertisement.

By

advertising in a Black newspaper, the president of the
Korean Association not only tried to persuade Black readers
to accept the presence of Korean shopkeepers in Harlem but
also made some connections with local Black journalists.
The president of the Korean Merchant As.sociation expected
the newspaper to dilute the bad image and to enhance the
good image of Koreans in Harlem.

However, the relationships

were soon severed, and new president of the Korean Merchant
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Association did not try to buy any influence.

Black Politicians vs. Grass-Roots Activists
The Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers revealed
not only the chasms between poor Black residents and Korean
shopkeepers and between Blacks and Whites but also between
Black grassroots activists and established Black
politicians.

For example, the switchboard of most popular

Black radio station, WLIB, lit up with complaints after
Mayor Dinkins's widely broadcasted speech44 on May 11,
1990, in which he said the boycott of two Korean stores by
blacks was based on race (Mew York Times. May 17, 1990).
This shows that the Black grassroots activists garnered
considerable support for the boycott from Black population
of New York City.

Different approaches by Black politicians

and Black activists toward Korean shopkeepers in Black
neighborhoods also symbolized the division among Black
population about Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers.
When David Dinkins first as City Clerk and later as
Manhattan Borough President tried to mediate the 1984 and
1988-89 boycotts in Harlem, the boycotters resisted
mediation and demanded the expulsion of targeted store
owners.

A similar situation emerged in the 1988 Brooklyn

boycott; while Assemblyman Albert Vann and his associates

44 All but one of the major television channels in New York
City broadcasted his speech for racial harmony.
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pursued negotiations, the boycotters accused Albert Vann of
selling out.
When Albert Vann and local leaders met with Korean
shopkeepers during the 1988 Brooklyn boycott, Sonny Carson
warned that "blacks are disgusted with bourgeoisie who sold
blacks out. Whenever blacks try to achieve any thing, they
divided blacks...

They are Uncle Tom, betrayers of the

black community..." Vann responded,

"I am aware that there

are other people in the black community who are opposed to
an amicable resolution in this matter.

But they don't

represent the majority of the opinion in our community.

The

point is that what we're doing is a starting point in a road
to control commerce in our own neighborhood."
Even though Albert Vann and Sonny Carson shared the
view that the Korean shopkeepers elicited the deep
resentment of Black residents through their conduct, Vann
and Black activists have opposite views about the meaning of
the presence of Korean shopkeepers in Black neighborhoods.
Elombe Brath, a member of the December 12th Movement said,
"I find it curious that these alleged black leaders are
trying to build a relationship with the Koreans without ever
coming to investigate what has happened in regard to the
African community in regard to the Korean merchants."

In

contrast, Albert Vann disputed the notion that Koreans took
business opportunities away from Blacks. "The Koreans did
not run blacks out of business. They filled a vacuum.
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are reasons why blacks have not filled that vacuum; some of
them are racial, and some are economic"

(New York V o ice,

Dec. 3, 1988).
The gulf between Albert Vann and Sonny Carson
symbolizes the distance between Black grassroots activists
and established politicians in New York City.

Albert Vann

started his political career as a grassroots activist with
Sonny Carson and Jitu Weusi45 who, as members of the
Congress of Racial Equality, fought together for community
control of local schools in the 1960s. However, Albert Vann
eventually became one of the most powerful assemblymen while
the others remained grassroots activists.46

Sonny Carson

believes that Al Vann had sold out (Sampson 1990).

Sonny

Carson and hi3 colleagues believe that other Black
politicians had also sold out.
For example, during the 1990 Brooklyn boycott, many
Black grassroots activists said that David Dinkins was a
tool of the White establishment, especially Jews, and that
his comments on episodes like the Black-led boycott of two

45 He once ran for Governor of New York City on a ticket of
a small third party. He supported the Church Avenue boycott
in 1990 and he also presented a speech for the supporters of
the boycott in a rally.
He is one of the most influential
Black activists in Brooklyn.
46 Albert Vann is Chairman of the Black and Puerto Rican
Legislative Caucus in New York State Legislature.
He is
said to talk regularly with Gov. Cuomo.
He was "considered
as one of the power elite of black politicians nationwide"
during the mid 1980s. (Sampson 1990)
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Korean groceries in Brooklyn were an affront to Blacks.47
Chimurenga, a leader of the December 12th

Movement, charged

that Dinkins turned a blind eye on the depth of Black
discontent and dissatisfaction in New York by refusing to
treat the protesters as a group agitating for respect and
power.

To Chimurenga,

"the city's first black mayor becomes

an Ed Koch in black face, a political minstrel show for the
1990s"

(Hornung 1990b:35).

Father Lucas, a member of December 12th Movement and
the boycott leader in Harlem expressed a similar view.
After the earlier goof of branding the boycott racist,
Dinkins made the latest ill-advised gaff of going to
the Red Apple and Church Street markets making some
small purchases with lots of press coverage and
gigantic symbolism to the African community.
It is
perceived as a response to the 'challenge' of the likes
of Mel Miller (majority leader of the State Assembly)
which was in fact a challenge to show how removed the
Mayor is from the thinking, behavior, and wishes of
Black folks. All that the mayor's action will do is to
strengthen the determination of the boycotters and make
Black folks more distrustful of the present
administration. (Amsterdam News. Oct. 6, 1990)
Sonny Carson echoed this opinion on a Black radio talk show.
Infuriated by attacks on Mayor Dinkins, Percy Sutton, a
former Manhattan Borough President, the owner of WLIB, and a
close personal advisor to Mayor Dinkins, declared that he
would close his station if Blacks continued to attack Mayor
47 A conversation between a poorly dressed young Black and a
Korean shopkeeper in a Korean store in Harlem during the
mayoral campaign of New York City in 1989 is very symbolic.
When the Korean shopkeeper urged him to register, he
replied, "He [Dinkins] is like Ice Cream. He has no
backbone... [Registration] no make any sense."
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David Dinkins through his station (Mew York T i mes, May 19,
1990).
Black politicians and Black grassroots activists such
as Sonny Carson and Chimurenga have very different
strategies for establishing black movements.

The activists

try to establish their leadership not from the ballot box
but from the street by galvanizing Black dissatisfaction.
Chimurenga said, "Our message is rooted in the neglect and
anger experienced by black people"

(Hornung 1990b: 35).

He

continued,
[T]he real task is to organize and build a movement
from the grassroots, from the people up. There is
resistance all over.
The question is how to organize
it" (Hornung 1990b:28).
"We see ourselves as the
vanguard, the leadership of what will become a large
movement to free the people.... We can't rely on City
Hall [where the mayor is a black]. We can rely on
going to our streets, where our people live.... We
will take the bridge and shut down the subways, stop
traffic to show the racists in this city that business
cannot go on as usual. We have power and we can use
it, make it grow. We can act before we are acted upon.
That's how we want black people to think.
To think
about their right to self-determination, to reject the
postcolonial mentality and build a life in our own
neighborhoods. (ibid.:35)
The December 12th Movement led the protests against
Columbia University which planned to replace the Audubon
Ballroom, where Malcolm X was assassinated, with a new
science research building.

The Movement's members often

carried photos of Malcolm X in their rallies and cited "the
spirit of Malcolm X" in boycott leaflets against Korean
shopkeepers.

Father Lucas, a leader of the Movement, also

spoke about Malcolm X for students in City College in
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February 21, 1990.

On the same day, the December 12th

Movement organized a rally to commemorate the 25th
anniversary of Malcolm X death in Harlem.

When one of the

leaflets, distributed by the Movement, explained a speech
delivered by Roger Wareham, a member of the December 12th
Movement to the United Nations,48 the title of the leaflet
was "From Harlem to Geneva, Carrying on the Legacy of
Malcolm X."

The leaflet states,

"the December 12th Movement

is fighting to uphold his [Malcolm X's] legacy in words and
deeds"(underline, original).
While Sonny Carson and his colleagues emphasized the
legacy of Malcolm X and steadfastly opposed elected Black
politicians who preferred peaceful compromises through the
legal political process, some other grassroots activists
emulated Martin Luther King Jr. and partially cooperated
with elected Black politicians.

For example, A1

Sharpton,49 who led marches into Bensonhurst to protest a
racial killing of a black in the neighborhood was critical

48 According to a leaflet of the December 12th Movement,
Roger Wareham, Esq., Center for Law and Social Justice at
Medgar Evers College, and Representative of the December
12th Movement, delivered to the 46th Session of the United
Nations' Commission on Human Rights at Geneva on Feb. 6,
1990, a speech which explained racist injustice in the
United States and demanded the Commission on Human Rights to
investigate U.S. violations of human rights.
49 According to Representative Owens in Brooklyn, A1
Sharpton is "able to mobilize a segment of the community who
cannot be mobilized any other way" (New York Times. Jan. 21,
1991).
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about Mayor Dinkins.

He commented after Mayor Dinkins's

speech for 'racial harmony' in May 1990, "I think his coming
out against the Korean boycott is an insult.... It was like
a James Brown record - talking loud and saying nothing"
(Daily N e w s . May 12, 1990).

In another interview, Al

Sharpton said,
...the so-called good times in New York are over. In
hard economic times, black people will turn away from
the leaders who tell us to be patient and wait.
You
know David Dinkins, Doug Wilder, even Jesse Jackson,
they can't appeal to the black middle class when the
black middle class is vanishing...
I don't know if
they can cross back to the roots of their power...
I'm
not the issue, the issue is leadership and black people
need it badly. (Village Voice. Jan. 1, 1991)
However, he eventually established a closer relationship
with established Black politicians.
On Jan. 21, 1991, Al Sharpton was greeted on the steps
of City Hall by Mayor Dinkins after he led a march across
the Brooklyn Bridge to celebrate the birthday of Martin
Luther King Jr.

Al Sharpton reiterated his belief that

nonviolent civil disobedience is the vehicle for Black
Americans to achieve justice in this country - Dr. King's
philosophy.

About Mayor Dinkins, he stated, "I don't excuse

him for not being aggressive enough on some racial issues,
but he's not responsible for the fiscal condition this city
in."

He finally emphasized that he was ready to "meet white

New York halfway-not on their terms, but on fair terms."50
50 New York Times. Jan. 21, 1991. He also ran for United
State Senator in New York state Democratic primary in 1992.
He received more votes than a White mainstream candidate,
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Because Al Sharpton and his group have different strategies
in establishing Black grassroots leadership, Chimurenga
said, "we consider Sharpton an enemy of the people."

As for

Farrakhan, a Black Muslim leader, he also considered
Farrakhan "as a traitor for his condemnations of Malcolm X"
(Hornung 1990b:27).51
The chasm between Black politicians and Black
grassroots activists is wide in New York City.

When Sonny

Carson organized several rallies against police brutality,
racial killings, and attacks on Blacks in 1987, Black
politicians, including the then Manhattan Borough President
David Dinkins, City Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward,
Representative Flake, and Representative Owens in Brooklyn
all avoided commenting publicly on Sonny Carson.52
New York City Comptroller Holtzman.
from New York City Blacks.

This

He got votes mostly

51 The basic difference between Martin Luther King Jr. and
Malcolm X was well summarized by Hornung (1990b:29).
"King
pressed for progress through a series of moral
confrontations tempered by compromise, while Malcolm X urged
replacing white institutions and values with black
organizations that serve as the first step toward selfdetermination." Another story of Dr. King and Malcolm X in
Harlem showed the distance between the followers of them,
"...they [Blacks] sensed that he [Dr.King] was essentially a
white choice.
This feeling surfaced in New York at the time
when the city council changed Harlem's 125th Street to
Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard.
Soon afterward, local
residents aired their own sentiments by renaming Lenox
Avenue [a major avenue in Harlem] after Malcolm X" (Hacker
1992:63).
52 New York Times. June 1987 (the date is unclear in my news
clipping). It is very difficult for Black politicians to
criticize Sonny Carson or other influential Black activists,
because "a lack of support, especially by Carson, of a black
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silence symbolized the difficulty Black politicians have in
dealing with grassroots activists and also the distance
between Black politicians and grass-roots activists such as
Sonny Carson and his colleagues.
However, there are also divisions between Black
politicians.

After Mayor Dinkins criticized the Church

Avenue boycott as race-based, a number of mainstream Black
leaders, including Dinkins's supporters, joined grassroots
activists like the Rev. Al Sharpton, Sonny Carson and Father
Lucas in publicly chiding Dinkins for being overly cautious,
slow to speak up for Black concerns and quick to appease
Whites and Jews53 at "the expense of a time-honored
tradition [boycott] of the civil rights movements"

(Newsday,

June 6, 1990; New York T i mes. Sept. 22, 1990).

Conclusion
The opposing views in the stories by Black boycotters
and their sympathizers on the one side and by Korean
shopkeepers on the other, reflect the difference in their
social positions.

While the boycotters and poor Blacks

expressed their discontent over the presence as well as the

politician in Brooklyn can be seriously detrimental"
(Sampson 1990).
53 Because Dinkins did not want alienate White supporters
(especially Jewish voters who voted more for Dinkins than
Protestant or Catholic Whites), he could not speak out for
Black causes. Without a considerable support from Whites,
he cannot win the mayoral election in 1993.
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attitudes of the Korean shopkeepers, the Korean shopkeepers
described the discontent as the result of jealousy, cultural
misunderstanding, or misdirected resentment which should be
targeted toward White American society.

The Korean

shopkeepers have a vested interest in maintaining the
present Korean shopkeeper/Black consumer relationship in
order to guarantee their profits in small business.
However, the Black boycotters and poor Blacks, as an
economically and politically deprived group, have an
interest not only in achieving better treatment from Korean
shopkeepers but also in enhancing their political and
economic status through their staunch resistance to the
present power and economic relationships with Korean
shopkeepers in particular and with American society in
general.
Korean shopkeepers, by contrasting themselves as hard
working against an image of Blacks as crimogenic and
irrational, thereby attempted to justify their success in
small businesses and their inconsiderate behavior toward
Blacks.

This contrast of images also allowed their

description of the Black discontent as an irrational
response.

Because Korean shopkeepers considered Blacks to

be inferior arid also wanted to make money quickly,
shopkeepers paid more attention to the problems caused by
Blacks such as shoplifting, burglary, robbery, looting,
"irrational" complaints, and laziness than to the welfare of
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Blacks.

For Korean shopkeepers, community participation or

concern for shoppers was not thought to be a job requirement
of shopkeepers in a capitalist country.
The boycotters and their sympathizers tried to present
Korean shopkeepers as bloodless merchants who do not care
about Black communities and focus only on making money
through prejudice toward Black people.

They saw, through

their unequal relationship with Korean shopkeepers, an
expression of a racist society which always rewarded groups
other than Blacks.

They saw not only White power but also

Black politicians supporting Korean shopkeepers.

Thus, the

boycotters aimed not only at particular Korean shopkeepers
who "beat" Blacks, but also at Korean, and furthermore
alien, shopkeepers who, the boycotters thought,
discriminated against Blacks, deprived them of opportunity.
They also aimed at the power structure which keeps Blacks in
the bottom rank of a social order.
Thus, Korean shopkeepers and Black boycotters expressed
their ideas in the context of American economic and
political relationships.

Because the American economic and

political relationships are primarily represented in terms
of race relationships through its history, the meanings
expressed not only by those two groups but also by White
media and politicians dwelled more on race relationships
rather than the shopkeeper/consumer relationship.

By

representing the Korean shopkeeper/Black consumer
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relationship as a race relationship between Blacks and
Koreans, the discourse produced by the conflict between two
groups became a discourse to reanalyze American race
relationships rather than class relationships.
Blacks as well as Koreans and Whites were active
participants in this representation.

The December 12th

Movement, which maintained socialist ideas as its ultimate
goal and despised the inactivity of the Black middle class,
mobilized Black people to boycott Korean shopkeepers by
stating "Korean shopkeepers beat Black women and children."
In their leaflets, they often targeted all Korean
shopkeepers and launched "Buy Black" movements.

Korean

shopkeepers reported the boycott as a "Korean-Black"
conflict to the Korean-American community and to the
mainstream news media.

The news media and politicians also

referred the conflict as a "Black-Korean" conflict.

Thus,

the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and Black residents
in inner-cities became, in fact, a conflict between Blacks
and Koreans.

This representation of the conflict not only

expresses the reality but also redefines reality.

This

redefinition of reality is partially intentional because the
involved parties try to mobilize their own ethnic groups and
to resist other racially-defined groups such as Blacks,
Whites, or Koreans.

Yet the redefinition is partially

unintentional because the involved groups merely adopted the
prevalent and familiar mode of thought in America.
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However, displayed meanings and the redefinition of
reality are part of the social practices of the involved
groups.

Cultural symbols and catch-phrases such as African

tri-color flag, Malcolm X, vampires, racial injustice,
racial harmony, minorities, White media,, capitalism, reverse
racism, "qumdunqvi." and "Japanese Jew," not only express
feelings but also create feelings.

Through the expression

and creation of feelings and meanings, social relationships
are expressed, redefined, recreated, and readjusted.
However, the recreation and readjustment of social
relationships are interconnected with existing power
relationships.

Various power relationships between Blacks

and Koreans; between the federal and local governments,
Korean shopkeepers, and the boycotters; between the news
media and the involved groups; and between Blacks, Whites,
and Koreans, are all intermingled in the expression and
imposition of ideas in an attempt to reshape reality.
One of the fundamental issues in this interconnection
was the social responsibility of Korean shopkeepers in poor
Black neighborhoods.

The boycotters emphasized that Korean

shopkeepers neglected their community responsibility by
extracting profit without returning anything to the Black
community and by mistreating Black residents.

Korean

shopkeepers rejected the idea of social responsibility for
saying that Korean shopkeepers are not responsible to the
problems of Black communities and that, in a free capitalist
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country, anyone can do business any place and can live in
any place.

The irreconcilable clash over morality between

the Korean shopkeepers and the boycotters, as well as many
Black residents, was expressed in their clash of power.

As

a clash of power Whites and state agents were drawn onto the
side of Koreans against many poor Blacks and Black activists
on the other side.

The clashes of meanings and power

rippled through various fields of society.
By proposing Black nationalism (e.g."Buy Black") rather
than socialism (e.g. abolition of private property), the
December 12th Movement tried to garner support from poor
Blacks.

Poor Blacks and some members of this Movement were

more readily responding to "nationalist claims" than to
socialist claims.

While most Blacks whom I met clearly

expressed opposition to White-domination, they did not speak
about capitalist domination.

Instead, they aspired for a

"fair share" or "equal participation" in power and economy
in terms of race.

In fact, a "fair share" can be either a

nationalist or a socialist claim.

Because different claims

would attract different alignments of social groups, the
prevalence of "nationalist" claims means that many Blacks
interpret American history and society in terms of racial
relationships rather than class relationships.

This is also

true among "Whites" or "Koreans."
However, the nationalist claims of poor Blacks are also
directed against some aspects of "American" capitalism: a
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needed social responsibility of Korean shopkeepers in poor
Black neighborhoods, the expulsion of Korean shopkeepers, a
forced increase of Black business, etc.

These assertions

directly stimulated local and federal governments to
intervene into the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and
Black boycotters, and the state agents tried to enforce the
American capitalist social order.

Mayor Dinkins as a part

of the state system which should enforce its laws could not
but condemn the nationalist claims of the boycotters and
enforced American capitalist order with the police.
was a reluctant move for Mayor Dinkins.

This

Because he needs

votes from both Whites and Blacks to be reelected, he
not alienate both segments of his constituency.

could

A

condemnation of the boycott would alienate a considerable
number of poor Blacks; his continued inaction would alienate
many Whites.

This was his dilemma. His eventual

condemnation of the boycott also increased the moral dilemma
of many Blacks too.
To the FBI, the NYPD, and those White politicians
dependent on White votes, the members of the December 12th
Movement were violators of the law not only because they
tried to impose nationalist claims but because they tried to
fundamentally change the existing social order.

For law

enforcement officers, they were not petty criminals but
major instigators of social unrest.
and other Black activists,

By bashing Sonny Carson

White politicians can stimulate
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White nationalism and garner votes from them.

Judges at the

courts responded negatively to Black activists, because
Black activists did not respect the order of law which,
Black activists thought, function to perpetuate racism
against Blacks in America.
The clashes of meanings and power were not separated in
the conflict between poor Blacks and Korean shopkeepers
because meanings required actions, and actions required
meanings.

These meanings and actions rippled through

various parts of society because many meanings and actions
in the conflict were evaluated, regulated, and influenced by
those groups who became involved.

In order to limit and

mitigate the spread of negative meanings towards Korean
shopkeepers, Korean shopkeepers tried to expand their moral
base, and to build various connections to Black leaders,
local residents, state agents, and White politicians.

The

Black boycotters used nationalist appeals and confrontations
to spread their ideas and to make their power grow.
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SOCIAL ORDERS
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION: DISCUSSION

[A steel worker's complaint about his boss]: This
one foreman I've got, he's a kid. He's a college
graduate.
He thinks he's better than everybody
else.
He was chewing me out and I was saying,
"Yeah, yeah, yeah."
He said, "What do you mean,
yeah, yeah, yeah.
Yes, Sir." I told him, "who
the hell are you, Hitler? What is this sYes sir'
bullshit? I came here to work, I didn't come to
here to crawl." (Terkel X974:xxxiii)
[A general foreman's way to control linemen]: When
you get familiarity [with linemen] it causes- the
more you get to know some body, it's hard to
distinguish between boss and friend.
This isn't
good for my profession. (Terkel 1974:183)
"Honesty,"
an absence
centrality
form[truck
1986:70)

in sum, was a code phrase not just for
of the deception but also for the
of control over the producers in this
system] of merchant capital. (Sider

Social Orders
Private Ownership of Property and Class Order
Property is "the material crystallization of a set of
social relationships"

(Sider 1986:110).

Only when one

person can exclude others, does the ownership of property
meaningful.

Thus, we are dealing with "the rights between

persons to a material object," (Goody 1962:287, quoted in
Sider 1986:110), when we deal with the ownership of
property.

In capitalist societies, the private ownership of

property is more exclusive than in any other type of
society.

Non-owners are, in legal terms, excluded from the
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use, consumption, and exchange of private property.
The accumulation of capital is the result of a social
relationship where a capital accumulator can amass a sum of
money or credit through a set of social relationships,
specifically the capital-labor relationship.

Shopkeepers

also have a set of socio-economic relationships.

A

shopkeeper buys goods from wholesalers and sells them to
consumers.

Through relationships with wholesalers and

consumers,1 shopkeepers can realize their profit.
A shopkeeper has an exclusive property ownership of
goods after taking the goods from wholesalers by paying with
money or credit.

The shopkeeper can, in legal terms, place

any price on it and sell to consumers in American
capitalism.

The difference between the amount he/she pays

for goods to wholesalers and the price he/she puts on the
goods for consumers is the source of his/her profit.

Thus,

the profit for shopkeepers comes from his/her mediation of
wholesalers and consumers.

The appropriation of profit for

shopkeepers is the materialized results of the mediation of
specific social relationships.

The moment of the exchange

1 Wholesalers are connected to other wholesalers, industrial
capitalists, or, in some cases, small producers.
Shopkeepers are located at the front of capitalist
distribution.
In other words, shopkeepers realize "surplus
value" for capital in the distributional fronts.
Consumers
are mostly wage-earners who reproduce their labor power
through consumption. Most wage-earners work for
capitalists, petty capitalists, or state systems.
This
capitalist circulation of labor and commodities conditions
the social position of shopkeepers.
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between a shopkeeper and a shopper, in general, is the
moment of the appropriation of profit.

After exchange, the

shopkeeper has private ownership of the money which the
shopper hands over to the shopkeeper; the shopper also has
private ownership over the goods she/he purchased and will
eventually consume.

This exchange act is habituated in our

daily interactions and can be called a "habitus"

(Bourdieu

1977) .
Capitalist law sanctifies the exclusive private
ownership which guarantees profit for shopkeepers in
general.

Through repeated everyday interactions, we are

accustomed to the exchange relationship.
this relationship as natural.

Most people accept

We do not raise questions

about the exchange relationship itself.
relationship is already hegemonized.

The exchange

Consumers have

accepted this relationship of exchange.

However, it does

not mean that the reproduction of this habituated
relationship is beyond contest.

These relationships can be

partially doubted, contested, disputed, or rejected in
certain circumstances.2
2 Bourdieu's (1977; 1984) scheme over the reproduction of
society through classificatory practices poorly explain how
and when the reproduction of social relationships can be
collapsed, especially in relation to the centralized
apparatus of power, that is, state system.
Even though the
habituated exchange relationship itself is not a target of
Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers, their protests
over the certain dimensions of the exchange relationship
also include, directly and indirectly the critiques of the
exchange relationship itself.
For example, the "Buy Black"
campaign criticizes not only the presence of "alien"
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Derogatory terms such as theft, robbery, shoplifting,
and burglary which describe behaviors violating private
ownership show the legal sanctity of the exchange
relationship to be based on the exclusive private rights of
property.

Terms such as theft or shoplifting already

presuppose that the behaviors in violation of the exclusive
private rights of property are immoral.

This again

presuppose the ideas that the exclusive private rights over
property should not be violated.

Theft is not simply

behavior to steal an object, it is a violation of a certain
rule of social relationship.
there is no theft.)

(If there is no ownership,

The moral feelings invested in "theft"

and its wide acceptance by most people already reveal the
leadership of anti-"theft" forces, that is, the private
property owners and the supporters for private ownership of
property.
Shopkeepers and consumers, in most cases, make contact
casually.
time.

Consumers can change their shopping route any

These casual contacts create the myth that they are

equal.3

However, shopkeepers are dealing with several

shopkeepers but also the "unjust" (i.e. free and racist
competition) element of the exchange relationship itself
with some ambiguity.
This ambiguous and partial critique
can be transformed into a frontal critique on the habituated
exchange relationship under certain circumstances.
3 This relationship is quite different from the relationship
between an employer and an employee or a boss and his/her
subordinate.
The latter relationships are, relatively, more
formally structured into a stable, unequal relationship even
though the employees or subordinates can quit any time.
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dozens or hundreds of consumers each day who need goods for
individual consumption.

Shopkeepers have more knowledge

about how to manipulate consumers than vice versa and
individual complaints from some consumers do not cause a big
problem for shopkeepers.

If consumers do not have enough

knowledge about stores, prices, and goods, their choices of
stores and goods will be limited.

When a consumer has an

individual complaint and a shopkeeper refuses to solve the
problem, it is also difficult for that consumer to fight
against the shopkeeper because the fight would require a lot
of energy and time from a consumer.

The legal system also

requires some energy, time, and money.

It is difficult to

mobilize other shoppers to protest against the shopkeeper
because consumers, in general, have only casual and
individual contacts with the shopkeeper.

There are, in

general, no communal experience and social relationships
among consumers.

If any collective memory or appeal among

them can be invoked in mobilizing consumers, the collective
memory can become a good rallying point for the complaints.4
4 The power relationship between shopkeepers and area
residents is not equal.
However, the relationship is not
predetermined by economic position. One Korean professor
sent a letter to a Korean newspaper (Korea Times of Mew
York. Sept. 17, 1991).
In it, he related a story from the
Deep South. When a Black shopkeeper caught a White
shoplifter, the shopkeeper called the police to arrest him.
Two days after the incident, the store was burned down by
Whites and the Black shopkeeper was injured very seriously
by a shooting. When a Korean grocer shot a White to death
in his store in a White area of Bay Ridge, Queens, some
Whites tried on three occasions to bomb the store. The
store-owner sold his store and left the area immediately
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The generalization and habitualization of the exchange
relationship and the general acceptance of them limit the
possibility of the criticism of the role of shopkeepers by
the Black boycotters (or by any other boycotters).5

The

limitation of protest by the Black boycotters to the
excessiveness of Korean shopkeepers in treating Black
residents is also evidence that commodity fetishism is
widely accepted by most of the American population.

The

commodity is not seen as a medium for surplus value, nor is
the exchange seen as the point of realization of surplus
value.

Because any critique of the private ownership of

property will stimulate the feelings of poor Black residents
in inner cities, the boycotters focus on retrieving Black
rage regarding racial injustice by emphasizing mistreatment
at the hands of Korean shopkeepers.6

The boycotters also

fSae Gae Ilbo. Feb. 8, 1990). As I already said, many
Korean shopkeepers complained about White shoppers because
they, explicitly and implicitly, demand racial deference.
5 Most boycotts in America focus on specific aspects of
business. For example, the tuna industry was boycotted
because the ships which caught tuna also killed dolphins.
(For other boycotts, see Rodkin 1991.)
Korean green grocers
and fish market owners also boycotted wholesalers in New
York City. They focused on the disrespectful acts of one or
two specific White wholesalers.
Even though the Koreans
boycotted only one or two White wholesalers, they knew it
would have a ripple effect on all other White wholesalers
(See afterword).
6 Because major members of the December 12th Movement are
socialists, they may oppose the capitalist exchange
relationship.
Yet they did not make the capitalist
relationship itself an issue.
They emphasized the racist
element of the relationship (mistreatment and the under
representation of Blacks) because of social conditions in
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raise questions about the price and quality of commodities
being sold by "alien" shopkeepers.

On another side, they

organize their campaigns around issues such as selfdetermination and the "Buy Black" movement.

By paraphrasing

the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and Black consumers
in terms of racial relationships, the boycotters and their
leaders want to show the possibility of economic and
political impact through Black power, the determination to
resist racial injustice, and racial pride to poor Black
residents.

That is, they want to change the mentality of

defeatism widespread in Black communities.

Racial Order
Skin color or perceptions over skin color have multiple
and sometimes contradictory meanings for many people.

Skin

colors have been socially constructed7 (partially based on
the various spectrum of definite skin colors) and socially
imputed with meanings through history and social relations.
Any construction of racial names is simultaneously a process
of the culture and politics of homogenization and

which they must appeal to the Black population, and possibly
to the moral feelings of other populations.
Socialist
phrases might derail moral appeals not only to Blacks but
also to most Americans.
This should be understood in the
context of American history where "Blacks" have been the
target of brutal racism for centuries. Race is a
fundamental and "real" category for most Americans.
7 In fact, very few people have any pure black; white, red,
or yellow color on their skins.
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differentiation.

The process of differentiation and

separation creates artificial boundaries and homogenizes the
divided and bounded space as racial units.

Under this

construction, those units are rearranged, reshuffled,
expanded, reconstructed, and reproduced through history and
social relations.
racialized units.8

Through this process, people are put into
This process is also the process of the

social construction of social order in terms of race
relationships.
Because unequal social relationships run also through
racialized social relationships, skin color or racial
identity is socially evaluated, and has various implications
in daily interactions between differently racialized
individuals and groups in American life.

The fundamental

unequal relationship in racialized units in America is
between Whites and Blacks.

"America is inherently a 'white'

country: in character, in structure, in culture"
1992:4).9

(Hacker

"White" people consider "Blacks" as "inferior."

Even though Whites absorb new Middle Eastern immigrants and

8 As Field(1990:118) states, "Nothing handed down from
the past could keep race alive if we did not constantly
reinvent and re-ritualize to fit our own terrain."
9 Even though Wilson (1978; 1987) declared that the
significance of race is declining, not only poor Blacks but
also middle class Blacks still experience significant racial
discrimination and harassment (e.g. Feagin 1991).
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Asian immigrants,10 thsy are particularly reluctant to
absorb Blacks as full citizens (ibid.)*
inferiorization of Blacks,

Through the

"[a]11 white Americans realize

that their skin comprises an inestimatible asset....
serves as a shield from insult and harassment....

It

What it

does ensure is that you will not be regarded as black, a
security which is worth so much that no one who has it has
ever given it away"(Hacker 1992:60, emphasis original).
At the beginning of the Korean influx, the boundary
between Black residents and Korean shopkeepers was not
clearly defined because the Koreans were not visible, and
they did not fit into the Black vs. White model.

Thus, some

residents considered Korean shopkeepers as fellow colored
people.

However, the newly-arrived Koreans already had a

sense of different social status from that of poor Black
residents.

The Korean shopkeepers further developed the

inferior images of Blacks in America.

Black residents soon

realized that the Koreans were not different from other,
White shopkeepers.

However, many Black residents still

consider Koreans as a neutral third party while they
consider Whites as the prime negative force for Blacks.

10 Loewen(1971) shows an interesting example.
In his book,
Mississippi Chinese who were considered Blacks when they
entered the Mississippi Delta were eventually accepted as
Whites. A conversation v/ith a White Baptist minister is
revealing.
"You're either a white man or a nigger, here.
Now, that's the whole story. When I first came to the
Delta, the Chinese were classed as nigras."
["And now they
are called whites?" (question by Loewen)]
"That's right 1."
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Most Korean shopkeepers consider Whites as the owner of
this society.

Korean shopkeepers experience racial

humiliation when they deal with White wholesalers at Hunts
Point (the fruit and vegetable wholesale market of New York
City) or at Fulton Fish Market (the wholesale fish market in
New York City).11

They also realize that White shoppers

often demand racial deference.
assertive and demanding.

Their attitudes are very

Whites are very difficult to deal

with, according to Korean shopkeepers.

That is the reason

why many Korean shopkeepers prefer poor Black neighborhoods
and stay there even after they accumulate enough capital to
open stores in White areas.

However, in the political

dimension, Korean shopkeepers are very ambivalent about
"White" power.

Many Koreans are worried about the

possibility that the White majority and politicians will
make Koreans a scapegoat in the conflict between Blacks and
Whites and/or Blacks and Koreans.

Most Koreans thought that

Koreatown was deliberately abandoned by the "White" police
in L.A. riot in April,

1992.

But, in another sense, many

Koreans also believe they cannot but depend on White power
to contain Black rage against Korean shopkeepers.

Racial Order and Spatial Order
The rigid racialization in America is also expressed in
the racialization of space.

For example, the Black

11 See afterword.
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population is highly segregated from Whites.

As the change

of Black residential areas in New York City shows,
Americans have extraordinarily sensitive antennae for
the colorations of neighborhoods.
In virtually every
metropolitan area, white householders can rank each
enclave by the racial makeup of the residents.
Given
this knowledge, where a family lives becomes an index
of its social standing.
While this is largely an
economic matter, proximity to blacks compounds this
assessment.
For a white family to be seen as living in
a mixed - or changing - neighborhood can be construed
as a symptom of surrender, indeed as evidence that they
are on a downward spiral. (Hacker 1992:38, emphasis
added).
These White reactions might be considered the same as
branding Blacks as carriers of contamination.

Blacks might

be seen as infecting a neighborhood simply because they are
Black.

The feelings in the term of "infection" includes not

only fear of racial "contamination" but also fears of crime
and the downturn of property values.

This process produces

inner cities with high minority concentrations.

This

spatial order raises a question about which shopkeepers will
work in "contaminated" inner cities.

From the point of view

of the Whites or those who buy the view of "contamination,"
some minorities such as Jews in inner cities, Chinese in the
Mississippi Delta, or Koreans in inner cities have risked
the danger of not only Black crime but also Black
"contamination*"
The segregation of territory gives claims of exclusive
rights over space to the occupants.

Hispanics do not have

as much territorial exclusivism in comparison with Blacks
because they are new to their territory.

They are

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

relatively vulnerable to counter-claims if they claim
exclusive territorial rights.12

Whites claim exclusive

territory rights in, for example, Carnarsie, Bensonhurst, or
most suburban areas in New York area.

When Whites claim

territorial exclusivism, they may rely on terror (arson,
physical attack, and ansence of patronage) to exclude Blacks
and frequently other minorities.13

However, Whites are

more permissive regarding the entry of Asians to their
neighborhoods than to the entry of Blacks.

Thus, " [s]urveys

of neighborhoods and schools show that Black Americans spend
more of their lives in segregated settings than even recent
immigrants" (Hacker 1992:146).
Blacks have also mobilized territorial claims on
commercial strips of Black neighborhoods rather than
residential areas14.

The commercial strips of Black

12 Among Asians, only Chinese have an visible and
exclusive territory known as Chinatown.
In fact, like Black
inner-cities, Chinatowns are also a product of the White
exclusion of Chinese.
Chinese who migrated during the 19th
century were confined in ghetto-like areas.
13 A White Italian in Carnarsie described his violence
against Black families.
"We got them out of Carnarsie.
We
ran into the house and kicked the shit out of every one of
them" (Massey and Denton 1993:91).
14 Because Whites and Asians avoid Black residential areas,
Black territorial claims on residential areas are not so
meaningful.
This does not mean that there are no other
racial groups in Black neighborhoods.
In the census track
which includes the boycotted Korean stores in Harlem,
157
Whites, 18 Asian, 47 Native Americans, and 277 others were
living among 3,503 Blacks (1990 Census of Population and
Housing). On 125th Street in Harlem, the number of Black
shopkeepers is only about 30 among about 160 shopkeepers.
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residential areas are used by Blacks but primarily occupied
by White or Asian shopkeepers, while the commercial strips
in other racial residential areas, according to many Blacks,
are not allowed to Blacks.

They note a racial injustice in

the racial and spatial distribution of shopkeepers.

Social Order. Humiliation, and Discontents
In capitalist societies, there exist a tension between
two ideas: 1) people are equal; and 2) there are differences
of prestige, wealth, and power among different groups.
can people negotiate this tension in everyday life?

How

In pre

capitalist societies, the cultural construction of unequal
social relationships were sanctioned by cosmological order.
In capitalist societies, the difference in wealth and power
is explained in terms of individual differences in
intelligence, work, competitiveness, and/or other virtues.
In this context, lower-class people are considered to
be those who lack certain individual virtues and values
(Wolf 1982:afterward).

Antonio Gramsci once concluded,

"for

a social elite the features of subordinate groups always
display something barbaric and pathological"(quoted in
Gutman 1977:73).

For example, throughout the Reform and

Depression eras, "[p]opular representations of Irish,
Italians, Poles, Jews, and others as mentally deficient,
diseased, and/or innately criminal were wide spread"
Leonardo 1991:236).

(di

Bourdieu (1977b; 1984) also finds the
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distinctions among different classes.
The hierarchical differentiation in virtues, values,
and tastes is one of the important aspects of capitalist
differentiation in class and status, thus in wealth, power,
and prestige.

The hierarchical differentiation in virtues

and values is an important element in the relationship
between Korean shopkeepers and poor Black residents.

This

hierarchization in virtues, values, and tastes justify the
social inequality as a matter of course.

Most Korean

shopkeepers in my research area thought they deserve wealth
for their hard-working and Blacks deserve the poverty for
their laziness and immorality.

However, while some Blacks

blamed their poverty as their fault, most Blacks blamed the
racism.

Thus, it can be said that the hierachization of

virtues and values among different groups is often
accompanied by discontents, complaints, resistance, and
organized boycotts.
Everyday interactions are an important locus where the
manipulation of hierarchization in virtues, values, and
status occurs.

Whether the relationship is between a male

and a female; between a boss and a subordinate; between a
White and a Black, or a White and a Yellow; or between a
merchant and a fisherman, there are often some symbolic
interactions which connote and express, implicitly and
explicitly, the difference in social classes or positions.
This symbolic interaction is contingent not only upon the
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difference in class, race, gender but also on individual
ability, determination, willingness, social customs, and
available symbols.
Through these symbolic interactions for the
hierarchization in virtues and values, domination/
acceptance/ resistance between or among persons and groups
are partially renegotiated and restructured in everyday
interactions.

One important aspect of hierarchization in

virtues and values is humiliation. "[Domination] always
entails attempts to humiliate the dominated.

So crucial are

the insults and the slander that they must themselves be
seen as an attempt to situate domination in time - to
present reasons and justifications for its current
existence, and to make claims against the future"
1987:21).

(Sider

These insults and slanders also produce counter

insults and slanders from the dominated.

However, because

of the power difference, and because of fear of discipline
and terror from the dominant, the dominated often develop
delicate, multivocal, or "back stage"
counter-claims and insults.

(Scott 1985; 1990)

The relationship between claims

and counter-claims, insults and counter-insults already
presupposes the influence of state power, past physical
confrontations, and the present and future possibility of
symbolic and physical violence, customs, and cultural
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norms.15

Social Order and Everyday Humiliation
Socially superior groups in economy and power try to
create and expand their cultural distance from lower groups
in order to legitimate their social wealth and status.
However, superior groups cannot distance themselves too far
because they also need to incorporate lower groups into an
"imagined community"

(Anderson 1983), or they may need to

create a myth of "imagined reciprocity."

By making the

distance too wide, superior groups will risk greater
discontent and efforts by the lower groups to become
independent, to change, or to overthrow.

The tantalizing

efforts by superior groups to maintain certain cultural
distance, while nevertheless incorporating lower groups, are
multi-faceted and ambiguous.
Through cultural manipulation, superior groups spread
cultural trenches and nets which persuade people to believe
that there is a difference between superior and lower groups
and that a cultural difference justifies differences in
power and economy.

Cultural trenches and nets are also

deployed to persuade people that all share some communal
identities.

Attitudes, gestures, hair, clothes, language

15 James Scott(1985; 1990) paid insufficient attention
to the implication of state power in his dealing with the
weapons of the weak. When the weak sense the possibility of
disorganization of the state and the ruling class, their
resistance often becomes explosive.
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(ideas, intonation, pronunciation, words...)# postures,
paraphernalia (watches, rings, jewelry, ties, shoes...),
decoration of a location, location of each individual,
arrangements of place, customs, rituals, supernatural
beings, and the human body are possible cultural trenches to
be manipulated in order to reproduce and recreate the
unequal and ambivalent interactions.

The fluid,

interactional cultural relationship (as well as economic and
political fluidity) creates endless dynamics of social
relationships.
One of those cultural trenches is the "crimogenic"
image of certain minorities.

"To many white Americans, not

only are blacks poor by their own volition and incompetence;
they also fail to exercise sufficient self-control and as a
result are wanton in their disregard of common decency and
the law which protects it" (Lewis 1978:77).

This myth16

16 Relatively more Blacks than Whites are in jail.
This
does not imply that Whites seldom commit crime. Many Whites
who may commit rape, assaults, or theft are not arrested
because they can defend themselves and usually draw better
treatment from the police, prosecutors, the court, and jury
(e.g. a nephew of Senator Kennedy in Palm Beach).
If we
consider white-collar crime, the reality is much more
opaque.
If a Black is caught two times for illegally
passing subway turnstiles (the loss to the city is only
about three dollars), he could be put in jail for three
months.
However, several inside or junk bond traders of the
New York Stock Exchange were on probation or in jail for
short terms (e.g. Michael Milken) even though the damage by
them to numerous people was several hundred million dollars.
The range of white-collar "theft" is considered widespread.
The social cost for white-collar crime and tax evasion is
much higher than that for violent crime (Monteiro 1991).
Those who commit white-collar crime and tax evasion are
seldom put in jail, and seldom described as "criminal."
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makes Whites believe that Blacks fail partially because of
their immorality.

In this context, Blacks are easily

recognized as a negative reference group.

This accusation

is a part of a pattern of discrimination and humiliation
that affects Blacks, especially poor Blacks, in everyday
interactions.

One Black university professor stated after

being accused as a shoplifter, "What it does to our
collective psyche is that it makes sure you never forget
that you are black and not welcomed"

(New York Times. April.

30, 1991).
Whenever new immigrants arrive, the construction of a
adjusted racial order is a locus of struggle.

To input new

(racial or ethnic) names17 into American racial conception
requires a reshuffling or readjustment of the existing order
of names in order to incorporate and differentiate new
names.

Despite numerous and readily available identities,

the fact that ethnic or racial categories becomes the
criteria for incorporation into the American order implies
that racial and ethnic conceptions are prominent in the
American mind.

Research into ethnic status in New York City

revealed that the status of Koreans was 43rd among 50 ethnic
categories in New York City and that the status of Blacks

17 The names, Black, Irish, or Korean, do not show the
multiple complexities inside Blacks, Irish, or Koreans. A
name often makes us ignore the complexity inside the named.
Homogenizing effects of a name also cause us often minimize
the complex relationships between or among "names" (Wolf
1982:18-19).
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was 42nd /Korea Times of Washington, D.C.. Nov. 27, 1992).
This ranking demonstrates that generally accepted ethnic
status of Koreans and Blacks is similar.

Despite these

similar positions, Koreans try to insert themselves above
Blacks within the American racial order through the
practices of humiliation and mistreatment.
The "crimogenic" idea of Blacks is shared by both
Korean shopkeepers and by Whites.

This idea is serving in

justifying the wealth and status of Korean shopkeepers.
Korean shopkeepers have some other means to manipulate Black
residents in everyday interactions because their business
put them in direct contact with Black people everyday.
Korean shopkeepers frequently use the word, qumdunovi
[nigger] in their private discourse but also sometimes in
front of Black shoppers.

As Hacker (1992:42) writes,

"nigger" reminds Blacks that "Blacks are still perceived as
a degraded species of humanity, a level to which whites can
never descend."

By using qumdunovi. Korean shopkeepers

imply that not only Whites but also Koreans cannot descend
into the position of "nigger."
Korean shopkeepers also relate to Black shoppers with a
negative attitude because they think many Blacks are
inferior and criminal.

Through humiliation and

mistreatment, Korean shopkeepers want to undermine the
assertions of poor Blacks for fair treatment and for better
prices.

By driving down the claims and assertions of poor
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Blacks inside the store, some Korean shopkeepers may sell
low-quality goods at a high price.

All the boycotted Korean

shopkeepers had only a short period of business experience.
This implies that they had not worked out "compromised"
attitudes toward poor Blacks or that they may have tried to
extract maximum profit with harsh mistreatment in order to
quickly establish their business.

Thus, they are highly

suspicious of any Blacks and treat ordinary shoppers and
shoplifting suspects badly in order to minimize their
losses, as well as minimize complaints from Blacks regarding
quality and price of goods.

Many Korean shopkeepers who are

"well-established," are more tolerant of Blacks and Black
suspects and expressed less severe judgements towards poor
Blacks.

They have already compromised their behavior and

ideas through various conflicts and confrontations with
Blacks.

They do not need to worry as much about Black

shoplifting and other problems because they have produced
steady profit, or have already made enough money to provide
some peace and tolerance regarding property loss.
In an experimental study of car dealers in Chicago,
Ayers (1991) found that females paid about $150 more than
males and Blacks paid about $400 more than Whites for the
exact same car.18

In the article, one car dealer says,

18 It is difficult to prove whether Korean shopkeepers
sell their goods for higher prices. According to Korean
shopkeepers, their prices are certainly higher than big
discount stores because of the difference in purchasing
power. (However, big discount stores are rare in inner
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"You know, sometimes it seems like the people that can least
afford it have to pay the most"

(Ayer 1991:872).

This

article did not inquire why car salespersons or car dealers
want more money from females or Blacks.

However, the

results show that status difference is often transferred
into ability to negotiate a favorable price.

Individual

transactions in a store are not free from the hierarchical
difference in social status.

Domination of shopkeepers over

Blacks within stores creates a condition where Blacks are
limited in expressing their full claims and assertions as
consumers.

Through humiliation or hierarchical

differentiation in social status in terms of race, Black
consumers encounter discrimination and frustration.

By

using hierarchical differentiation, shopkeepers do not give
full information and fair treatment to low-status consumers.
Humiliation and ridicule remind subaltern groups of
their subordinate position and creates anxiety.

Humiliation

cities.) They also believe that their prices are lower than
that of Black shopkeepers because Korean shopkeepers have
greater purchasing power (more capital) or have cheaper and
hard-working labor. But, the difference in brands and
quality makes the comparison more difficult.
However, it is
true that Korean as well as other shopkeepers generally sell
low- priced and low quality goods in inner-cities,
commanding a higher margin of profit.
In comparison with
invested capital, many Koreans believe that Korean
shopkeepers in inner cities can harvest higher rates of
profit than those in White neighborhoods or downtown where
more capital investment is required for space and higher
quality goods.
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and ridicule are a form of "symbolic violence"19 to keep a
subaltern group in order.

Symbolic violence is partially an

expression of the superiority complex of the victimizers and
is partially intended to generate feelings of inferiority
from the victims.

In the relationship between Korean

shopkeepers and poor Black consumers, Korean shopkeepers try
to put the double burdens of "inferior" race and lower class
positions on the shoulders of poor Black consumers.

As

Fields (1990:106) says, "[p]eople are more readily perceived
as inferior by nature when they are already seen as
oppressed."

Korean shopkeepers want to fix the inferior

image of poor Blacks through everyday interactions.

If poor

Blacks already accept their image of inferiority, they will
resist less.

When poor Blacks think the inferior-superior

relationship between Korean shopkeepers and poor Black
residents is absurd, and Korean shopkeepers continue their
insistence on an inferior-superior relationship through
symbolic manipulation, tensions and confrontations result in
19 Bourdieu (1977a;1990) explains symbolic violence as
a means of domination through, for example, gift giving in
small scale societies.
Thus, he describes symbolic violence
as "gentle, invisible violence, unrecognized as such, chosen
as much as undergone, that of trust, obligation, personal
loyalty, hospitality, gifts, debts, piety, in a word, of all
the virtues honored by the ethic of honor" (Bourdieu
1990:127, for the better discussion of symbolic power, see
Bourdieu 1991:163-120).
I use "symbolic violence" as a more
negative term than Bourdieu.
In my sense, symbolic violence
is an effort, with symbolic manipulation, to create psychic
injury, self-doubt, self-feeling of worthlessness, or
negative subjectivity in the victims.
Insults, degradation,
humiliation, devaluation, and unfair criticism can be
considered as symbolic violence in this sense.
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due course.

However, because symbols are usually vague and

ambiguous, these tensions and confrontations are also
ambiguous.
Both crimogenic idea and the practice of humiliation
are both explanations and a justifications for Korean
shopkeepers regarding the differences of social status and
social meanings between Korean shopkeepers and poor Black
residents.

These practices put the responsibility of Black

problems such as poverty upon the shoulder of Blacks.
According to Korean shopkeepers and mainstream news media,
Blacks have the same chances as Koreans, but they fail
because of a lack of "something" among poor Blacks.
"Something" may be intelligence, hard working ethics, or
some other individual virtues.

In contrast to Blacks,

Korean shopkeepers think of themselves as "smart," "hard
working," and "law-abiding."20

Thus, the differences of

social status and wealth are natural for Korean shopkeepers.
In fact, it is a post factum justification of the
differences in status and wealth.

The causes of the

differences, understood post factum by Korean shopkeepers
and the boycotters, are respectively, the "laziness,"
"criminality," or "inferiority" of Blacks and "racism" of
Koreans and White America.
not the point here.

Whether either claim is true is

The point here is the implication of

20 However, some Korean shopkeepers note that Blacks have
better physical body. Thus, they excel in sports and dance.
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those claims in the reproduction of social relationships.
The failure of poor Blacks is also criticized in
relation to the success of middle class Blacks.

A newspaper

editorial stated,
But to blame race for all poverty is to demean those
many millions of black Americans who have refused to be
victims, who do not wallow in self-pity, who do not
whine or make excuses but choose instead to live proud
and productive lives." (Mew York Pos t . May 17, 1990,
emphasis original)
Thus, the poor Black residents in inner cities are blamed
regardless, due to the success of either Koreans or middle
class Blacks.
This ideological attack, symbolic violence, and
everyday humiliation may persuade many poor Blacks to accept
their problems and low status as their own fault.
the opposite is also true.

However,

Symbolic violence and everyday

humiliation can ignite anger and rage.

If space for more

open discourse for poor Blacks can be acquired, the rage and
anger can be contagious because of deep-seated feelings of
injustice and frustration.

Through the emphasis of an

independent identity (that is, Black), more autonomous space
to express anger, rage, and feelings of injustice is
acquired.

In the open public and private spaces of streets,

parks, subways, stores, e t c ., the victimizers can often feel
the mood of vengeance in the expressions of the victims.
Through various means, subaltern classes or groups may try
to discipline themselves, and to revenge the dominant.
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Discontents and Confrontation
As I explained previously, the relationship between
shopkeepers and shoppers is usually unequal.

However, the

hierarchical nature of the two is not predetermined.

The

relationship is continuously negotiated and compromised
through various interactions and contentions.

The "newness"

of Korean shopkeepers is especially important because there
is no given criteria or accepted norm around which Korean
shopkeepers and poor Black customers can negotiate or
compromise in their social relationships.

The lack of

accepted criteria and the determination of Korean
shopkeepers to insert themselves above Blacks creates
"[extra/] ordinary contentions and episodic confrontations"
(Sider 1986:72) between the two groups.

This contention is

not only about struggle over ethnic status but also about
struggle over the appropriation of profit.
Theft, shoplifting, and burglary can be considered not
only as a crime but also as a political act.

Korean

shopkeepers complain that Black shoplifters do not feel
shame when they are caught.

This "lack of morality" could

be a political statement because, according to Bruce Wright,
a Black New York City judge, they are simply breaking "a
social contract that was not of their making in the first
place"

(quoted in Hacker 1992:187).21

Thus, it is a joy

21 In fact, young Blacks developed various anti-White,
"anti-social," from the White perspective, culture.
"If
whites speak Standard American English, succeed in school,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

332
for some young Blacks to disrupt the rules.

In one style of

disruption is a group of young Blacks may enter a store,
disrupt business, grab anything at random, and run away.
This "wilding" is described as "joyful" by some young
Blacks .22
However, everyday individual contentions and
confrontations do not produce visible effects on the way
Korean shopkeepers treat poor Blacks and extract profits.
Korean shopkeepers ignore individual contentions and
confrontations because they know there are several hundred
other consumers each day.

Some individual Blacks often try

to boycott Korean stores, but they fail because they do not
have the manpower, resources, and determination.
Occasionally local looting and riots destroy some Korean
businesses.

However, looting and riots draw heavy moral

attacks from news media, politicians, and the White
majority.

Successful or long-term boycotts had been

organized only by Black activist organizations.

Black activist and nationalist organizations try to
work hard at routine jobs, marry, and support their
children, then to be 'black' requires one to speak black
English, do poorly in school, denigrate conventional
employment, shun marriage, and raise children outside of
marriage.
To do otherwise would be to 'act white'" (Massey
and Denton 1993:168).
This oppositional culture is a way to
protect their Black identity and a means to express that
they are not a subordinate part of White America, at least
culturally.
Thus, the ideals in White America are often
ridiculed and rejected by young Blacks.
22 For Whites and Koreans, these kinds of acts are another
proof of the immorality of young Blacks.
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organize Black people in order to pursue an independent
"Black interest."

By collectivizing the power of "a sack of

potatoes," these organizations want to form an effective
class or "race-class."23

The December 12th Movement

created manifold interactions among poor and young Blacks
through various rallies (e.g. city-wide "Day of Outrage"
demonstrations, demonstrations against police brutality and
drug dealers, and boycotts of Korean shopkeepers).
Continuous collective confrontations can increase the size
of the collectivity by allowing Blacks to experience the
possibility of "Black Power".

The confrontations also

increase the opportunity for the collective experience of
"Blackness" by Black participants and residents.

These

confrontations are, for Black activists, forward-looking
confrontations which are construct, solidify, and expand the
consciousness, networks, and linkages in and between Blacks.
23 Mot only small peasants but also the urban poor (the
unemployed, part-timers, and small-business workers) are
often "potatoes in a sack," because they don't enter "into
manifold relationships with each other" (Marx 1967:123-124).
However, poor Blacks often form communal but fractured
discursive fields through their concentration in a separate
living space, their shared experience of racism, the shared
aspiration for justice, and the shared memory of the past.
Modern transportation and information systems extend the
discursive field. Thus, the beating of Rodney King by L.A.
policemen was not only an event for L.A. but also an event
for the U.S. and the world.
The image of the beating and
the consequent acquittal of the policemen creates a temporal
manifold relationships with among Blacks.
Black activist
groups try to strengthen those manifold relationships
through confrontations and organizations.
By doing so and
putting their interest hostile to the interest of dominant
groups, "they form a class" (Marx 1967:124) or a "raceclass."
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However, for state agents and many Whites, the same
confrontations are considered as dangerous, criminal, and
disruptive activities and an expression of moral disorder.
For Black activists,

"Korean bashing" is, in a sense,

an issue with the kind of emotional appeal needed to unite
the Black community behind its radical leaders (Kwong
1990:29).

They might think that anger over the mystery24

of the rapid success of Korean shopkeepers and individual
discontents and sporadic confrontations against Korean
shopkeepers can be absorbed into collective confrontations.
Korean bashing could have more powerful appeals to the
concrete thoughts and experience of Black residents because
they contact Korean shopkeepers everyday.

Korean bashing

could provide poor Blacks a rallying point against injustice
in America by highlighting the Korean case in the context of
American racism.
If the Korean question provides a contemporary issue,
the life of Malcolm X provides a historical repertoire of
actions and expressions for many Blacks.

Martin Luther

24 This mystery is accompanied with an idea of
"irregularity" or something "uncommon." For many people,
the rapid success of Korean immigrants was difficult to
comprehend through common sense, especially compared to the
failure of Black business in general. Thus, the existence
of the "uncommon" or irregularity behind the success story
of Koreans received wide-acceptance and created curiosity.
The suspicious "uncommon" entity also ignites curiosity for
some people and anger for others who suspect the nature of
that "uncommon" entity.
The "uncommon" entity could be
racist assistance to Koreans from the government, and banks
(for many Blacks) or an exceptional hard work of Koreans
(for many news media).
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King, Jr. also provides a repertoire for other Blacks.

For

the December 12th Movement, however, which focuses on inner
city Blacks, the repertoire of Dr. King does not represent
the interest of poor Blacks.
King fails.

For them, the strategy of Dr.

The peaceful marches which intend to appeal to

the morality of liberal Whites failed to achieve any real
change for poor Blacks.

The direct confrontations which

intend to threaten the stability of "racist" society are
considered more relevant to achieving fundamental social
equity for the December 12th Movement.

Not by begging for

morality, but through "Black Power" which can disrupt the
existing order, they believe they canobtain an equal share
and respect.

Their symbol, frequently expressed in their

leaflets for the boycotts against Korean shopkeepers or for
general strikes, displays their feelings very well. In it, a
muscular Black hand grabs and breaks something very
powerfully.
However, individual discontent and symbolic
manipulation is not the same as participation in collective
confrontations are not the same.

The December 12th Movement

has its own networks and chapters in New York City.

Its

members as well as other boycott participants distribute
leaflets

on streets, organize rallies, send and make

opinions

to newspapers, radio stations, and television news

programs

to

stimulate the moral indignation of Blacks, to

persuade Blacks to join the boycotts or demonstrations, or
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to build manifold interactions among Blacks.

This does not

mean that the confrontations can create a homogeneity of
Blacks or poor Elacks.

Elected Black officials complain

about the tactics of "radical" confrontation used by the
boycotters, and some Black leaders and poor Blacks complain
about the political intention of the radical activists.
The process of confrontation is also a process of
constructing images of the self as victim and of others as
victimizers.

Being victims, they can command moral

superiority, at least among those who accept these images.
The images of morality are invoked "to debate the present"
(Roseberry 1989:223), the past, and the future, whatever its
historical veracity is.

These images are partially accepted

by some liberal Whites (Hacker 1992) and by some state
agents.

Black activists also include a partial image of the

present in their immediate alternative image.

In this

alternative image, the capitalist social relationships are
expressed with a human face, that is, with a demand for a
"fair share" for Blacks.

In fact, various groups share

parts of the images or readings of the past and the present
of the others.

This partial sharing is well-expressed in

the ambivalence of members of the December 12th Movement
toward capitalism, of liberal Whites toward Black
nationalism, and of some Korean shopkeepers toward Black
contentions.
ideas.

They often express contradictory, fragmented

Their positions are fluid, to some degree, and
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conjoin with social contexts.
However, there are certain disjunctions between images
and actions.

The acceptance

of a particular reading of

others about the past and the present does not mean that
emerging actions will recruit full participation.

The

acceptance of images or readings is different from the
concessions or compromise in political and economic
practices.

That is, even though the confrontations in

images and readings conjoin with the physical and political
confrontations, there are also disjunctions between them.
Thus, seeking minor or major changes in social order
requires not only "cultural war" but also organizations.
Black boycotts are acts
order and also of the racial

in defiance of American racial
order in Korean minds.

The

boycotts are also in defiance of the capitalist social
order, particularly in the realm of the distribution of
goods for individual consumption.
boycotts are multivocal.

That is, discontent and

They aim not only at the attitudes

of Korean shopkeepers and other shopkeepers,

they are also

partially directed at the existence of these shopkeepers,
Black politicians, American racism, and capitalism.
Connections between these targets are played in a fluid
manner because of the fluctuation of situations and the
change of discursive space and context.
Korean shopkeepers also know that the claims and
targets of the boycotts are multivocal.

When a neighboring
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Korean shopkeeper is boycotted, all other Korean shopkeepers
in the area, and for that matter in the city talk about it
and complain that the boycott, in fact, is aimed at each of
them.

By mere show, or "threat" of physical confrontations

against a few Korean shopkeepers, Black boycotters
successfully, but only partially, change the attitudes of
Korean shopkeepers.

Korean shopkeepers lessen their

insults, lower their watchful eyes, and momentarily lessen
their profits, and instead, tighten their etiquette and
their supervision of each other.
Through these concrete, minor changes, physical and
economic confrontations can provide partial claims and hopes
for the future to some Blacks.

Certainly, the failure of

the confrontations can also provide partial self-denial and
hopelessness for the future.

However, by reclaiming the

focus on the victimization of Blacks, the boycotters hope to
augment the sense of injustice among Blacks and to increase
the desire of Black Power to retake "what should be
rightfully owned by Blacks."

Through this process, the

members of the December 12th Movement want to establish
their hegemony (moral and political leadership) among Blacks
in order to counter

White domination.

Developmental Process of the Conflict
Although there was some Black resentment of Korean
shopkeepers,

such discontents did not erupt into collective
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confrontations in the late 1970s when there were few Korean
shopkeepers in Harlem.

Initially, the presence of Korean

shopkeepers was not readily visible; the Black residents'
ideas about Korean shopkeepers remained vague.

Some Blacks

even expressed their curiosity and asked the Korean
shopkeepers whether they were Chinese or Japanese.

Some

other Blacks welcomed Korean shopkeepers since they
considered that "Koreans are not Whites."

Because the

number of Korean shopkeepers was very small, Korean
shopkeepers behaved carefully despite belief in their
superiority to poor Blacks.
After the massive influx of Korean shopkeepers
beginning in 1980, Black residents expressed their
increasing anger at their mistreatment by Korean
shopkeepers, especially by new Korean shopkeepers, and at
the occupation of business strips by new 'alien' shopkeepers
while Black were excluded.

The rapid increase of Korean

shopkeepers also increased the suspicion and anger of Blacks
rapidly.

This anger and suspicion was often expressed by

individual Blacks.

This anger was also sporadically

expressed through collective complaints and boycotts led by
various groups beginning in 1982.

Through these complaints

and boycotts, the two groups became more conscious about the
presence and acts of each other.
Korean shopkeepers responded to these boycotts by
organizing their own association, by intensifying efforts to
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expand their moral base for Black residents, and by
strengthening their connections to state agents and Black
leaders. However, Korean shopkeepers' increasing visibility
and their mistreatment of local Blacks promoted the
involvement of more determined and well-organized Black
nationalist groups.

These nationalist groups also tried to

expand the moral base for their "Buy Black" campaigns in
Black neighborhoods by targeting the Korean shopkeepers who
became the most visible shopkeepers in poor Black
neighborhoods during the 1980s.

This collectivization of

the tension between two groups increased both the
involvement of various state agents and the attention of the
news media.
Through this process, the conflicts between poor Black
residents and Korean shopkeepers symbolize not only the
relationship between the two groups but also the positions
of the two groups in the context of American society.

While

Black boycotters understand the presence of Korean
shopkeepers as an expression of the White domination over
Blacks, Koreans and the White news media interpret the Black
boycotts as a 'reverse racism' for new immigrants.

Thus,

the tension between the two groups became more collectivized
through the last decade.

This tension has also been

increasingly presented by Koreans and the White news media
as a symbol of the inability of Blacks to excel through
their own self-help and by many Blacks as a symbol of the
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pervasive racism against Blacks in America, where only
Blacks are systematically excluded.

Ripple Implication and Effects
During the process of the conflict, both groups tried
very hard to establish their moral superiority and to
enhance their moral appeals to mainstream news media and to
the general public.

These moral battles included not only

interpretations of the cause of conflicts and of the past,
present, and future relationships between the conflicting
groups but also interpretations of the justness of American
society and the capitalist social relationships, especially
exclusive property rights.

Black boycotters and Korean

shopkeepers also interpret the conflict in American
contexts, while news media, Whites, and state agents
interpret the conflict in the context of American society.
For Korean shopkeepers and state agents who have to
deal with any illegality in the conflict,
bashing,"

"Black activist

especially, "Carson bashing" is an issue with the

kind of emotional appeal needed to attract support from the
White community and news media, to divide Black support for
the boycotts, and to turn the tide against the nationalist
demands of the Black boycotters.

These connections which

cross over racial, ethnic, and class lines provide a moment
to reshuffle racial connections in New York City.

By

bashing the "reverse racism" of Black boycotters against
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Koreans as a member of "Asians," Asians were presented as
new victims of "new racism."

The category of Asians

suddenly became a visible racial umbrella which connected
hitherto discrete ethnic units such as Koreans, Chinese,
Filipinos, and Vietnamese into one category.

Especially

after some Vietnamese were misrecognized as Koreans and
beaten by Black youths, Asians felt that they cannot but
live under the common umbrella of "Asians."
Whites, as well as Asians, were reshuffled.

The

aggressive offense by Black activists produced tension among
liberal Whites.

White complaints appeared all over the

mainstream newspapers in New York City.

This process

produced a vivid image that Blacks were not only victims of
racism but also that some Blacks were racists.

Sonny

Carson's famous "anti-White" comments during the mayoral
election campaign in 1989 and his previous "anti-Semitic"
comments, sensationalized by news media, provided a context
for Whites in understanding "reverse racism."

This

contextualization was further strengthened by the comments
of the police, some federal agents, and Mayor Dinkins over
the boycotts.

Because of "reverse racism," the ties between

Blacks and liberal Whites were further strained.

Mark

Naison said, given the influx of immigrants from Asia and
Latin America, "the politics of black rage and white guilt
no longer serves the cause of justice in a multiethnic New
York"

(New York Times. Jan. 21, 1991).
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However, the discontent over White domination is
widespread among the Black population.

Even Mayor Dinkins

mentioned that "there was a time when we had been so
brainwashed, as it were, by whites in the United States that
we did not fully appreciate the grand and glorious heritage
that is ours"

(New York Times. Feb. 21, 1990).

The boycotts

against Korean shopkeepers were another opportunity for some
Blacks to explore how Whites react.

As many Blacks

expected, Whites again came out against Black causes.
Thus, the mistrust, injustice, immorality, and racism
of each other are reconfirmed.

Korean shopkeepers became

more conservative and demanded stronger discipline of
"criminals" (including boycotters) by the police and other
law enforcement institutions.

The law enforcement

institutions reconfirmed their suspicions over Black
activists as disrupter of social order.

The Black activists

again reconfirmed the racism of the police, FBI, offices of
district and federal attorneys, and the court.

Some liberal

Whites were shocked by Black "reverse racism" toward
Koreans.
Blacks.

Other Whites again confirmed their distrust toward
Still other Whites saw two "barbaric" minorities

engaged in a dog-fight.

The image of Koreans and Blacks

during the L.A. riots is a good example.

The Koreans were

described as overreacting to the riot, with guns and rifles,
while Blacks were described as hoodlums and gang members.
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Persuasion or Coercion?
Through its multivocality, ambiguity, and fluidity of
meanings, not only the dominant groups but also the
resisting groups provide their own moral and political
alibi.

Because the subaltern groups also have their own

alibi, it is very difficult to say that the dominant groups
excercise moral leadership over all dominated groups.

Some

dominated groups can create multivocal and autonomous spaces
where the moral leadership of the dominant group only
partially penetrates.

Korean shopkeepers and Black

boycotters are good examples.

While Korean shopkeepers

accept and internalize racism and capitalism, they also
express their resentment about White demands for deference.
Black boycotters reject racism and White deference while
they partially accept the capitalist social relationships.
The partial rejection of the leadership of the dominant
group by the dominated groups means that there should be
continuous negotiation and struggle in order to temporarily
stabilize the fluid and ambiguous boundary between autonomy
and penetration.

In other words, the unequal social

relationships are not fixed.

They are challenged,

reinstituted, and reconstituted through interactive talks,
symbols, forces, and economic constraints.

Dominant groups

in stratified societies have the tantalizing requirement to
reproduce the "biased" balance of power in reproducing their
unequal social relationships.
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Persuasion
The dominant groups may want to create and reproduce
social environment where their superiority is not
challenged.

If the unequal social relationships can be

accepted as common sense by the dominated, the reproduction
of the unequal social relationships would be easier for the
dominant.

However, common sense is a series of stratified

deposits, multiplicity of distinct and often contradictory
ideas; thus, common sense always has a possibility of change
(Gramsci 1987).

Common sense is also a locus of struggles

to input "biased accents" in the "common sense" vision of
the world.

Classification, the words, the names (Bourdieu

1989) which construct common sense of the social reality are
also at stake in the struggles.

The construction of

negative images over Blacks is also a way to cause negative
images to be perceived as common sense.

For many Whites and

Koreans, the negative images of Blacks are common sense.
However, this is not common sense for many Blacks, because
this make no sense to them.
Korean shopkeepers do not have a patrimonial bond with
the Black population.

Korean shopkeepers have no cultural

repertoires which can be claimed as communal with poor
Blacks.25

Thus, they cannot counter the boycotters' claims

25 Any Black shopkeeper, having problem with a Black
consumer, can mobilize a variety of communal repertoires,
persuasive to Blacks, to counter the possible "collective"
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of Koreans as "outsiders" or "exploiters."

In the movie,

"Do the Right Thing," a Korean shopkeeper avoids the
destruction of his store by shouting, "Me black, Me black."
In reality, that does not work.

Many Korean intellectuals

insist that Blacks and Koreans are part of the same oppresed
minority.
Koreans.

This makes only partial sense to many Blacks and
Some Blacks think Koreans are not the proper

target of Black rage because they are both minorities.
However, because of the attitudes of Koreans, their
residence in White areas, and their economic position, the
claims of Koreans as outsiders make more sense to Black
residents.
Korean shopkeepers have to create cultural repertoires
in order to use them.

By participating in several local,

Black festivals, donating to several Black organizations,
joining in local ceremonies, campaigning for Black
politicians, and advertising in Black newspapers, Korean
shopkeepers try to create a common sense that Korean
shopkeepers are also a part of Black communities.

That is,

the cultural participation of Korean shopkeepers in Black
neighborhoods is an effort by Korean shopkeepers to blur the
boundary between Black residents and Korean shopkeepers and
to make Korean shopkeepers partial insiders of Black

claims against him/her. However, there may also be some
distance between Black shopkeepers and poor Blacks (Loewen
1971).
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communities.26

For example, Korean traditional dances in

Harlem provide a context where Korean shopkeepers
"coordinate and coadjust a multiplicity of emotions and
interests" (Sider 1986:94) between Korean shopkeepers and
Black residents. Because of the multiplicity and ambiguity
of meanings in Korean dances, the intentions and reactions
are fluid and vague.

However, the Korean shopkeeper who

organizes the Korean dance performance felt much more
clearly about the implication of Korean dance toward the
conflict between Korean shopkeepers and poor Blacks.
While Korean shopkeepers try to persuade Black
residents not to feel angry toward Koreans, the boycotters
try to both persuade Black residents to join the boycott and
to persuade Korean shopkeepers to stop discrimination.

The

Black boycotters and relavant Korean shopkeepers try to
discuss the issues.

This partial negotiation and persuasion

is not effective, because both groups project a very
different agenda.

In fact, they give up the attempt to

persuade each other.

Because dialogue does not work, they

try other methods of persuasion: displays of power and
determination.

It is very difficult to call these acts

26 This does not mean that Korean shopkeepers
eliminate the boundary. They do not want to
as Blacks who are degraded in America.
They
blur the boundary to some degree in order to
centralization and organization of scattered
anger against Korean shopkeepers difficult.

want to
become the same
just want to
make the
discontent and
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persuasion or coercion.27

In fact, persuasion often

presupposes political coercion and economic constraints.
Both are interconnected but with some disjunctures.
One of the examples is the barrage of negative images
of the Black boycotters in mainstream newspapers.

In a

sense that the newspapers produce only images, this is a
method of persuasion.

But in another sense, the barrage of

negative images, which will certainly produce a negative
response among Whites, politicians, and possibly some
Blacks, can also create a great political pressure or an
excitement of exposures for the boycotters.

However,

negative images of the boycott may isolate the boycotters,
fostering detrimental pressure from various social groups
including some Black organizations.
The mainstream news media provided sensationalized
images of the conflict between Blacks and Koreans during May
and June 1990.

These sensationalized negative images of the

Black boycotters (particularly Sonny Carson) created an
uproar over "reverse racism" not only from White viewers but
also from some Black viewers.

These viewers believed that

the demand of the boycotters to expel Korean shopkeepers was
"racist" and the boycotters preached "racial hatred" in
Black neighborhoods.

This uproar directly influenced the

position of Mayor Dinkins about the boycott.
he criticized the boycott as "based on race."

By May 1990,
This

27 It could be called a "persuasive threat."
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expression of opposition was a powerful persuasion for many
Blacks because the Black mayor had received 91% of the Black
vote just six months earlier and also maintained a claim to
a strong communal bond with the Black population and their
aspirations.

This situation made many Blacks cross the

picket line.

Even though the Black boycotters were not

persuaded by Mayor Dinkins at all (rather the opposite
happened), they then had to deal with the consequence of his
speech to other Blacks.

Coercion and Constraints
According to W o l f (1990), power is composed of a series
of stratified power relationships.

These power

relationships are also the locations of pressure and
coercion in the conflict between Korean shopkeepers and
black boycotters.

These relationships presuppose each other

during the conflict between poor Blacks and Korean
shopkeepers.
On the level of individual daily interactions, the
physical confrontations or threats of confrontation and
symbolic violence through name-calling or humiliation
provide the context of temporal coercions.

However, as I

have explained, Korean shopkeepers have more power in
everyday interactions through the support of state power and
the nature of the interactions.

Individual coercion, that

is, physical confrontation by a consumer will not produce
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effective results for what he/she wants.

According to some

Blacks, Korean stores are the only stores in their immediate
area.

Because of these economic constraints, they must shop

at Korean stores in many Black neighborhoods.
Individual physical threats or coercion of Korean
shopkeepers against shoplifting suspects may reduce
shoplifting.

But this type of physical confrontation often

produces innocent victims.

Above all, physical discipline

by Korean shopkeepers of innocent victims or shoplifting
suspects, whoever they are, is illegal.
is monopolized by the state system.

Physical discipline

However, violations of

law does not guarantee the imprisonment of the violator
because of various problems in legal system, legal agents,
or social relations.
Collectivization of power is an important step in
fighting a more powerful person because of the strength of
numbers, the possibility of attention from friendly forces
(although the opposite is also possible), and the
possibility of overpowering a "higher" individual by a
group.

However, collectivization will make an issue a

collective matter, thus the other side may try to
collectivize their power, and furthermore intervention from
third parties such as state agents or other forces may also
occur.

Collective boycotts against Korean shopkeepers

inspire Korean shopkeepers to form Korean merchant
associations all over New York City and the surrounding
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area.

That is, in order to counter the collectivization of

Black power against Korean shopkeepers,

Korean shopkeepers

have also collectivized their power through the formal
organization of dispersed individual shopkeepers or
"potatoes in a sack."

Collective boycotts also brought the

police into the matter and inspired members of Korean
shopkeeper organizations to busily contact state agents and
private local leaders.
A boycott itself is economic coercion.

The Black

boycott was an economic coercion forcing several Korean
shopkeepers to lose money and close their stores.
boycott may also be

The

considered political persuasion and

pressure because it demonstrates that other Korean
shopkeepers or any non-Black shopkeepers who mistreat Blacks
may become a target of a later economic coercion.

The

boycotters successfully apply force to the boycotted Korean
stores.

During the boycotts, sales at the boycotted Korean

stores dove down to tens of dollars from thousands of
dollars.

If the boycott is part-time as in Harlem in

1988,

a store could manage to produce enough profit to sustain
their store.

However, this economic constraint of the

boycotts is countered by the police who try to open and
maintain free business interaction or by Korean shopkeepers
who donate money to the boycotted stores.
The presence of dozens or hundreds of police officers
created an image of physical confrontation in the conflict.
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However, only a few boycotters were actually arrested for
violating minor laws, and other boycotters and Korean
shopkeepers were ticketed because of their physical
confrontations.

Because the police maintained a balance of

power through the appearance of physical force and because
more law enforcement agents could be mobilized, there was no
direct confrontation with the police or between Korean
shopkeepers and Black boycotters.28
Since state agencies have to follow the laws which
protect not only individual property rights but also the
individual rights of free speech, they allow the boycott to
continue while protecting the property rights of Korean
shopkeepers.

However, the boycotts are restricted to

prevent the violation of the property rights of the target
store-owners.

Thus, the imposition of communal

responsibility on the Korean shopkeepers by the protesters
is not possible.

The capitalist law and state systems

protect individual property rights over communal
responsibility.

The determination of the Black boycotters

to boycott and the determination of the Korean shopkeepers
to stay open, and the rights of free speech and property
which are to be protected by state agents, create a
stalemate.

28 The direct confrontation with the police or even with the
army is possible as the L.A. riot in 1992 showed.
In the
L.A. riots, there was also a direct confrontation involving
guns and rifles between Korean shopkeepers and rioters.
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When the front was stabilized among Korean shopkeepers,
police agents, and Black boycotters, there was a fierce
struggle to win the influence of Mayor Dinkins, other
politicians and other state agents.

When the President of

the Association of New York met President Bush in June 1990,
he requested the intervention of the federal government in
the 1990 Church Avenue boycott.

The intervention from the

federal government agents was very limited.

However, the

FBI which had previously destroyed the Black Panther Party
and other Black activist groups investigated the boycott and
members of the December 12th Movement.
Mayor Dinkins and his subordinates applied pressur
hard to stop the boycott.

There was also pressure on Mayor

Dinkins to take the side of the boycotters because Black
activists in the boycott had considerable influence over the
Black population in Brooklyn.

These interactional pressures

between Black activists and Black politicians created
tension among the Black population in New York City.

Even

though the boycotts are over at this moment, the tension
between Black activists and Black politicians remains.

Conjunction of Persuasion and Coercion
Political force, economic constraints, and physical
confrontations are interpenetrated and intermingled in the
case of the Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers.

The

enforcement of certain coercive tactics also presupposed a
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certain degree of cultural consensus because the
participants followed specific rules.

For example, the

boycotters and Korean shopkeepers avoided individual
beatings not only because of the state agents or the fear of
notoriety but because they also shared, to some degree, the
idea that private beatings of individuals were improper.

On

the public stage, they also shared the idea that each side
should follow specific aspects of law (e.g. civil rights for
all).
Because the both groups also wanted to gain moral
superiority in order to appeal to Black residents and the
general public, their confrontations were constrained to a
moral struggle.

The desire for moral superiority limited

not only physical confrontations but also the presentations
of meanings.

Because of the desire for moral superiority

and the presence of police force, the expression of certain
ideas were restricted or stimulated.

Thus, it can be said

that expressions or censure of certain ideas presuppose the
existence of coercion and constraints.
Minor everyday coercion (disciplinar strategies using
oney, power, physical forces, and symbolic violence) is
intermingled with the manipulation of claims, symbols, and
customs.

Possibility of coercion and cultural forms are

often inseparable.

Harassment and humiliation are partially

coercion and partially persuasion.

Because the nuance of

cultural activity reflects a background of coercion and
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ambiguity, many victims knowingly ignore racist attitudes,
insults, provocation, and irritation.

Everyday racist jabs

and insults injure the minds of victims and often remind
them of the threat of physical force.
Persuasion and coercion are not under the exclusive
possession of the ruling bloc.

Resisting groups such as

Black boycotters also use both of them.

The social fields

might be full of multivocal, vague, clear, series of dis- or
conjointed, episodic or relatively stable ideas, customs,
symbols, constraints, and coercions.

Thus, partial

accommodation of opposed ideas and partial coercion (not
only physical, but also economic and political) are common
not only among the dominated but also possibly among the
dominant.

Because the dominant groups need not only to

discipline the dominated groups but also to incorporate them
into a shared or "imagined" boundary, it is difficult for
the dominant to exclude all of the ideas and customs of the
dominated.

That is, "[t]he process of domination imposes a

dialogue between dominators and dominated"(Sider 1987:22).

Orderings in Meaning, Power, and Economic Relationships
The relationship between Korean shopkeepers and poor
Black residents is not only economic but also a relationship
of power and meanings.
the other.

Each relationship interpenetrates

By using their economically higher position,

Korean shopkeepers try to insert themselves above Blacks in
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the American racial order.

Through humiliation and insults,

they may drive down the claims and assertions of Black
consumers during the economic interactions.

This continuous

humiliation is only possible through the unequal power
relationship which is again based on the unequal economic
relationship between Korean shopkeepers and poor Black
residents.

This does not mean that the economic

relationship determines other relationships.

There are some

disjunctions among the relationships on different levels.
Each relationship is also fully embedded in wider
social relationships.

The meanings projected to each other

cannot be fully understood if the social context of American
racism, the history of the experience of oppression of
Blacks, and the newness of Koreans in America are ignored.
The power relationship between the two can be understood
only in the context of state power and the American
electoral system.

The economic relationship between the two

already presupposes American capitalism.

Not because

Koreans have a greater access to the government, news media,
and the White public, but because all of the above have, or
believe to have, an interest in maintaining the present
American capitalist and racial order, Korean shopkeepers
could obtain supports from state agent and Whites.

However,

this is contingent upon specific conditons because a
temporary alliance of some Whites and some Blacks is also
possible.
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Because of the lack of social power and the lack of
social support from Whites, state agents, and news media,
poor Blacks cannot depend on the existing or legitimate
channels which are biased against poor Blacks.

Legitimate

channels (the police and the courts) are more supportive of
higher classes and prosecute only the conspicuous wrongdoing
of superior classes.

Minor mistreatment and cultural

humiliation do not become issues.

Thus, Blacks feel

frustrated with legitimate channels and depend more on
disruptive tactics, demonstrations, and street
confrontation.
Economically and politically higher classes or groups
often describe lower groups as pathological, barbaric,
dirty, or lazy.

By describing them so, the higher groups

may claim their innocence and blame the victims.

Through

their power, they may try to silence discontent and
criticism directed against the higher groups.

This creates

better conditions for the reproduction of unequal social
relationships.

However, this process is full of tensions,

due to the changing balance of power and negotiation.
The continuous actions and negotiations make the
reproduction of concrete unequal social relations relatively
uncertain,

the various dimensions of assorted practices or

actions influence the process of the reproduction of social
relations.

Social orders in different dimensions of social

practices are interpenetrated and interconnected.

There are
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"the unbreakable links among language, power relations, and
the materiality of everyday life"(Pred and Watts 1992:xvi,
emphasis original).

Thus, it can be said that " [s]ocial

relations presuppose the legal system, state system, and
culture"(Hoffman 1975:114).
While different racial experiences and rhetoric are
the principal framework for understanding the conflict
between Korean shopkeepers and poor Black residents,

the

state and capitalist social relationships are the principal
ordering forces in everyday power-relations between them.
However, the Black boycotts against Korean shopkeepers also
simultaneouslu aim at different dimensions of social orders.
The boycotters could project alternative images of racial,
cultural, political, and economic orders in the limited
spaces during a limited time.

The partial disruption of the

reproduction of the social relationships by the December
12th Movement and the boycotters provided some sense of
claiming the future —

a future of challenging, yet not

replacing, power.
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AFTERWORD

The Korean Seafood Association of New York1 —
which protects the rights of its 800 KSA member—
has declared an immediate boycott of Slavin and
Sons, 106 South Street.
Picketing and protest
will begin July 28, 1988 at 7 A M in front of
Slavin and Sons.2
Slavin and Sons has consistently demonstrated
unfair business practices when dealing with KSA
buyers. These include: the monopolization of
certain goods, poor quality of merchandise sold,
unprofessional conduct with KSA buyers, and
inconsistent refund policies.
• • •

In many cases, the fish market is the sight
for quick-tempers, competitive attitudes that
force sellers and buyers to engage in
unprofessional business activity.
Some of these
aspects have been entrenched in the fish market as
part of the game.
Slavin and Sons, however, go
beyond the limitations of the game. Consistently,
repeatedly, deliberately, time-in and time-out,
they have shown complete disrespect and dishonesty
towards Koreans.
And this is exceptional. And it
cannot be tolerated...(from a leaflet for a
boycott by Korean fish retailers against a White
fish wholesaler)
Conflicts between Korean Shopkeepers and White Wholesalers
When new Korean green grocers first came to Hunts
Point, Bronx, the wholesale market for vegetables and fruits
in New York City, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, some
1 The association is for the Korean fish retailers in the
greater New York City area. They organized several boycotts
against individual White wholesalers in the Fulton Fish
Market which supplies about one to two hundred million
dollars of fish and marine products for New York City and
vicinity e v e r y day.
2 At the time of the boycott, Korean fish retailers
considered Slavin and Sons to be the worst wholesalers for
the Koreans.
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wholesalers who were openly anti-Asian refused to deal with
those Korean immigrants.

Others overcharged.

One of the

first Korean grocers, recalled that Korean green grocers
were not allowed to open crates to inspect the produce they
were buying.

Another Korean green grocer, who has a Ph.D.

degree in Nuclear Physics and entered the green grocery
business in the late 1960s, said that the wholesalers always
yelled, "Chinks, go away.
here."

We don't want Chinks around

One day he challenged a wholesaler.

threw some punches at a wholesaler.
soundly beat him.

He blew up and

But the wholesaler

He sighed, "I was too ashamed to tell my

wife, too ashamed to tell my family"(Harris 1983).
Korean fish retailers experienced similar things.

A

Korean fish market owner in Harlem remembered that whenever
he bought a box of 125 pounds of whiting, the real weight of
the box was always about 100 pounds.

The price depended on

the mercy of the wholesalers (the price always fluctuates in
the wholesale market because of the whims of the weather,
supply and demand, and the wholesalers).

If he demanded an

explanation, the wholesalers and his employees would insult
him with foul language and threats.

If he checked inside

the box to find out whether the fish were good or not, the
wholesalers and his employees would insult him again.

In an

incident that occurred in 1984, one Korean fish retailer
demanded an explanation.

The argument began between the

Korean fish retailer and one of the employees of the
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wholesale stores, and the employee eventually killed the
Korean fish retailer.
As in the case of the conflict between Black residents
and Korean shopkeepers, the two groups involved have
different understandings about the origin of conflict.
Accordingly, the wholesalers expressed an opposite view.
One wholesaler stated that the conflicts began because the
Koreans would pick out the best of the contents and leave
the rest scattered on the floor.

He also added, "The fact

that they didn't speak English well didn't help either"
(quoted in Harris 1983).
Whatever the cause of the conflict., the frustration of
Korean green grocers and fish retailers runs deep.

Whenever

they reported this injustice to the police, nothing
happened.

They suspected a connection between the police

and the wholesalers.

When the number of Korean fish

retailers increased quickly during the mid-1980s, many
Koreans hoped to direct some activism against the worst
wholesaler in the market in order to show all wholesalers
that Korean fish retailers had punitive power.
When Korean shopkeepers organized their boycott against
White wholesalers, the Koreans ironically mentioned almost
the same things which Black boycotters mentioned about
Korean shopkeepers:
and abuse.
was strong.

disrespect, high price, humiliation,

Because the frustration was deep, the solidarity
The boycott target, Slavin and Sons, was
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notorious among Korean fish retailers for mistreatment and
price manipulation.

The Korean Seafood Association (KSA)

demanded that the owner respect Korean -fish retailers and
practice fair business.
surrendered.

After four months, the wholesaler

The business could not manage to produce a

profit, primarily because the Korean fish retailers were the
majority of the retailers, and they had stopped patronizing
the wholesale store.

After this victory, the KSA taught

several "bad" wholesalers some lessons with the threat of
boycotts or through actual boycotts.
During the boycott, the Koreans tried to reach various
government officials and politicians for a beneficial
intervention.

Since the Korean fish retailers targeted only

one store and demanded only the change of specific "unfair"
practices* they were not considered a threat to social order
by the state agents.

However, the state agents also did not

consider the practices of the wholesaler to be criminal.

As

usual, small humiliations and unfair practices did not draw
the attention from state agents.

The Korean fish retailers

also tried to "play" fish wholesalers against each other
competitively.

The wholesalers in the market frequently

donated money for KSA events to attract Koreans to their
stores.

One wholesaler rented a space to the KSA for 100

years at no charge.
After the boycotts, there was a visible change in the
attitudes of the wholesalers.

Aside from the boycotted
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wholesalers the other wholesalers compromised their
attitudes and their business practices.

Nevertheless, some

months after the boycotts, a few wholesalers again expressed
their contempt of Koreans openly.

Korean fish retailers and

green grocers also wanted to take further action to change
more fundamental discriminatory practices which were
hitherto considered "acceptable."

Thus, there have been

periodic boycotts by Korean shopkeepers against subtle and
open discrimination, mistreatment, and humiliation by White
wholesalers.

This fluidity and dynamics of tension between

them has often erupted into a violent confrontation between
individuals in the two groups.
While some of the demands from the Black boycotters
went beyond the limit of capitalism (e.g., community control
over its economy) and American racial order (e.g., Black
Power ) , the demands from Korean fish retailers were within
capitalism's boundary (e.g., do fair business), and the
Koreans did not challenge the racial order.

That is, they

did not demand "Korean Power," or "Buy Korean Movement."
Thus, the Koreans were not considered a threat to social
order by the state agents.

In the case of the Black boycott

against Korean shopkeepers, they were considered a threat.
Thus, the opposition from the public and the negative
intervention of state agents such as the NYPD, FBI,
politicians, and courts made the demands of Black boycotters
for the radical change of an existing social relationship
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unsuccessful.

The Korean fish retailers demanded only a

minor change in the practices of one fish wholesaler at a
time.

However, the results of the two different boycotts

were similar: improved and fairer treatment from those who
are in a better position.

The Social Dilemma of Korean Shopkeepers
In this dissertation, I focused on the relationship
between the Korean shopkeeper and poor Black customers.
Through the use of their economic position, Korean
shopkeepers tried to establish a racial hierarchy.

In the

case of the conflict between White wholesalers and Korean
shopkeepers, the White wholesalers used their class and
racial power to create and stabilize hierarchical
differences by victimizing Korean shopkeepers.

Thus, Korean

shopkeepers organized boycotts against White wholesalers.
In fact, the racism of intermediary Whites or Koreans
should be contextualized in the whole American social
structure.

Intermediaries face great status anxiety and

pressure from the pervasive racism in America.

Although

Korean racism conforms to the existing racism of the
dominant, their actions are partially efforts to avoid
further victimization or degradation by stepping on the
shoulder of Blacks, thus creating their social distance from
Blacks.

Often, those in direct contact with the most

degraded groups are the most violent racists.
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I do not want to excuse the racism of intermediate
groups here.

I merely want to point out that the racism of

the intermediate and lower status groups is well-connected
to the racism of the dominant groups.

In this sense,

whether they accept or reject the moral leadership of the
dominant groups or not, they reproduce the racism in their
own way and act within the boundaries of cultural norms
supported by the dominant groups.

While the intermediate

status groups resent and often envy the privileges of the
dominant and their discrimination against the intermediate
groups, these intermediate groups also try to expand their
own privileges and discriminate against easily degraded
people.
White wholesalers abused and taken advantage of Korean
shopkeepers; Korean shopkeepers abused and taken advantage
of Black consumers.

As an intermediate class between

capital and labor, as well as between White wholesalers and
Black consumers, Korean shopkeepers are the victims of
racism and simultaneously racist victimizers.

Final Words
By describing Blacks, Koreans, or Whites as a unit of
ethnicity or race, I have falsely created bounded ethnic and
racial units.

Even though I qualified their class positions

by using terms such as "poor," "shopkeeper," and
"wholesaler," the complexity of the fluid and contradictory
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phenomena cannot be fully described in this presentation.
In reality, ethnic or racial boundaries are based on
"imagined communities"
communities.

(Anderson 1983) rather than real

Imagined communities are often more apparent

-than real communities, for through the imagination of human
beings, imagined communities are considered tangible and
people act accordingly.
The creation of an identity based on an imagined
community is also an effort by people to understand their
ethnic and racial reality within their political-economic
and cultural environment.

Thus, the simplified hierarchy of

imagined communities is also a conceptual effort to find
order in reality.

This attempt often falls into the false

image of separate and distinct boundaries for racial and
ethnic units.

Blacks, Koreans, or Whites are so diverse

that it is almost impossible to understand the diversity
with simple racial or ethnic terms.
I used Blacks, Koreans, or Whites as conceptual tools
which allow to approach reality.
precise reflection of reality.

Conceptual tools are not
Conceptual tools usually

simplify and put reality in order.
analyzing reality.

They are useful in

If the conceptual tools cannot

efficiently explain and analyze reality, the tools can be
discarded or modified.

However, I hope I conveyed some of

the complexity of social reality by using conceptual tools
of race and class.

Because conceptual tools are in tension
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(as all words are in social tension [Volosinov 1986]) and
also limit and structure our possibility of understanding
reality, my understanding of reality is also limited and
structured by the continuous tension of my conceptual tools.
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